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ABSTRACT 
 
Sound natural resource management considers the full range of costs and benefits 
of policy action. Understanding these implications as they pertain to nonmarket goods or 
externalities requires an accurate assessment of consumer preferences and behavior. The 
chapters of this dissertation ascertain this knowledge in the context of recreational 
Atlantic striped bass fishery management and offshore wind development in the northeast 
United States.  
 Atlantic striped bass are the most prominent and heavily targeted recreational 
species found along the coast from Maine to North Carolina. Yet due in part to heavy 
recreational fishing effort, the species may be currently overfished. Given this status, it is 
pertinent to explore the concurrent impacts of potential policy action on angler 
participation, angler welfare, and recreational fishing mortality such that efficient 
compromises between conservation and socioeconomic objectives of fisheries 
management can be made.  
In Chapter 1, we evaluate the economic incentives faced by recreational striped 
bass anglers using data from a recently-administered recreational striped bass angler 
survey. We estimate angler preferences for and the nonmarket value of keeping and 
releasing small (22”), medium (29”), and trophy-sized (38”) fish. We find that for each 
size-class, anglers prefer keeping to releasing striped bass and that the nonmarket value 
of Atlantic striped bass increases exponentially with catch size. Illuminating the tradeoffs 
made by recreational striped bass anglers, our results indicate that one harvestable 
trophy-sized fish can be exchanged for about two medium-sized or three small ones. 
  
 
Chapter 1 also sheds light on an important issue that arises when using discrete choice 
experiment data to evaluate angler preferences; namely, the influence of including versus 
excluding catch-and-release regulations on ensuing parameter estimates in models of 
angler utility. We find that failing to control for such regulations leads to counterintuitive 
estimates of the marginal utility of releasing striped bass. Finally, while choice 
experiment survey data is used extensively in the literature on recreational demand 
modeling, little attention has been paid to  survey non-response bias on welfare estimates. 
We spearhead this issue using data collected from survey non-respondents during a 
telephone pre-screening interview.  
In Chapter 2, we integrate the main results from Chapter 1 and historical catch 
data into an aggregate demand model to examine the broad effect of recreational striped 
bass fishing policies. We simulate the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery and 
measure the relative effect of alternative sets of fishing regulations on angler welfare, 
angler participation, fishing mortality, and mature female fishing mortality. By 
comparing fishery outcomes across several recreational fishing policies, we assess 
policy-induced economic and biological tradeoffs that have yet to be considered jointly 
by managers of the fishery. We find that a wide range of economically efficient policies 
are available when the primary purpose of proposed policy action across the studied 
region is to control total recreational fishing mortality. When proposed management 
action is intended to curtail mature female recreational fishing mortality, however, 
proposed policy action that does not account for potential economic consequences can 
lead to inefficient outcomes, as exemplified by several of the policies analyzed lying 
inside the efficient frontier of welfare and female spawning stock removal volume. The 
  
 
findings in Chapter 2 illuminate the practicality of assessing angler behavioral responses 
as a means of selecting efficient regulations, particularly when fisheries managers seek to 
balance socioeconomic goals with multiple conservation objectives.  
Chapter 3 of this dissertation, currently in review at Resource and Energy 
Economics, addresses one previously unanswered question related to offshore wind 
energy development: that is, to what extent do offshore wind farms (OSWFs) impact 
local tourism? We examine how the Block Island Wind Farm, the United States’ first 
operational OSWF, has impacted the short-term housing rental market. Using data from 
AirBnb, we estimate a difference-in-differences model that compares rental activity in 
Block Island to that in three nearby tourist destinations in Southern New England before 
and after construction. Estimation results suggest that following its construction, the 
Block Island Wind Farm caused a significant increase in nightly reservations, occupancy 
rates, and monthly revenues for AirBnb properties in Block Island during the peak-
tourism months of July and August but had no effect in other months. The findings from 
this case study indicate that offshore wind farms can act as an attractive feature of a 
location, rather than a deterrent, and provide an important data point for the ongoing 
debate surrounding tourism impacts of OSWFs.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
ESTIMATING THE RECREATIONAL VALUE OF KEEPING AND RELEASING 
ATLANTIC STRIPED BASS 
 
1 Introduction 
The status of Atlantic striped bass as the most prominent and heavily targeted 
recreational species found along the coast from Maine to North Carolina is represented 
poorly by the absence of studies addressing the policy-relevant economic research 
questions posed by the fishery’s governing body. A few previous studies estimate the 
nonmarket value of catching additional striped bass (U.S. EPA 2004; Gautum and 
Steinback 1998; Bockstael et al. 1989), but due to data limitations, these studies do not 
examine how recreational anglers value fish they keep relative to fish they release nor 
assess the extent to which these values vary with catch size. Consequently, results of 
these studies provide little insight into the implications of changing recreational Atlantic 
striped bass fishing regulations. We fill this research gap by estimating the recreational 
value of keeping and releasing small, medium, and trophy-sized striped bass, providing a 
platform on which to “[evaluate] striped bass angler preferences for size of harvested fish 
and tradeoffs with bag limits” (ASMFC 2018) and therefore inform managers of this 
fishery. 
We take a stated preference (SP) approach to nonmarket valuation by estimating 
angler preferences and values using choice experiment data obtained from a recently-
administered striped bass angler survey. These estimates indicate that, for each size-class, 
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anglers prefer keeping to releasing striped bass. We also find that the nonmarket value of 
keeping and releasing striped bass increase almost exponentially with catch size. 
Estimated marginal rates of substitution indicate that anglers are willing to exchange one 
harvestable trophy-sized fish for about two medium-sized or three small ones. We also 
assess the extent to which our welfare calculations are affected by survey non-response 
bias, an issue that has been largely overlooked in nonmarket valuation studies applied in 
recreational fisheries contexts. These results show little evidence to suggest that survey 
non-response bias infiltrates our estimates of angler willingness-to-pay.  
Our investigation of the recreational value of keeping and releasing trophy striped 
bass is timely given that (a) the most recent estimate of total female SSB is below the 
binding management threshold, indicating that the stock is overfished (ASMFC 2018), 
and (b) trophy-sized striped bass are almost exclusively part of the spawning stock 
(Bigelow and Schroeder 1953). Our results intuitively indicate that anglers place a high 
recreational value on harvesting trophy striped bass, but we also find that releasing fish of 
this size is of considerable nonmarket value. We estimate these values such that accurate 
inferences can be drawn about the potential economic impact of proposed regulations, 
particularly those designed explicitly to protect the spawning population.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we provide 
background information about the Atlantic striped bass fishery. Section 3 discusses the 
methods and data source used for analysis. The modelling approach is described in 
Section 4 and we interpret our results in Section 5. In Section 6, we assess the influence 
of non-response bias on welfare estimates and we conclude in Section 7.  
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2 Fishery Overview 
Atlantic striped bass (Morone saxatilis) are an anadromous, highly-migratory 
species found along the U.S. east coast from Maine to North Carolina. During spring and 
early summer, the bulk of the population spawns in estuarine waters of the Chesapeake 
Bay and its tributaries, the Delaware River, and the Hudson River. After spawning, adults 
migrate north, as far as the Bay of Fundy, Canada, following prey and cooler waters. In 
the fall, adults move southward on their migratory path and return to spawning grounds 
to overwinter.  
Partly due to their wide geographical range, Atlantic striped bass are among the 
most popular recreational species in the northeast and mid-Atlantic region of the United 
States. Recreational fishing trips targeting or catching striped bass consistently surpass 
twenty million annually, a level of effort that conduces high recreational striped bass 
harvest volume. In fact, from 2012 to 2016, the average annual recreational harvest 
volume of Atlantic striped bass was the largest among all recreationally targeted species 
in the U.S. (NMFS 2017).  
Commercial landings typically account for a quarter of total striped bass harvest 
volume, thus excessive recreational harvest is a perpetual concern for the Atlantic States 
Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC). The ASMFC sets biological targets and 
thresholds for female spawning stock biomass (SSB) and the rate of fishing mortality (F). 
They then translate these reference points into a set of standard recreational regulations 
for the coastwide fishery but allow coastal states to implement alternative, conservation 
equivalent regulations. If either biological reference points surpasses its threshold, the 
ASMFC is obliged to adjust coastwide regulations such that these conservation objectives 
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can be met. 
The most notable regulatory change in recent years was prompted by results of 
the stock assessment for 2012. In addition to revealing a steady decline in female SSB 
below target levels since 2006, the stock assessment projected with high probability that 
female SSB would fall below its threshold in subsequent years if the rate of fishing 
mortality remained at 2012 levels. As a precautionary measure to conserve the spawning 
population, the ASMFC approved Addendum 4 to Amendment 6 of the fishery’s 
management plan, which called for a 25% reduction in harvest from 2012 levels in 
coastal states beginning during the 2015 fishing season (ASMFC 2014). Managers 
expected that in addition to conserving the population of spawning fish by reducing 
fishing mortality, Addendum 4’s mandate would effectively protect a strong 2011 year-
class. In response to the mandate, many coastal states adopted a one-fish, 28” or longer 
daily recreational possession limit during 2015, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1.  
Results of the 2016 stock assessment update proved the Addendum 4 measures 
successful. Coastwide harvest of Atlantic striped bass in 2015 was reduced by 22.4% 
relative to 2012 levels, and all sectors achieved or exceeded their harvest reduction goal 
except for the Chesapeake Bay recreational sector, within which harvest increased by 
53.4% relative to 2012 (ASMFC 2016b). Total F in 2015 was estimated to be 0.16, below 
both its target (0.18) and threshold (0.22) level (ASMFC 2016a). Female SSB in 2015 
was estimated to be 58,853 metric tons (mt), which is below its target of 72,032 mt and 
above its threshold of 57,626 mt.  
However, improvements to the status of the stock engendered by the Addendum 4 
measures were short-lived. Preliminary results of the 2018 benchmark stock assessment, 
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which introduced a two-stock statisitical catch-at-age model rather than the single-stock 
approach used previously, show that in 2017, female SSB and F for the Delaware 
Bay/Hudson River stock, and female SSB and Focean (but not FChesapeake Bay) for the 
Chesapeake Bay stock surpassed the biological threshold level (ASMFC 2018). Hence, it 
is likely that the Delaware Bay/Hudson River and Chesapeake Bay stock are currently 
overfished, the Chesapeake Bay stock is experiencing overfishing in the ocean but not in 
the Chesapeake Bay, and the Delaware Bay/Hudson River stock is experiencing 
overfishing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Recreational striped bass fishing regulations during 2014 (top) and 
2015 (bottom) (ASMFC 2016b, 2015b). 
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3 Methods and Data 
3.1 Nonmarket Valuation   
 Preferences for nonmarket goods and amenities can be evaluated using revealed 
preference (RP) or stated preference (SP) methods. RP methods use data on observed 
behavior, while SP methods use data derived from survey questions that are carefully 
constructed such that preferences and values can be identified. One RP approach for 
nonmarket valuation commonly employed in the context of recreational fisheries is the 
travel cost model. Travel cost models relate the choice to fish at a specific site, or the 
number of fishing trips taken at a site over a period, to access costs and a vector of other 
site characteristics that typically include catch or harvest rates (Gautum and Steinback 
1998; Bockstael et al. 1989; Loomis 1988). Estimates from these models can be used to 
calculate the marginal value of site characteristics, which provides a basis on which to 
infer the economic implications of policy-induced changes in such characteristics.  
However, when analysts seek to evaluate the potential impact of previously 
unobserved policies or if there exists nonrandom variation in the attributes of interest 
across sampled fishing sites, the observational data needed to pursue RP methods is 
inadequate and SP methods must be adopted. In our case, both reasons necessitated 
primary SP data collection and analysis. To begin, our research objectives include 
estimating angler preferences for and willingness-to-pay (WTP) values of changes in trip 
quality caused by policies that have yet to be implemented in the recreational Atlantic 
striped bass fishery. Additionally, information about the length of striped bass that are 
released by recreational anglers is limited and, for our purposes, unreliable. The few 
states along the coast from Maine to North Carolina that collect these data do so through 
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voluntary angler logbook programs, yet the nonrandom nature of these samples make 
ensuing utility parameter estimates susceptible to selection bias.  
Thus, within a SP framework we employ and analyze data obtained from a 
discrete choice experiment (DCE) survey. After presenting respondents with two or more 
hypothetical, multi-attribute alternatives, DCE questions ask respondents to choose or 
rank their most preferred alternative. Each alternative is comprised of a combination of 
attribute levels, the ranges of which are carefully selected to fulfill policy-relevant 
research objectives. Responses to DCE questions can be used to evaluate choice 
behavior, preferences, and WTP values for marginal changes in attribute levels (Louiviere 
et al. 2000). 
Several studies have employed a DCE to evaluate angler preferences for different 
aspects of the recreational fishing experience. Because they cover a wide range of species 
and fishery-specific research objectives, these studies differ in terms of the attributes used 
to explain angler preferences. In general, the attributes of interest to fisheries economists 
typically include catch or harvest rates and regulations. Angler preferences for marginal 
changes in catch and regulations have been estimated jointly for summer flounder in the 
Northeast (Massey et al. 2006; Hicks 2002), trout and grayling in Norway (Aas et al. 
2000), paddlefish in Oklahoma (Cha and Melstrom 2018), trout in Michigan (Knoche and 
Lupi 2016), and pacific halibut and salmon in Alaska (Lew and Larson 2012; Lew and 
Seung 2010). In addition to catch rates and regulations, other studies have evaluated non-
consumptive aspects of recreational fishing, such as hooking and losing, or seeing a target 
species (Goldsmith et al. 2018; Duffield et al. 2012). Lew and Larson (2015) exclude 
catch attributes from the utility function and estimate Alaskan charter boat angler 
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preferences and WTP for alternative bag and size limit restrictions.  
Some economists have examined the interface between recreational catch and 
regulations by estimating the nonmarket value of fish that may kept and of those that 
must be released. These studies consistently reveal that the recreational value of keeping 
fish is higher than that of releasing fish for a range of recreational species in the U.S. 
(Lee et al. 2017; Lew and Larson 2014; Anderson and Lee 2013; Anderson et al. 2013; 
Jarvis 2011). Carter and Liese (2012) further differentiate catch disposition into keep, 
release due to a minimum size limit, and release due to catch exceeding the bag limit for 
four recreational species in Florida. For all four species, they estimate higher WTP values 
for keeping fish rather than releasing fish and for one of the species, they estimate WTP 
values that differ considerably between the two release dispositions.  
We build on this body of literature by estimating keep and release parameters for 
three size-classes of fish, an approach that is most closely related to Anderson and Lee 
(2013) and Anderson et al. (2013). The authors of these studies estimate size-specific 
keep parameters for several species in Washington but, to avoid estimating a very large 
number of parameters, aggregate the number of fish that must be released by weight. 
Hence, they assume that “anglers do not care whether, for example, 20 pounds of fish 
released come from one or two fish”. Based on anecdotal evidence and confirmed by our 
results, this is an untenable assumption about the recreational fishery for Atlantic striped 
bass.   
 
3.2 Data 
The data we use to evaluate recreational striped bass fishing preferences comes 
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from a dual mode, i.e., mail and web-based, angler survey that was implemented in late 
2016. We randomly selected survey participants into our sample frame from a database 
comprised of all recreational anglers who were licensed or registered for saltwater fishing 
during 2015 in any of the ten coastal states from Maine to Virginia.  
Prior to implementation, we tested the survey instrument by conducting two focus 
group sessions each in Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland with recreational striped 
bass anglers. We intentionally selected focus group participants who differed in terms of 
gender, age, and striped bass fishing experience to obtain feedback from a diverse mix of 
anglers. Based on their feedback, we conformed the survey language to regional 
differences in dialect to ensure consistent interpretation of survey questions. We also used 
the feedback to design contextually realistic and straightforward choice experiment 
questions.  
Questions in final survey instrument were split into three sections: (1) recreational 
saltwater fishing experiences and opinions, (2) the discrete choice experiment (DCE), and 
(3) demographics. Each of the four DCE questions presented respondents with three 
options: two recreational striped bass fishing trips options and an option to not go 
recreational striped bass fishing. The DCE questions instructed respondents to compare 
the three options and to indicate their first and second-most preferred option. An example 
choice question is displayed in Figure 2 and one version of the complete angler survey 
can be found in the Appendix. 
 
3.3 Survey Implementation 
We used a stratified random sampling approach to reach the target population of 
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recreational striped bass anglers. From each state license or registration frame, we drew 
survey participants in proportion to that state’s contribution to the total number of 
recreational striped bass fishing trips taken during 2015 across the study region, as shown 
in Table 1. Closely following the methods outlined in Dillman et al. (2009), we made up 
to six contacts with an original sample of 2,200 anglers: a telephone pre-screening 
interview, an advance letter or email invite, an initial survey mailing or email invite, a 
reminder letter or email, a second survey mailing or email invite, and a final reminder 
letter or email.1 The survey implementation timeline is detailed in Table 2.   
                                                 
1 All survey mailings provided respondents with the option to participate in the web version of the survey. 
All email correspondences contained a web-link to the survey. 
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The first potential point of contact with survey participants, a telephone pre-
screening interview, allowed us to determine eligibility and thus focus survey efforts on 
anglers with relevant fishery experience. Based on responses to the first question of the 
telephone survey, we deemed ineligible those who indicated not having fished for striped 
bass within the past three years and excluded these anglers from subsequent solicitation 
procedures. After establishing eligibility, we solicited anglers’ primary method of striped 
bass fishing, total number and targeted striped bass fishing trips taken in the past 12 
months, likelihood of striped bass fishing next season, age, and income; in Section 6, we 
Figure 2. Example DCE question 
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use this information to assess the extent to which survey non-response bias affects our 
welfare estimates. Then, we invited those who completed the interview to participate in 
the full version of the angler survey. If willing to participate, respondents indicated their 
preference for receiving a mail, a web, or both a mail and a web version of the survey. 
From the original sample frame of 2,200, we called the 2,085 licensees with telephone 
information. Of the 577 people who completed the interview, 325 were eligible to 
participate in the survey. These interviews proved effective at boosting response rates; the 
survey completion rate among unscreened anglers was only 29%, while 55% of screened 
anglers completed the full survey. 
Due to a low response rate from the original sample, we drew a supplemental, 
web-only sample of 1,000 anglers. These anglers received an advance email invitation to 
participate in the survey, a first reminder email, and a final reminder email. The overall 
survey response rate, which excludes ineligible participants, the deceased, those with 
non-working email addresses, and those with undeliverable mailing addresses, is 22.7%. 
It is likely, however, that many non-respondents were ineligible. When adjusted for 
estimated ineligibility based on the results of the telephone pre-screening interview, the 
survey response rate is approximately 35%.  
 13 
 
Table 1.  Survey distribution, response rates, and composition of final sample by state. 
Table 1. Survey distribution, response rates, and composition of final sample by state.  
  Final survey disposition  
State 
2015 striped bass 
trips/surveys 
distributed (%) 
Completed: 
eligible (%) 
Completed: 
ineligible (%) 
Did not complete 
survey† (%) 
Estimation 
sample 
(%) 
CT 8.77 6.33 8.33 9.28 4.90 
DE 0.91 0.58 0.00 0.94 0.64 
MA 21.86 28.06 15.63 20.07 28.14 
MD 19.68 15.11 14.58 21.09 16.42 
ME 4.82 4.60 7.29 4.93 5.12 
NH 1.64 1.58 2.08 1.67 1.28 
NJ 21.36 28.92 29.17 19.42 25.59 
NY 9.86 6.76 14.58 10.63 6.40 
RI 4.82 4.03 2.08 5.05 7.46 
VA 6.27 4.03 6.25 6.92 4.05 
Total (#)  1,869,821/3,200 695 96 2456 469 
Notes: 2015 striped bass trips were estimated using the unadjusted MRIP data (released prior to 
July 8th, 2018) that was available during the survey sampling procedure. Composition of final 
sample by state based on responses to the question: “In what area do you go recreational 
fishing for striped bass most often?” 
†Includes surveys mailed to the deceased, ineligibles, non-respondents, those who refused to 
participate, and those whose mailings were returned undeliverable 
 
Table 2. Survey implementation schedule. 
Table 2. Survey implementation schedule. 
Contact Type Date 
Telephone pre-screening interview/email invitation 11/23/2016 – 12/17/2016 
Reminder email to pre-screened anglers 12/7/2016 – 12/27/2016 
Advance letter to unscreened anglers 12/23/2016 
Email invitation to unscreened anglers 12/27/2016 
First survey mailing to screened anglers/advance letter recipients 12/30/2016 
Second email invitation to unscreened anglers 1/3/2017 
Postcard reminder to anglers included in the initial survey mailing   1/5/2017 
Second survey mailing to non-respondents 2/17/2017 
Email invitation to all non- respondents 2/24/2017 
Supplemental sample email invitation 3/13/2017 
Supplemental sample email reminder 3/20/2017 
Final email reminder to all non-respondents 4/3/2017 
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3.4 Experimental Design 
The attributes used to create the DCE questions are shown in Table 3. They 
include catch of 22", 29", and 38" (hereafter small, medium, and trophy) striped bass, the 
minimum and maximum size limit, the bag limit for striped bass longer than the 
minimum size limit (bag limit), the bag limit for striped bass shorter than the minimum 
size limit but longer than 20” (small-fish slot limit), the number of other legal-sized fish 
caught, and the trip cost. Our fractional-factorial experimental design for main effects and 
selected interactions selected the subset of all attribute-level combinations that 
maximized the statistical efficiency of ensuing model parameters (Kuhfeld et al. 1994).2 
We removed from the design choice scenarios that included a dominant fishing trip 
alternative, as well as trip alternatives in which the number of striped bass kept and 
released could not be calculated from the combination of striped bass catch and 
regulatory attributes.3 To ensure that DCE questions presented respondents with 
conceivable sets of regulations, we removed scenarios in which the total possession limit 
(bag limit + small-fish slot limit) was greater than three striped bass. The procedure 
yielded 72 choice scenarios, blocked into 18 unique sub-versions of the survey that each 
contained four DCE questions. 
                                                 
2 We generated the design in SAS using the Kuhfeld macros (Kuhfeld 2010).   
3 An example of such an alternative would contain the following attribute levels: small striped bass 
catch=2, medium striped bass catch=1, bag limit=1, small-fish slot limit=1, minimum legal size=30''. In 
this example, it is not possible to determine whether a respondent would keep two small striped bass or one 
small and one medium striped bass. 
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Table 3.Choice experiment attributes and levels. 
Table 3. Choice experiment attributes and levels.  
Attribute Levels 
Catch (# fish)  
    Small, 22", striped bass  0, 2, 4 
    Medium-sized, 29", striped bass  0, 1, 2 
    Trophy-sized, 38", striped bass  0, 1, 2 
    Other legal-sized fish  0, 2, 4 
Striped bass regulations  
    Minimum legal size  28", 30" 
    Maximum legal size None, 36" 
    Bag limit (# fish ≥ min. size) 1, 2 
    Small-fish slot limit (# fish > 20" and  ≤ min. size) 0, 1, 2 
Trip cost ($) 10, 20, 30, 40 
Notes: Trip cost levels shown are for shore/kayak version of the survey. 
Private/head boat cost levels were 25, 45, 65, and 85. Charter boat cost 
levels were 75, 100, 125, and 150. 
 
After creating the design, we modified the DCE questions displayed in final 
survey version because several focus group participants had trouble answering DCE 
questions in which trip cost levels fell outside the range of costs that these participants 
typically incurred. For example, participants who fish for striped bass primarily from the 
shore became perplexed when presented with alternatives whose cost reflected a private 
or charter boat fishing trip. These findings portended widespread cognitive burden that 
we expected would dampen the survey response rate and threaten the reliability of the 
data because, unlike many other recreational species in the region, striped bass are 
heavily targeted both by both shore-based and boat anglers.4 We therefore displayed in 
the final survey version trip cost levels based on respondents' primary method of striped 
bass fishing, if known. We generated ranges of trip costs associated with shore and kayak, 
                                                 
4 In any given year, directed striped bass fishing trips taken on a boat (private, charter, and party) and from 
the shore typically account for about 60% and 40% of the total number of directed striped bass fishing trips 
taken across the study region, respectively.  
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private and party boat, or charter boat fishing trips. In the web version of the survey, we 
linked the range of displayed trip costs levels to a preceding survey question such that all 
web-survey respondents answered DCE questions appropriately tailored to their indicated 
primary method of striped bass fishing. To mail survey respondents who completed the 
telephone pre-screening interview and thus indicated their primary method of striped bass 
fishing, we sent surveys containing an appropriate range of trip costs. Some mail survey 
recipients who did not complete the telephone pre-screening interview, however, 
answered DCE questions which displayed trip costs that were misaligned with those they 
typically incurred. 
 
4 Modelling Approach 
4.1 Random Utility Models  
The choice experiment method is grounded in Lancastrian consumer theory, 
which postulates that the overall utility provided by a good is determined by the part-
worth contribution from each observable attribute (Lancaster 1966). In addition to the 
observable attributes of a good, an unobserved component specific to each decision 
maker influences choice. We analyze our DCE data using random utility maximization 
(RUM) models that decompose utility into its observable and unobservable components 
(McFadden 1973). RUM models assume that when faced with multiple alternatives, 
individual n will select alternative 𝑖 that maximizes utility, 𝑈௡௜: 
  𝑈௡௜ > 𝑈௡௝ ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. (1) 
   
Partitioning 𝑈௡௜ into its two component parts, the choice of alternative 𝑖 is such that 
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 𝑉௡௜  +  𝜀௡௜ > 𝑉௡௝  +  𝜀௡௝ ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, (2) 
   
where 𝑉(∙) is a function typically specified to be linear in parameters, 𝑉௡௝ = 𝛽𝑥௡௝, that 
relates observed attributes to utility and 𝜀 captures the utility derived from all other 
unobservable factors. The utility parameters 𝛽 measure the relative importance of the 
attributes 𝑥௡௝ that describe alternative 𝑗. Because 𝜀 is stochastic, it is not possible to 
determine absolute levels of utility; however, probabilistic inference about individuals' 
choices can be made under the standard assumption for logit models that these terms are 
distributed i.i.d Type I extreme value. From Equation 2, the probability that angler 𝑛 
selects fishing alternative 𝑖 is 
  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌௡௜) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏ൣ൫𝜀௡௝ −  𝜀௡௜൯ < 𝑉(𝛽𝑥௡௝) −  𝑉(𝛽𝑥௡௜)൧ ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. (3) 
   
Train (2003) calculates this probability for a multinomial logit (MNL) model as 
    
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌௡௜) =
𝑒௏೙೔
∑ 𝑒௏೙ೕ௃௝ୀଵ
. (4) 
   
The MNL model, however, is subject to several behavioral restrictions based on 
the assumption that error terms are distributed i.i.d. Type I extreme value. This 
assumption implies that unobserved factors are uncorrelated over alternatives and 
uncorrelated over time in repeated choice situations. It also leads to the MNL model 
exhibiting the properties of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and proportional 
substitution, which in most cases are poor representations of individual decision-making 
processes. Another limitation of the MNL model is its inability to accommodate 
unobserved preference heterogeneity for the attributes 𝑥௡௝ that may exist across a sample 
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of decision makers.  
To relax these behavioral restrictions and allow for heterogeneity in preferences, 
we estimate a random parameters logit (RPL) model. We partition the full set of 
attributes, 𝑥௡௝, into 𝑥௡௝ᇱ  and 𝑥௡௝ᇱᇱ , which denote attributes with fixed utility parameters, 𝛽ᇱ, 
and attributes with randomly distributed utility parameters, 𝛽௡ᇱᇱ, respectively. The 
parameters in 𝛽௡ᇱᇱ become the sum of a population mean parameter, 𝑏, and a deviation 
parameter with zero mean, 𝜇௡, which represents an angler’s preferences relative to 
average preferences across the sampled population. This decomposition captures 
stochastic taste variation in the sampled population because preferences for the attributes 
in 𝑥௡௜ᇱᇱ  are assumed vary across respondents given a sequence of observed choices. The 
utility angler 𝑛 receives by selecting fishing trip alternative 𝑖 in the RPL model is given 
by 
  𝑈௡௜ = 𝑉௡௜ + 𝜀௡௜                                               
 = 𝛽ᇱ𝑥௡௜ᇱ + 𝛽௡ᇱᇱ𝑥௡௜ᇱᇱ + 𝜀௡௜                 
 = 𝛽ᇱ𝑥௡௜ᇱ + 𝑏𝑥௡௜ᇱᇱ + 𝜇௡𝑥௡௜ᇱᇱ + 𝜀௡௜ . (5) 
   
The stochastic portion of utility in Equation (5) is 𝜂௡௜ =  𝜇௡𝑥௡௜ᇱᇱ + 𝜀௡௜, a non-zero 
term that incorporates unobserved preference heterogeneity in the attributes 𝑥௡௜ᇱᇱ . This 
specification for the error component relaxes the IIA assumption because, given the 
common influence of 𝜇௡, utility is correlated over alternatives: Cov൫𝜂௡௜ , 𝜂௡௝൯ =
𝐸(𝜇௡𝑥௡௜ᇱᇱ + 𝜀௡௜)൫𝜇௡𝑥௡௝ᇱᇱ + 𝜀௡௝൯ = 𝑥௡௜ᇱᇱ
ᇱ 𝛺 𝑥௡௝ᇱᇱ , where 𝛺 is the covariance of 𝜇௡. We specify 
error components to independent across alternatives by restricting off-diagonal elements 
of 𝛺 to be zero.  
We make two additional modifications based on the nature of our data. First, we 
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treat the data as a panel because respondents answered up to four choice questions. The 
unconditional probability that respondents make their observed sequence of choices,  𝐼 =
{𝑖ଵ, … 𝑖்} in scenarios 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, given the vector of fixed parameters, is the product of 
the logit formulas: 
  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌௡ூ|𝛽ᇱ) = න ൭ෑ ቈ
𝑒௏೙೔೟೟
∑ 𝑒௏೙ೕ೟௝
቉
்
௧ୀଵ
൱
ఉ೙ᇲᇲ
𝑓(𝛽௡ᇱᇱ|𝜃)𝑑𝜃, (6) 
   
where 𝜃 are parameters that describe the density of the random parameter distribution 
𝑓(𝛽௡ᇱᇱ|𝜃) (Train 2003). Second, we exploit additional information from respondents’ full 
ranking of alternatives, which we infer through their selection of a first- and second-most 
preferred alternative in each choice scenario. Each choice scenario is decomposed, or 
“exploded”, into 𝐽 − 1 statistically independent pseudo-observations which therefore 
increases the number of sample observations. Compared to those that use unranked data, 
choice models estimated using ranked data have been shown to improve the precision, 
and thus reduce sampling variance of estimated utility parameters (Chapman and Staelin 
1982). The unconditional probability of a respondent ranking the three alternatives in 
choice scenario 𝑡 from most- to least-preferred as 𝑗ଵ, 𝑗ଶ, and 𝑗ଷ, in that order, is 
    
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌௡௧|𝛽ᇱ) = න ቆ
𝑒௏೙ೕభ
∑ 𝑒௏೙ೕ௝ୀ௝భ,௝మ,௝య
×
𝑒௏೙ೕమ
∑ 𝑒௏೙ೕ௝ୀ௝మ,௝య
ቇ
ఉ೙ᇲᇲ
𝑓(𝛽௡ᇱᇱ|𝜃)𝑑𝜃 
 
 
   = න ቌෑ ቈ
𝑒௏೙ೕ
∑ 𝑒௏೙ೖଷ௞ୀ௝
቉
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
ቍ
ఉ೙ᇲᇲ
𝑓(𝛽௡ᇱᇱ|𝜃)𝑑𝜃. (7) 
   
With these modifications, the unconditional choice probabilities for our panel rank-
ordered RPL model is expressed as 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌௡|𝛽ᇱ) = න ቌෑ ቌෑ ቆ
𝑒௏೙ೕ೟
∑ 𝑒௏೙ೖ೟ଷ௞ୀ௝
ቇ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
ቍ
்
௧ୀଵ
ቍ 𝑓(𝛽௡ᇱᇱ|𝜃)𝑑𝜃
ఉ೙ᇲᇲ
. (8) 
   
4.2 Model Specification 
A principal goal of this analysis is to evaluate angler preferences for keeping and 
releasing striped bass, thus we generate size-specific keep and release variables based on 
the catch and regulatory attributes included in the experimental design. As discussed 
previously, we removed from the design scenarios in which these variables could not be 
determined unambiguously. We model fishing trip utility as a function of the number of 
the number of small, medium, and trophy striped bass kept and released (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, and 
𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒), the number of other legal-sized fish caught (𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ), the trip 
cost (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡), and the opt-out alternative (𝑂𝑝𝑡 − 𝑜𝑢𝑡): 
  𝑈௡௝௧ = 𝛽ଵ𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝௡௝௧  
             + 𝛽ସ𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௡௝௧ + 𝛽ହ𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௡௝௧ + 𝛽଺𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௡௝௧ 
                + 𝛽଻𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ௡௝௧ + 𝛽଼𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଽ𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡௡௝௧ + 𝜀௡௝௧, (9) 
   
where 𝑛 indexes respondent, 𝑗 indexes alternative, and 𝑡 indexes choice scenario.  
Equation (9) assumes that regulations affect fishing trip utility only indirectly by 
determining the number and size of striped bass kept and released. Preliminary testing of 
models that included regulatory attributes, however, revealed this to be a restrictive 
assumption, as these models revealed significant relationships between select regulatory 
variables and utility. Additionally, as we will see in the Results section, the coefficient on 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 changes sign when we include regulatory attributes, which suggests 
that this estimate may be confounded with other determinants of fishing trip utility.  
 21 
 
  Given these findings, we modify Equation (9) by including regulatory variables. 
These variables—one for each of the three striped bass catch sizes—control for zero-fish 
bag limits and are derived from the minimum and maximum size limit attributes included 
in the experimental design. To control for the presence of a zero-fish bag limit for small 
and medium striped bass, we include the variables 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 and 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 that equal one if 
the minimum size is 28” or 30”, respectively, and the small slot bag limit equals zero.5 
The coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 measures the differential impact to angler utility of a 28” 
minimum size limit, which restricts harvest of small striped bass, relative to a 20” 
minimum size limit. Likewise, the coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 measures the differential impact 
to angler utility of a 30” minimum size limit, which restricts that harvest of both small 
and medium-sized striped bass, relative to a 20” minimum size limit. To control for the 
presence of a zero-fish bag limit for trophy striped bass, we include the indicator variable 
𝑀𝑎𝑥36, which equals one if the maximum size limit is 36”. The coefficient on this 
variable measures the differential impact to angler utility of a 36” maximum size limit 
relative to a scenario with no maximum size limit. With these variables included, our 
baseline model of fishing trip utility becomes 
  𝑈௡௝௧ = 𝛽ଵ𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝௡௝௧  
               + 𝛽ସ𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௡௝௧ + 𝛽ହ𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௡௝௧ + 𝛽଺𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௡௝௧ 
               + 𝛽଻𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ௡௝௧ + 𝛽଼𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଽ𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡௡௝௧  
               + 𝛽ଵ଴𝑀𝑖𝑛28௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝑀𝑖𝑛30௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଵଶ𝑀𝑎𝑥36௡௝௧ + 𝜀௡௝௧. (10) 
   
                                                 
5 This is necessary as the definition of attribute is defined as “The number of striped bass equal to or longer 
20” and shorter than the minimum size restriction”. 
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4.3 Estimation Sample 
From the full sample of survey respondents, we remove those who indicated not 
having fished for striped bass within the past three years and focus instead on eliciting the 
preferences of anglers who are more likely to be affected by changes in striped bass 
fishing conditions. Furthermore, including in the sample anglers who did not 
recreationally fish for striped bass recently may evoke sample selection bias, as these 
anglers, if identified a telephone pre-screening interview, were intentionally excluded 
from subsequent sampling procedures. We also remove respondents who always selected 
the opt-out alternative as their most-preferred alternative despite considerable variation in 
attribute levels across choice scenarios, which is indicative of protest behavior. For 
reasons discussed in Section 3.4, we exclude observations from mail respondents who 
answered DCE questions containing trip cost levels that did not reflect these respondents’ 
indicated primary method of striped bass fishing. Our final estimation sample consists of 
469 anglers.  
Table 4 displays demographic and fishing-related information about our sample. It 
also includes results from a two recent angler surveys to which we compare the 
characteristics of our sample. One of these surveys was directed at recreational striped 
bass anglers licensed in CT and MA (Murphy et al. 2015), and was one directed at the 
population of recreational anglers in the U.S. (Lovell et al. 2016). The striped bass 
anglers in our sample have a mean age of 54.3, which is consistent with the median age 
of sampled anglers from Murphy et al. (2015), and spent an average of 26.7 days fishing 
for saltwater species in the past 12 months. Both of these characteristics are comparable 
to the nationwide statistics in Lovell et al. (2016). In contrast to the population of U.S. 
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recreational anglers at large, however, the anglers in our sample are predominantly more 
male, slightly more affluent, and have attained higher levels of education. While these 
differences engender concerns about sample representativeness, that they have surfaced 
previously from a sample of more than twenty thousand randomly-intercepted striped 
bass and other anglers (Gautum and Steinback 1998) bolsters confidence that our sample 
is not anomalous. Like the sampled recreational striped bass anglers from Murphy et al. 
(2015), anglers in our sample have been fishing for striped bass for about 22 years and 
spent an average of 14.7 days fishing for striped bass during the past 12 months. Finally, 
more than 90% of the anglers in our sample fish for striped bass primarily from the shore 
(36.2%) or from a private boat (54.6%). 
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Table 4. Characteristics of sample anglers and the U.S. population of anglers. 
 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Utility Parameter Estimates  
 Table 5 displays estimation results from four model specifications. The model in 
Column (1) is defined by Equation (9) and excludes striped bass regulations. Column (2) 
Table 4. Characteristics of sample anglers and the U.S. population of anglers.  
Characteristic Sample anglers 
Recreational striped 
bass anglers licensed 
in CT and MA 
(Murphy et al. 2015) 
U.S. population  
of anglers  
(Lovell et al. 
2016) 
Gender (% male) 92.8 96 85.5 
Age (mean years) 54.3 54 (median) 53.5 
Household income (%)    
  < $20,000 3 N/A 7 
  $20,000 - $99,999 41 N/A 57 
  $100,000+ 52 N/A 36 
  Did not answer 4 N/A N/A 
Education (%)    
  Less than high school graduate 1.71 N/A 7.4 
  High school graduate or GED 18.8 N/A 21.7 
  Some college no degree, 
associate/technical degree 32.4 N/A 27.3 
  Bachelor’s degree 27.1 31 25.5 
  Master’s degree or higher 18.1 N/A 18.1 
  Did not answer 1.9 N/A N/A 
Days saltwater fished past 12 months 
(mean days) 26.7 N/A 27.8 
Days striped bass fished past 12 months 
(mean days) 14.7 
16 (days fished in 
previous fishing 
season) 
N/A 
Years of saltwater fishing (mean in years) N/A N/A 31.5 
Years of striped bass fishing (mean in 
years) 22 23 NA 
Primary striped bass fishing mode (%)    
  Shore 36.2 N/A N/A 
  Kayak 2.9 N/A N/A 
  Private motorized boat 54.6 N/A N/A 
  Charter boat 4.2 N/A N/A 
  Head or party boat 1.9 N/A N/A 
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adds the maximum size limit variable and Column (3) adds the two minimum size limit 
variables. Column (4) is defined by Equation (10) and includes all three regulatory 
variables. We follow the relevant literature and specify striped bass keep and release 
parameters to be normally distributed (Lee et al. 2017; Lew and Larson 2014; Anderson 
and Lee 2013; Carter and Liese 2012), which captures the most important sources of  
heterogeneity in the context of this study, and we treat the other parameters as fixed.6 We 
estimate all models using NLOGIT version 5. 
Across all columns of Table 5, the estimated parameters on the non-striped bass 
attributes are stable and behave as expected. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficients on 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ suggest that catching other species of fish while fishing for 
striped bass is a boon to angler utility. Trip cost parameters, which represent the marginal 
utility of price, are negative and statistically significant. Estimated coefficients on the 
opt-out variable, which represent the utility from choosing not to fish, are negative, 
significant, and intuitively suggest that striped bass anglers prefer fishing for striped bass 
when such an opportunity is available. Another result that is common across 
specifications is the magnitude and statistical significance of the standard deviation 
coefficients on the striped bass catch variables. These estimates indicate considerable 
unobserved preference heterogeneity for keeping and releasing striped bass across the 
population of sampled anglers. 
                                                 
6 Alternative models in which all non-cost parameters are specified to be normally distributed yielded 
qualitatively similar results but at the expense less precisely estimated coefficients. 
 26 
 
Table 5.Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model. 
Table 5. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model.  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean parameters     
    Small keep   0.383*** 0.380*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.060) 
    Medium keep   0.504*** 0.501*** 0.348*** 0.347*** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.062) 
    Trophy keep   0.606*** 0.526*** 0.653*** 0.586*** 
 (0.081) (0.101) (0.080) (0.099) 
    Small release   0.067*** 0.070*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
    Medium release   -0.084* -0.084* 0.129** 0.127** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.058) (0.059) 
    Trophy release   0.247*** 0.286*** 0.242*** 0.275*** 
 (0.035) (0.047) (0.034) (0.046) 
    Other catch 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
    Cost -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    Opt-out -2.933*** -2.982*** -3.170*** -3.209*** 
 (0.130) (0.128) (0.130) (0.129) 
    Max. 36”  -0.132  -0.110 
  (0.088)  (0.085) 
    Min. 28”   -0.109 -0.106    (0.088) (0.088) 
    Min. 30”   -0.644*** -0.637***    (0.106) (0.107) 
Standard deviation parameters    
    Small keep   0.961*** 0.961*** 0.967*** 0.967*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) 
    Medium keep   1.168*** 1.168*** 1.156*** 1.156*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.063) 
    Trophy keep   1.258*** 1.249*** 1.247*** 1.242*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) 
    Small release   0.411*** 0.411*** 0.407*** 0.408*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
    Medium release   0.508*** 0.504*** 0.512*** 0.509*** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) 
    Trophy release   0.679*** 0.679*** 0.678*** 0.678*** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
Log likelihood -2010.540 -2010.057 -2003.305 -2002.968 
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.358 0.358 0.360 0.360 
AIC 4051.100 4052.100 4040.600 4041.900 
Notes: Number of observations is 1,747. Number of individuals is 469. 500 Halton draws used to 
maximize the simulated log-likelihood.*,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level of significance, respectively. 
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The model in Column (1) excludes regulatory variables. Estimated marginal 
utilities of keeping striped bass are intuitive—anglers prefer keeping larger striped bass to 
smaller striped bass. However, the model yields a puzzling pattern of release parameters. 
The coefficients on the variables for 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 and 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 are positive, 
significant, and have magnitudes that align with a priori expectations, but the coefficient 
on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 is negative and statistically significant. This latter estimate implies 
that catching and having to release medium-sized striped bass negatively affects angler 
utility. Results from other model specifications in Table 5, however, suggest that this 
estimate is confounded with the impact of catch-and-release only regulations, discussed 
in more detail below.  
Column (2) adds 𝑀𝑎𝑥36 to the model. The estimate for this variable is negative 
yet statistically insignificant, implying that the anglers in our sample are insensitive to 
harvest restrictions on trophy-sized striped bass. This finding is consistent with the results 
of a recent survey directed at striped bass anglers in Massachusetts and Connecticut. In 
their research, Murphy et al. (2015) find that over 55% (71%) of the sampled recreational 
striped bass anglers are supportive or have neutral opinions toward a proposed maximum 
recreational size restriction of 36'' (36” to 44”). Compared to Column (1) estimates, the 
coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 decreases slightly in magnitude and its standard error 
increases, and both the magnitude and standard error of the coefficient on 
𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 increase slightly. Estimated coefficients on the other striped bass catch 
variables change very little moving from Column (1) to Column (2). 
In Column (3), we replace 𝑀𝑎𝑥36 with the two minimum size restriction 
variables. The coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 is negative but statistically insignificant, which 
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suggests that if at least one medium striped bass can be kept, the average angler is 
indifferent to regulations that permit harvest of small striped bass. One potential 
explanation for this result is that most recreational striped bass anglers are accustomed to 
fishing in the absence of small harvest slot regulations. More specifically, as shown in 
Table 1, our sample reflects the population in that it is composed largely of individuals 
who fish in waters north of Delaware, where small harvest slots are seldom implemented. 
In contrast to the parameter on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28, the estimated parameter on 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 is negative, 
significant, and relatively large in magnitude, indicating that anglers are highly averse to 
harvest restrictions on medium-sized striped bass. This finding may be driven by angler 
sensitivity to changes in the “status-quo”, as most coastal states have adopted a 28” 
recreational minimum size limit in recent years (ASMFC 2017, 2016, 2015). 
Nonetheless, this finding is consistent with other studies that model angler utility as a 
function of both catch and catch-and-release regulations (Cha and Melstrom 2018; 
Knoche and Lupi 2016).  
The results in Column (3) also illuminate the effect in including minimum size 
restriction variables on the estimated striped bass catch parameters. Compared to the 
estimates in Column (1), the coefficients on 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 decrease in 
magnitude, those on 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 and 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 increases slightly in magnitude, 
and there is almost no change in the magnitude of the 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 parameter. The 
most striking difference between Columns (1) and (3) is in the estimated impact of 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 on angler utility. Where in Column (1) it is negative and significant, 
the coefficient on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 in Column (3) is positive, significant, and greater in 
absolute magnitude. This estimate implies that, after controlling for catch-and-release 
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only regulations, angler utility is positively affected by catching and releasing medium-
sized striped bass, a finding that is not in isolation; Jarvis (2011) reveals a similar 
directional change in coefficient estimates on pollock and haddock release variables when 
regulatory variables are excluded and included in the utility specification. Taken together, 
the three striped bass release coefficients in Column (3) intuitively suggest that anglers 
prefer catching-and-releasing larger striped bass to smaller striped bass. This finding is 
more sensible than that uncovered in Columns (1) and (2) and plausibly reflects the 
sportfishing nature of the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery. Finally, Column (3) 
reveals anglers’ relative preferences for small, medium, and trophy striped bass to be 
nearly identical across catch dispositions. Specifically, an increase in striped bass catch 
size from small to medium leads to a 43% and 47% relative increase in utility for fish that 
are kept and fish that are released, respectively; an increase in striped bass catch size 
from medium to trophy yields an 88% relative increase in angler utility levels. These 
findings lend credence to the set of utility parameters estimated by the specification in 
Column (3).  
Column (4) considers all three size regulation variables. The coefficients on these 
variables are consistent with estimates in Column (2) and Column (3), in which these 
variables enter separately. Estimated coefficients on the small and medium striped bass 
catch variables align with Column (3) estimates, and coefficients on the trophy catch 
variables fall within the range of those estimated by the other specifications in Table 5.  
We select a preferred specification by comparing information criteria and model 
fit statistics between the models in Table 5. All models perform reasonably well, as the 
goodness of fit statistic, McFadden’s pseudo R2, is and remains high across columns. 
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Compared to those in Columns (1) and (2), the models in Columns (3) and (4) have lower 
AIC values, which implies a greater support for these models. While AIC values are 
similar for these two models, a likelihood ratio test for including 𝑀𝑎𝑥36 in Column (4) 
suggests that this variable does not lead to an improved model fit. Additionally, the model 
in Column (3) yields more precise estimates of the striped bass catch coefficients than the 
model in Column (4), thus we select the model shown in Column (3) as our preferred 
specification.  
While our preferred specification performs well and yields intuitive results, the 
directional change of the coefficient on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 between Column (1) and 
Column (3) of Table 5 warrants additional attention. When 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 is omitted from the 
model, as in Column (1) of Table 5, the estimated effect of 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 on angler 
utility is negative and statistically significant. Yet the results in Column (3) suggests that, 
relative to a 20” minimum size limit, a 30” minimum size limit yields a strong and 
adverse effect on angler utility. Taken together with the estimated coefficient on 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 in Column (3), it seems that, rather than catching-and-releasing 
medium striped bass, it is imposing a 30” minimum size limit that reduces angler utility. 
However, because the variable 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 includes fish that are released due to a 
30” minimum size limit as well as those released in excess of a positive bag limit, the 
specification in Column (3) cannot separate the effect of releasing medium striped bass 
when 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 = 1 from the effect of 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 itself.  
We therefore display in Table 6 results from two additional models that isolate 
these impacts. In each, we disaggregate 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 into two separate variables: 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝐵𝐿, which represents the number of medium striped bass released 
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due to a zero-fish bag limit (when 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 = 1), and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐵𝐿, 
which represents the number of medium striped bass released above a positive bag limit 
(when 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 = 0). The model in Column (1) of Table 6 excludes regulations and the 
model in Column (2) adds the two minimum size regulations.   
In Column (1) of Table 6, the coefficient on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝐵𝐿 is 
negative and statistically significant, while that on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐵𝐿 is 
positive yet insignificant. This would suggest that the negative impact to angler utility 
from a marginal increase in 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 revealed in Column (1) of Table 5 is driven 
by catching-and-releasing medium striped bass. The model in Column (2) of Table 6, 
however, estimates positive and statistically equivalent coefficients on 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝐵𝐿 and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐵𝐿. It also estimates a 
negative and significant coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 that, along with other coefficient estimates, 
is consistent with our preferred specification from Table 5. The results in this column are 
evidence that the estimated impact of 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 on angler utility shown in 
Column (1) of Table 5 is confounded with the impact of catch-and-release regulations for 
medium striped bass. Hence, including the variable 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 in our model seems essential 
for disentangling the effect of catching-and-releasing medium striped bass from the effect 
of catch-and-release only regulations, a finding of which further supports the selection of 
Column (3) of Table 5 as our preferred specification.  
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
Table 6. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model with disaggregate medium release 
variables. 
Table 6. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model with 
disaggregate medium release variables.  
Variable (1) (2) 
Mean parameters   
    Small keep   0.346*** 0.227*** 
 (0.051) (0.061) 
    Medium keep   0.433*** 0.347*** 
 (0.062) (0.063) 
    Trophy keep   0.572*** 0.652*** 
 (0.083) (0.084) 
    Small release   0.077*** 0.096*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) 
    Medium release zero BL -0.177*** 0.144 
 (0.064) (0.100) 
    Medium release positive BL 0.133 0.131 
 (0.083) (0.083) 
    Trophy release   0.232*** 0.236*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
    Other catch 0.152*** 0.156*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
    Cost -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
    Opt-out -3.070*** -3.22*** 
 (0.134) (0.133) 
    Min. 28”  -0.108 
  (0.090) 
    Min. 30”  -0.671*** 
  (0.132) 
Standard deviation parameters   
    Small keep   0.968*** 0.965*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) 
    Medium keep   1.204*** 1.213*** 
 (0.064) (0.063) 
    Trophy keep   1.315*** 1.319*** 
 (0.105) (0.103) 
    Small release   0.418*** 0.414*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
    Medium release zero BL 0.540*** 0.583*** 
 (0.078) (0.076) 
    Medium release positive BL 0.587*** 0.605*** 
 (0.091) (0.090) 
    Trophy release   0.767*** 0.761*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) 
Log likelihood -2007.025 -2001.144 
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.359 0.361 
AIC 4048.0 4040.3 
Notes: Number of observations is 1,747. Number of individuals is 469. 500 Halton 
draws used to maximize the simulated log-likelihood.*,**, and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
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5.2 Relative Values of Keeping Striped Bass  
Recreational striped bass fishery managers are interested in understanding the 
tradeoffs anglers are willing to make between the number and size of fish that can be kept 
so that these tradeoffs can be considered when designing regulations. Hence, Table 7 
displays estimates of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between each pair of striped 
bass keep variables. These estimates imply the rate at which different sizes of harvestable 
striped bass can be exchanged while holding angler utility constant. An estimated MRS of 
one, for example, would indicate that two size-classes of harvestable striped bass perfect 
are substitutes in that they can be exchanged on a one-to-one basis.  
The MRS between attributes 𝑥ଵ and 𝑥ଶ is the ratio of the partial derivative of the 
utility function with respect to 𝑥ଵ to the partial derivative of the utility function with 
respect to 𝑥ଶ. Because we specify striped bass parameters to be normally distributed, 
Table 7 displays estimates of the mean MRS and 95% confidence intervals obtained 
using the Krinsky and Robb (1986) approach. We randomly draw observations from a 
multivariate normal distribution parametrized with the mean coefficients and covariance 
matrix of our preferred specification. Then, using these observations denoted 𝛽෨௫భ and 𝛽෨௫మ, 
we calculate the MRS. We repeat this process 5,000 times to obtain an estimate of the 
mean MRS between attributes 𝑥ଵ and 𝑥ଶ, 
  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑅𝑆௫భ,௫మ = ൭ ෍
𝛽෨௫భ
𝛽෨௫మ
ହ଴଴଴
൱ × 5000ିଵ. (11) 
 
95% confidence intervals are based on percentiles of the simulated distribution. 
All estimates displayed in Table 7 are significant at the 1% level of confidence. 
The first row indicates an angler willingness-to-exchange of one trophy, harvestable 
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striped bass for approximately three small ones. This result implies that, under certain 
conditions, a three-fish bag limit for small striped bass could compensate anglers for full 
harvest restrictions on trophy-sized striped bass. Based on the current objectives and 
status of the fishery, the estimate in the second row of Table 7 is perhaps more policy-
relevant. The estimate in this row implies that anglers are willing to forego one 
harvestable trophy fish if compensated with about two that are medium-sized. Thus, a 
two fish, 28” possession limit accompanied by a restriction on trophy harvest may be a 
viable regulatory alternative for mangers seeking to relax current one-fish 28” 
regulations, protect larger fish, and hold angler utility levels relatively constant. Finally, 
the third row shows that, to hold utility constant after giving up one harvestable medium-
sized striped bass, the average angler must harvest 1.52 small striped bass.   
Table 7. Mean MRS between striped bass keep attributes. 
Table 7. Mean MRS between striped bass keep attributes. 
Ratio Mean MRS  95% CI 
Trophy keep:small keep 2.906***  (1.665, 5.399) 
    
Trophy keep:medium keep 1.934***  (1.320, 2.827) 
    
Medium keep:small keep 1.52***  (0.866, 2.681) 
Notes: Mean MRS and 95% confidence intervals calculated using the Krinsky-
Robb approach with 5,000 replications. *,**, and *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
5.3 Angler Welfare  
 In addition to measuring the extent to which different size-classes of harvestable 
fish can be exchanged while holding angler utility constant, a primary objective of this 
analysis is to evaluate the nonmarket value of keeping and releasing striped bass. This 
information is critical for inferring the potential economic implications of changes in 
 35 
 
regulations. We therefore use estimates from our preferred model specification to 
calculate angler WTP for marginal changes in striped bass fishing trip attributes. Table 8 
displays mean WTP values and 95% confidence intervals, both calculated using the 
approach described in Section 5.2. 
All marginal WTP values for striped bass catch attributes are significant at the 1% 
confidence level expect for medium release, which is significant at the 5% level. 
Preference rankings among size-classes of striped bass revealed in Table 8 mirror those 
uncovered by our preferred model specification—trophy striped bass are substantially 
more valuable to anglers than medium-sized striped bass, the latter of which are only 
moderately more valuable to anglers than small striped bass. Angler WTP for a one-fish 
increase in the number of small, medium-sized, and trophy striped bass kept is $13.80, 
$19.80, and $37.26, respectively. Angler WTP for releasing an additional small, medium-
sized, and trophy striped bass, is $5.05, $7.32, and $13.84, respectively.  
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Table 8. Mean WTP for striped bass fishing trip attributes. 
Table 8. Mean WTP for striped bass fishing trip attributes.  
Attribute Mean WTP  95% CI 
Small keep 13.80***  (7.35, 20.43) 
    
Medium keep  19.80***  (13.50, 26.14) 
    
Trophy keep  37.26***  (28.72, 47.06) 
    
Small release 5.05***  (2.40, 8.03) 
    
Medium release  7.32**  (0.84, 14.12) 
    
Trophy release  13.84***  (9.48, 18.88) 
    
Other fish  8.67***  (6.44, 11.49) 
    
28” minimum size (1=yes) -6.31  (-16.91, 3.41) 
    
30” minimum size (1=yes) -36.92***  (-52.04, -23.56) 
Notes: Mean WTP and 95% confidence intervals calculated using the Krinsky-
Robb approach with 5,000 replications. *,**, and *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
Disaggregated across size-class and catch disposition, these WTP estimates 
provide a more detailed depiction of the recreational value of striped bass than that which 
currently exists. Hence, we cannot compare directly our results to those found previously, 
but a brief review of the extant literature is necessary. Gautum and Steinback (1998) 
examine how the aggregate recreational value the striped bass fishery could be affected 
by policies that increase the environmentally determined catch rate, such as the 1985-
1989 Atlantic striped bass fishery moratorium. Using telephone and intercept survey data, 
they estimate a RUM model and find that angler WTP for catching additional striped bass 
is $5.57.7 Using only the intercept survey data, they also estimate a travel cost model; this 
specification yields a $7.42 angler WTP value for catching additional striped bass. More 
                                                 
7 These values are inflation-adjusted 2016 dollars and represent WTP for one-fish increase in historical 
average catch rate. Because they are derived from models that allow for diminishing marginal utility of 
catch, WTP for the first fish caught is slightly higher.  
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recently, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigate the effects of 
reduced impingement and entrainment on recreational fishing opportunities in the mid-
Atlantic (U.S. EPA 2004). They estimate angler WTP for catching additional striped bass 
to $20.79 and $20.73 for boat and shore-based anglers, respectively, both values of which 
are considerably higher than those estimated in Gautum and Steinback (1998). Thus, in 
addition to providing more policy-relevant recreational use values for striped bass 
fishing, our results serve to mitigate the ambiguity that permeates current understandings 
of the nonmarket value of striped bass. 
In the remaining rows of Table 8, we find that angler WTP for a one-fish increase 
in the number of other fish caught on a striped bass fishing trip is $8.67. Estimated WTP 
for 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 is statistically significant, implying that anglers would require a $36.92 
discount to hold welfare constant with an increase in the minimum size limit from 20” to 
30”. The statistically insignificant WTP estimate associated with 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 implies that no 
angler discount would be required to hold utility constant with an increase in the 
minimum size limit from 20” to 28.  
Table 8 reveals a large degree of overlap in WTP confidence intervals for 
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, which suggests that these values may indistinguishably 
different. We formally test for differences in WTP across keep sizes in Table 9. As 
expected, keeping trophy striped bass is worth significantly more to anglers than keeping 
smaller ones: the difference in WTP between keeping trophy and medium-sized striped 
bass is $17.55, and the difference in WTP between keeping trophy and small striped bass 
is $23.61. The difference in WTP between keeping medium-sized and small striped bass, 
however, is insignificantly different than zero. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
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that the recreational values anglers place on keeping small and medium striped bass are 
equivalent.  
Table 9. Mean WTP differences between striped bass keep attributes. 
Table 9. Mean WTP differences between striped bass keep attributes. 
 Difference in mean WTP   95% CI 
Trophy keep - small keep 23.61***  (12.54, 35.91) 
    
Trophy keep - medium keep 17.55***  (7.77, 27.93) 
    
Medium keep - small keep 6.09   (-1.93, 14.14) 
Notes: Differences in mean WTP and 95% confidence intervals calculated using the Krinsky-
Robb approach with 5,000 replications. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
6 Assessing Survey Nonresponse Bias 
 The validity of inferences drawn from any nonmarket valuation study that relies 
on survey data rests on the assumption that estimated utility parameters represent the 
preferences of the study population at large. One potential source of bias that can threaten 
valid inference is the existence of systematic differences between respondents and non-
respondents that affect both the propensity to respond to the survey and the preference 
parameters estimated from the realized sample of respondents (Groves 2006). We utilize 
data collected from survey non-respondents during the telephone pre-screening interview 
to investigate whether angler preferences and WTP values are influenced by variation in 
demographic and fishing-related characteristics that affect individuals’ propensity to 
respond to the survey.  
 We follow the framework in Abdulrahman and Johnston (2016) and implement a 
two-stage procedure for assessing survey non-response bias. In the first stage, we 
estimate a binomial logit model where survey response is a function of age, income, 
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primary method of striped bass fishing, and likelihood of fishing in the next twelve 
months. In the second stage, we estimate a modified version of our preferred RUM model 
specification that includes interaction terms between trip attributes and predicted 
response propensities from the first stage. The coefficients on the interactions measure 
the degree to which mean marginal utilities of trip attributes vary with the predicted 
likelihood of responding to the survey.  
To understand how mean welfare estimates are potentially affected by survey non-
response bias, we use the second-stage model specification to evaluate WTP at (1) the 
average predicted response propensity for the realized sample (respondents) and (2) the 
average predicted response propensity for full sample (respondents and non-respondents), 
which we assume represents the average propensity to respond for the population of 
recreational striped bass anglers. We interpret the difference between (1) and (2) as the 
magnitude of the impact of survey non-response bias on angler welfare estimates.   
 
6.1 Propensity to Respond 
 We model the propensity to respond to the angler survey as a function of 
demographic and fishing-related variables. Since the model requires information about 
respondents and non-respondents, potential explanatory variables are limited to those 
derived from questions asked on both the telephone pre-screening interview and in the 
full survey. In addition to the first question which determined survey eligibility, the 
telephone pre-screening interview asked questions about anglers’ (1) primary method of 
striped bass fishing, (2) total number of recreational fishing trips taken in the past 12 
months, (3) total number of recreational striped bass fishing trips taken in the past 12 
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months, (4) likelihood of striped bass fishing next season, (5) age, and (6) income. 
However, some respondents in our main estimation sample, as well as some non-
respondents who completed the telephone interview, did not provide answers to all six 
questions. Fifty respondents did not indicate the total number of saltwater fishing trips 
nor the number of striped bass fishing trips they took in the past 12 months, thus we 
exclude these variables from the response propensity model. After removing those who 
did not answer at least one of the other four questions, we are left with a sample 
composed of 447 respondents and 110 non-respondents. 
 Comparing the characteristics of each group, which are displayed in Table 10, 
suggests the potential existence of systematic differences. We find no significant 
differences between the two groups in terms of days spent saltwater fishing in the past 12 
months (p-value = 0.073) or primary method of striped bass fishing (χ2(4) = 6.240, p-
value = 0.182). However, respondents and non-respondents differ significantly in the 
number days striped bass fishing in the past 12 months (p-value = 0.007), age (p-value = 
0.00), income (p-value = 0.018), and likelihood of fishing in the next 12 months (χ2(4) =  
42.946, p-value = 0.00). These observed differences justify further examination into the 
influence of survey non-response on our main results.  
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Table 10. Demographic and fishing-related information collected from respondents and non-respondents. 
Table 10. Demographic and fishing-related information collected from respondents 
and non-respondents. 
Variable 
Respondents included 
in full sample 
(N=469) 
Non-
respondents 
(N=143) 
Days saltwater fished past 12 months 
(mean days) 26.73 (n=419) 19.89 (n=139) 
Days striped bass fished past 12 months 
(mean days) 14.75 (n=419) 8.48 (n=137) 
Primary striped bass fishing mode  
(# individuals)(% of sample)   
    Shore 170 (36.25) 64 (44.76) 
    Kayak 14 (2.99) 3 (2.10) 
    Private motorized boat 256 (54.58) 64 (44.76) 
    Charter boat 20 (4.26) 10 (6.99) 
    Head or party boat 9 (1.92) 2 (1.40) 
    Did not answer 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Likelihood of recreational striped bass 
fishing during the next 12 months (# 
individuals)(% of sample) 
  
    Certain to go fishing  307 (65.46) 53 (37.06) 
    Very likely 111 (23.67) 53 (37.06) 
    Somewhat likely 41  (8.74) 25 (17.48) 
    Very unlikely 9 (1.92) 7 (4.90) 
    Definitely will not go fishing 1 (0.21) 4 (2.80) 
    Did not answer 0 (0.00) 1 (0.70) 
Age (mean age) 54.35 (n=460) 44.27 (n=135) 
Household income (# individuals)(% of 
sample)   
    Less than $20,000 13 (2.77) 5 (3.50) 
    $20,000 to $39,999 26 (5.54) 13 (9.09) 
    $40,000 to $59,999 53 (11.30) 21 (14.69) 
    $60,000 to $79,999 44 (9.38) 12 (8.39) 
    $80,000 to $99,999 67 (14.29) 14 (9.79) 
    $100,000 to $149,999 112 (23.88) 21 (14.69) 
    $150,000 to $199,999 80 (17.06) 10 (6.99) 
    $200,000 or more 54 (11.51) 15 (10.49) 
    Did not answer 20 (4.26) 32 (22.38) 
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Proceeding to the first-stage, we estimate a binomial logit model in which the 
propensity that individual 𝑛 responds to the survey is specified as 
  𝑃௡(𝑦௡ ≠ 0|𝑍௡) = 𝛼𝑍௡ + 𝑒௡, (12) 
   
where the dependent variable, 𝑦௡, is discrete and equals one if an individual responds to 
the survey and zero otherwise, 𝑍௡ is a vector of demographic and fishing related variables 
whose relative impact on response propensity is measured by the parameters in 𝛼, and 𝑒௡ 
is an independently and identically distributed error term. 
Table 11 displays odds ratio estimates from Equation (12). All estimates are 
statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence or higher except for that on the 
indicator variable for primary fishing method, which equals one if an individual fishes for 
striped bass from a kayak, private boat, charter boat, or party boat, and zero otherwise. 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 is measured using the midpoint of each response category8 and the magnitude of 
its estimate indicates that for each a $10,000 increase in household income, the odds an 
individual responds to the survey by a factor of 1.039. Age is also positively correlated 
with response propensity; a one-year increase in individuals’ age increases the odds of 
responding the survey by a factor of 1.056. Intuitively, response propensity decreases 
with decreases in individuals’ likelihood of fishing in the next 12 months. Compared to 
those who are certain to go fishing, the odds that individuals who will “definitely will not 
go fishing” respond to the survey are lower by roughly a factor of 12. In the final step of 
the first-stage, we use the model defined by Equation (12) to obtain individuals’ predicted 
probability of responding to the survey conditional on the covariates in 𝑍௡, which is 
                                                 
8 We set the highest income category, $200,000 or more, to $225,000.    
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calculated as 
  
𝑃௡෡ (𝑦௡ ≠ 0|𝑍௡) =
exp(𝛼𝑍௡ + 𝑒௡)
1 + exp(𝛼𝑍௡ + 𝑒௡)
 . (13) 
   
 
Table 11. Results from response propensity model. 
Table 11. Results from response propensity model.  
Variable Odds Ratio (standard error) 
Primarily fish for striped bass on a boat (1=yes) 1.086 
 (0.260) 
Income ($10,000s) 1.039** 
 (0.020) 
Age 1.056*** 
 (0.009) 
Likelihood of recreational striped bass fishing 
during the next 12 months†  
    Very likely 0.378*** 
 (0.100) 
    Somewhat likely 0.247*** 
 (0.084) 
    Very unlikely 0.209** 
 (0.134) 
    Definitely will not go fishing 0.083** 
 (0.099) 
Constant 0.307** 
 (0.150) 
Number of observations                  557 
Pseudo R2                 0.162 
Notes: †baseline is “Certain to go fishing”. *,**, and *** represent significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively 
 
6.2 Response Bias in Marginal Utilities and WTP Values  
The second stage integrates the predictions from Equation (13) into the RUM 
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model defined by equation 10.9 We interact all non-cost attributes (𝑋௡௝௧) with 𝑃௡෡  and the 
utility function is written as  
  𝑈௡௝௧ = 𝛽௞𝑋௡௝௧ + 𝛽଼𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡௡௝௧ +  𝛽௟𝑋௡௝௧𝑃௡෡ + 𝜀௡௝௧. (14) 
   
Here, marginal utilities of the fishing trip attributes are given by (𝛽௞ +  𝛽௟𝑃௡෡ ) and the 
marginal utility of trip cost is measured by 𝛽଼. The coefficients in 𝛽௟ indicate the degree 
to which variation in predicted response propensity differentially affects the marginal 
utility of fishing trip attributes. To assess whether such variation affects welfare 
estimates, we use the Krinsky and Robb approached discussed in Section 5.2 and, for 
each attribute, evaluate WTP at (1) the average predicted response propensity for the 
realized sample (respondents), 𝑃௠௥෢ , and (2) the average predicted response propensity for 
full sample (respondents and non-respondents), 𝑃௠௔෢ :  
  
𝑊𝑇𝑃௠௔ =
𝛽௞ + 𝛽௟𝑃௠௔෢
𝛽଼
, (15) 
 
𝑊𝑇𝑃௠௥ =
𝛽௞ + 𝛽௟𝑃௠௥෢
𝛽଼
. (16) 
   
For each attribute, we calculate the difference between 𝑊𝑇𝑃௠௔ and 𝑊𝑇𝑃௠௥. This 
measures the degree to which marginal WTP values differ between the realized sample 
and the population based on demographic and fishing-related variations in response 
propensity, and is written as 
  
𝑊𝑇𝑃ௗ௜௙௙ =
𝛽௞ + 𝛽௟𝑃௠௔෢
𝛽଼
−
𝛽௞ + 𝛽௟𝑃௠௥෢
𝛽଼
=
𝛽௞ + 𝛽௟൫𝑃௠௔෢ − 𝑃௠௥෢ ൯
𝛽଼
 . (17) 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, the inverse of predicted response propensity can be used to weight observations prior to 
estimation. Estimates from this specification, displayed in the Appendix, are consistent with those 
estimated by our preferred specification. 
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Table 12 displays results from the unrestricted model, defined by Equation (10), 
which includes interaction terms between fishing trip attributes and predicted response 
propensities. For reasons discussed above, however, this sample includes fewer 
individuals than the main estimation sample used in Table 5. Therefore, Table 12 also 
displays results from a restricted model that excludes the additional interaction terms. 
Comparing results from the restricted model to those from our preferred specification, 
shown in Column (3) of Table 5, allows us to assess the extent to which estimated fishing 
trip preferences differ between the full and reduced sample.  
Results of the restricted model in Table 12 are broadly consistent with the results 
of our preferred specification. Except for the statistically insignificant coefficient on 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, estimated parameters from the restricted model maintain the sign, 
level of significance, and approximate magnitude as their analogues in Column (3) of 
Table 5. Because each specification utilizes a different sample, we cannot explicitly test 
for differences in utility model parameters, yet the consistency of estimation results 
between the two specifications bolsters our confidence in the validity of the inferences 
drawn from this analysis. 
The coefficients on the interaction terms included the unrestricted model can be 
interpreted as the deviation in mean marginal utilities associated with a one percentage 
point change in the predicted likelihood of response. Most of these coefficients, however, 
are statistically insignificant. We interpret this as evidence that, for these attributes, 
estimated mean marginal utilities do not suffer from the presence of non-response bias. 
The statistically significant and negative coefficient on 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ × 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 indicates 
that the baseline level of utility from catching other species of legal-sized fish on striped 
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bass trips is lower for those who have a higher propensity to respond to the survey.  
Table 12. Results from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model with propensity score interactions. 
 
Table 12. Results from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model with propensity score interactions. 
 Restricted  Unrestricted 
Attribute Mean St. Dev.   Mean St. Dev. 
Main effects      
    Small keep   0.246***      0.938***  -0.203 0.933*** 
 (0.061) (0.068)  (0.384) (0.069) 
    Medium keep   0.298*** 1.167***  0.087 1.134*** 
 (0.063) (0.062)  (0.330) (0.062) 
    Trophy keep   0.662*** 1.253***  0.973** 1.244*** 
 (0.084) (0.101)  (0.459) (0.101) 
    Small release   0.089*** 0.400***  -0.039 0.396*** 
 (0.023) (0.025)  (0.148) (0.025) 
    Medium release   0.092 0.501***  0.605 0.492*** 
 (0.060) (0.060)  (0.384) (0.061) 
    Trophy release   0.242*** 0.677***  0.184 0.687*** 
 (0.035) (0.041)  (0.205) (0.042) 
    Other catch 0.147***   0.379***  
 (0.016)   (0.107)  
    Cost -0.017***   -0.016***  
 (0.002)   (0.002)  
    Opt-out -3.155***   -0.723  
 (0.130)   (0.617)  
    Min. 28” -0.098   -0.797  
 (0.090)   (0.550)  
    Min. 30” -0.689***   -0.591  
 (0.108)   (0.752)  
Interactions      
    Small keep × Score   0.537  
    (0.450)  
    Medium keep × Score   0.238  
    (0.389)  
    Trophy keep × Score     -0.390  
    (0.537)  
    Small release × Score     0.151  
    (0.174)  
    Medium release × Score     -0.606  
    (0.448)  
    Trophy release × Score     0.069  
    (0.244)  
    Other catch × Score   -0.277**  
    (0.124)  
    Opt-out × Score    -2.933***  
    (0.732)  
    Min. 28” × Score   0.843  
    (0.647)  
    Min. 30” × Score   -0.133  
    (0.865)  
Log likelihood -1937.26  -1924.27 
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.358  0.362 
AIC 3908.5  3902.5 
Notes: Number of observations is 1,684. Number of individuals is 447. 500 Halton draws used to maximize the 
simulated log-likelihood.*,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. 
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 Likewise, those who are have a higher propensity to respond to the survey are less 
likely to choose the no-fish trip alternative, as indicated by the negative and significant 
coefficient on 𝑂𝑝𝑡 − 𝑜𝑢𝑡 × 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒. Taken together with the findings in Table 11 that 
reveal response propensity to be positively correlated with likelihood of fishing for 
striped bass in the next 12 months, these results intuitively suggest that, compared to 
those less likely to go fishing, individuals who are more likely to go striped bass fishing 
next year receive less utility from (1) catching non-striped bass species while fishing for 
striped bass and (2) not fishing for striped bass. 
We now examine the extent to which variation in response propensity based on 
demographic and fishing-related characteristics affects welfare calculations. Columns (2) 
and (3) of Table 13 displays mean WTP values for fishing trip attributes based on the 
restricted model. In Columns (4) and (5), we show the results of Equations (15) and (16), 
respectively. The sixth column of Table 13 displays differences between mean WTP 
evaluated at 𝑃௠௔෢  and mean WTP evaluated at 𝑃௠௥෢ , calculated from equation 17. We 
duplicate WTP estimates from our main analysis in the second column of Table 13 to 
assess differences in welfare calculations between the full sample (Column 2) and the 
reduced, non-response sample (Column 3).  
As revealed previously by comparing utility model parameters, we find no 
substantial differences in the magnitudes of WTP values between those derived from the 
full and non-response sample except for that pertaining to a marginal change in 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, which becomes insignificant when estimated using the non-response 
sample. Across fishing trip attributes, WTP values evaluated at the mean propensity score 
of respondents and non-respondents (Column 4) are consistent with those evaluated  
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Table 13. Estimates of and differences in mean WTP evaluated at the average predicted response propensity for the 
realized sample (respondents) and full sample (respondents and non-respondents). 
Table 13. Estimates of and differences in mean WTP evaluated at the average predicted response 
propensity for the realized sample (respondents) and full sample (respondents and non-respondents).  
 Restricted  Unrestricted 
Attribute Main sample Non-response sample 
 All 
(𝑊𝑇𝑃௠௔) 
Respondents 
(𝑊𝑇𝑃௠௥) 
Difference 
in means 
(𝑊𝑇𝑃ௗ௜௙௙) 
Small keep 13.80*** 14.80***  13.84*** 14.93*** -1.10 
 (7.35, 20.43) (8.04, 21.74)  (6.57, 21.31) (7.96, 22.25) (-3.08, 0.72) 
Medium keep 19.80*** 17.82***  16.92*** 17.28*** -0.44 
 (13.50, 26.14) (11.28, 24.72)  (9.61, 24.03) (10.45, 24.16) (-2.01, 1.12) 
Trophy keep 37.26*** 39.84***  40.39*** 39.49*** 0.79 
 (28.72, 47.06) (30.42, 50.88)  (30.76, 51.67) (29.95, 50.31) (-1.28, 2.98) 
Small release 5.05*** 5.37***  5.07*** 5.35*** -0.31 
 (2.40, 8.03) (2.41, 8.67)  (2.07, 8.51) (2.45, 8.70) (-1.06, 0.40) 
Medium release 7.32** 5.51  7.25* 6.08 1.24 
 (0.84, 14.12) (-1.61, 12.69)  (-0.14, 15.06) (-1.29, 13.71) (-0.56, 3.14) 
Trophy release 13.84*** 14.70***  14.73*** 14.79*** -0.14 
 (9.48, 18.88) (10.05, 20.46)  (9.49, 21.29) (9.72, 21.13) (-1.13, 0.88) 
Other fish 8.67*** 8.88***  9.64*** 9.05*** 0.57** 
 (6.44, 11.49) (6.37, 11.99)  (6.90, 13.22) (6.54, 12.31) (0.069, 1.11) 
28” minimum  -6.31 -5.93  -7.52 -5.82 -1.69 
size (1=yes) (-16.91, 3.41) (-17.58, 4.79)  (-20.34, 3.98) (-18.13, 5.38) (-4.45, 0.94) 
30” minimum  -36.92*** -41.80***  -43.11*** -43.14*** 0.30 
size (1=yes) (-52.04, -3.56) (60.03, -27.44)  (-62.24, -26.87) (-61.91, -27.96) (-3.21, 3.80) 
# observations 1,747 1,684  1,684 1,684 1,684 
# individuals 469 447  447 447 447 
Notes: Mean WTP, differences in means, and 95% confidence intervals (below in parenthesis) 
calculated using the Krinsky-Robb approach with 5,000 replications. *,**, and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
at the mean propensity score of respondents (Column 5). Differences between Column 
(4) and Column (5) estimates, shown in Column (6) of Table 13, can be interpreted as the 
degree to which survey non-response bias affects estimated WTP values. Estimates in 
Column (6) are statistically insignificant for all attributes except 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ, yet the 
magnitude of this coefficient trivial. Overall, the results in Column (6) provide 
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considerable evidence against the notion that our estimates of WTP are affected by bias 
related to survey non-response propensity. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 To meet the demands of fishery managers, this study “[evaluates] striped bass 
angler preferences for size of harvested fish and tradeoffs with bag limits” (ASMFC 
2018). We separately identify the recreational value anglers place on keeping and 
releasing small, medium, and trophy striped bass using data from a recent choice 
experiment survey. In line with the results from choice experiment studies focused on 
other recreational species, model estimates indicate that anglers place a higher value on 
striped bass that may be kept than on those that must be released. However, in contrast to 
the results of some of these studies indicating that angler welfare increases less than 
proportionally with catch size (Goldsmith et al. 2018; Anderson and Lee 2013), we find 
that the recreational value of keeping or releasing striped bass increases almost 
exponentially with fish size, which likely reflects the sportfishing nature of the Atlantic 
striped bass fishery. Additionally, we find little evidence to suggest that our welfare 
estimates suffer from the presence of survey non-response bias.   
Accounting for the recreational value of catching-and-releasing striped bass is 
necessary to accurately assess the extent to which harvest restrictions affect anglers. One 
finding pertinent to this claim is the relatively high recreational value anglers place on 
catching-and-releasing trophy-sized striped bass. Our estimates indicate that releasing a 
trophy striped bass is slightly more valuable to anglers than keeping a small one, and only 
slightly less valuable than keeping a medium-sized one. While anglers will incur a 
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considerable welfare loss from catching-and-releasing a trophy-sized striped bass as 
opposed to keeping that same fish, the results suggest that such a loss can be largely 
recouped if an angler catches and keeps a medium striped bass on the same trip. We do 
not investigate the underlying factors driving the high catch-and-release value of trophy 
striped bass, but one possible explanation is the ostensibly widespread support for 
conservation-minded fishing practices given by regulatory and other agencies across the 
study region. In addition to being implicit in recreational regulations that fully or partially 
restrict trophy harvest, many states encourage such practices through voluntary catch-
and-release award programs or tournaments; in Maryland, for example, recreational 
anglers who release alive a striped bass longer than 40” can receive the Governor’s 
Striped Bass Conservation Award. Some volunteer conservation organization employ 
similar tactics; Striper Forever’s Release a Breeder Club, for example, recognizes anglers 
who release unharmed striped bass longer than 36” in total length.  
 Our study provides additional insight into the effects of including versus 
excluding catch-and-release regulations in models of angler utility applied to choice 
experiment data. When we exclude catch-and-release regulations from the model, the 
estimated impact to angler utility from releasing medium-sized striped bass is negative. 
Our preferred model specification, however, which includes catch-and-release 
regulations, estimates a positive relationship between angler utility and releasing 
medium-sized striped bass, the magnitude of which intuitively falls within the range of 
that associated with releasing small and trophy-sized striped bass. Estimates from this 
model indicate that angler utility is negatively affected by catch-and-release regulations 
for medium-sized (29”) striped bass, yet unaffected when such regulations are applied to 
 51 
 
small or trophy striped bass. While specific to the context of this study, these findings 
highlight the importance of controlling for catch-and-release regulations in models of 
angler utility that rely on DCE data.  
 While the results of our study can be used to infer the potential economic impact 
of changes in recreational striped bass fishing regulations, some limitations exist. First, 
when generating keep and released variables from the DCE data, anglers are assumed to 
harvest all fish that can be legally retained, but further research is needed to understand 
whether this is a realistic depiction of angler behavior. Second, evaluating the extent to 
which changes in striped bass regulations affect aggregate trip demand and angler welfare 
requires considering the proportion of fishing trips that may be affected by such changes, 
which is outside the scope of this study. In the next chapter of this dissertation, however, 
we use results from this analysis to evaluate aggregate fishery outcomes conditional on 
changes in recreational Atlantic striped bass regulations.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SHORT-RUN ECONOMIC AND BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
RECREATIONAL ATLANTIC STRIPED BASS FISHING POLICY 
 
1 Introduction 
Recreational fisheries managers often attempt meet short-run conservation 
objectives by adjusting daily possession and size limit regulations. These policy actions 
influence aggregate recreational fishing demand by altering the incentives faced by 
individual anglers. If inaccurately predicted or left unaccounted, however, policy-induced 
shifts in demand may undermine managers’ attempts to meet intended conservation 
objectives or result in policies that overly reduce angler welfare. To predict the 
concurrent impacts of policy action on demand, welfare, and fishing mortality—key 
linkages in the coupled social-ecological system of recreational fishing (Fenichel et al. 
2013; Hunt et al. 2013)—it is necessary to evaluate the incentives faced by anglers.  
We evaluate the incentives faced by recreational Atlantic striped bass anglers and 
use this knowledge to predict aggregate, short-run economic and biological effects of 
changing possession (bag) and size limits. Our predictive model of angler behavior links 
recreational striped bass fishing policy in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut 
to individual, trip-level outcomes. The model is parameterized with the results of a recent 
choice experiment survey, where angler participation and welfare are conditional on trip 
cost and the number and size of striped bass kept and released. It simulates the fishery 
under actual 2015 policy conditions, imposes alternative 2015 bag and size limits, and 
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calculates resultant changes in angler welfare and demand. We use estimates of the 
change in recreational demand occurring under alternative 2015 policy conditions to 
compute expected levels recreational fishing mortality. By comparing model outputs 
across several bag and size limit combinations, we illustrate the biological and economic 
tradeoffs created by different recreational Atlantic striped bass fishing policies. 
A central research objective is to assess the effect of different harvest-size 
restrictions on angler welfare and female spawning stock biomass (SSB). The 
recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery provides an excellent canvas for illustrating 
these tradeoffs because (a) the most recent estimate of female SSB, while preliminary, is 
below the binding management threshold, indicating that the stock is overfished (ASMFC 
2018), (b) trophy-sized striped bass are almost exclusively part of the spawning stock 
(Bigelow and Schroeder 1953), and (c) the recreational value of striped bass increases 
exponentially with the size of fish kept or released. Thus, this fishery is particularly 
suited for investigating the economic and biological implications of full or partial harvest 
restrictions on trophy-sized striped bass.  
Results indicate that striped bass angler welfare is highly responsive to changes in 
the baseline minimum size limit because such policy adjustments strongly influence the 
rate at which angler encounter harvestable striped bass. Conforming to intuition, we find 
that harvest slot policies, which specify both a minimum and maximum size limit, more 
effectively mitigate mature female fishing mortality than minimum length only policies. 
But when these types of policies specify a narrow legal size range, they may lead to 
inefficient outcomes in terms of angler welfare and total recreational fishing mortality. 
We also find instances where two or more policies yield similar impacts to angler welfare 
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and recreational fishing mortality but differ considerably in their effect on female SSB. 
These and other findings highlight the importance of accounting for both angler welfare 
and the biological characteristics of the stock when proposed policy action seeks to 
efficiently reach socioeconomic and conservation goals of fisheries management.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we provide 
background information about the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery. In Section 3 
and 4, we discuss the relevant literature examining the biological and economic impacts 
of recreational fishing regulations. Section 5 discusses the data used to estimate the 
angler behavioral model and we interpret results from this model in Section 6. Section 7 
describes our procedure for evaluating aggregate impacts of recreational striped bass 
fishing. In Sections 8, we discuss results of the aggregate demand model and we conclude 
our analysis in Section 8.  
 
2 Fishery Background 
Atlantic striped bass are the most prominent and heavily targeted recreational 
species found along the coast from Maine to North Carolina. Typically caught or targeted 
on more than 20 million recreational fishing trips annually, striped bass are also one of 
most-harvested recreational species in the region; in fact, from 2012 to 2016, annual 
average harvest volume of Atlantic striped bass was the largest among all recreationally 
targeted species in the U.S. (NMFS 2017).  
Given the popularity of Atlantic striped bass as a recreational target, excessive 
recreational harvest is a perpetual concern for the fishery’s governing body, the Atlantic 
States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC). The ASMFC sets biological targets and 
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thresholds for the rate of fishing mortality (F) and level of female spawning stock 
biomass (SSB). They then translate these biological reference points into a set of standard 
recreational regulations for the coastwide fishery but allow coastal states to implement 
alternative, conservation equivalent regulations. This regulatory flexibility typically 
results in a variety of state-level recreational striped bass bag and size limits, the latter 
which include minimum lengths, harvest slots, and protected harvest slots, as shown in 
Figure 1.10  
The most notable regulatory change made in recent years was prompted by results 
of the stock assessment for 2012. In addition to revealing a steady decline in female SSB 
below target levels since 2006, the stock assessment projected with high probability that 
female SSB would fall below its threshold in subsequent years if the rate of fishing 
mortality remained at 2012 levels. As a precautionary measure to conserve the spawning 
population, the ASMFC approved Addendum 4 to Amendment 6 of the fishery’s 
management plan, which called for a 25% reduction in harvest from 2012 levels in 
coastal states beginning during the 2015 fishing season (ASMFC 2014). Managers 
expected that in addition to conserving the population of spawning fish by reducing 
fishing mortality, Addendum 4’s mandate would effectively protect a strong 2011 year-
class. In response to the mandate, many coastal states adopted a one-fish, 28” or longer 
daily recreational possession limit during 2015.  
Results of the 2016 stock assessment update proved the Addendum 4 measures 
successful. Coastwide harvest of Atlantic striped bass in 2015 was reduced by 22.4% 
                                                 
10 Minimum size limits specify a minimum length of legally harvestable fish, harvest slots specify a 
minimum and maximum length of legally harvestable fish, and protected harvest slots specify a minimum 
and maximum length of fish that cannot be legally harvested. 
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relative to 2012 levels, and all sectors achieved or exceeded their harvest reduction goal 
except for the Chesapeake Bay recreational sector, within which harvest increased by 
53.4% relative to 2012 (ASMFC 2016b). Total F in 2015 was estimated to be 0.16, below 
both its target (0.18) and threshold (0.22) level (ASMFC 2016a). Female SSB in 2015 
was estimated to be 58,853 metric tons (mt), which is below its target of 72,032 mt and 
above its threshold of 57,626 mt.  
However, improvements to the status of the stock engendered by the Addendum 4 
measures were short-lived. Preliminary results of the 2018 benchmark stock assessment, 
which introduced a two-stock statistical catch-at-age model rather than the single-stock 
approach used previously, show that in 2017, female SSB and F for the Delaware 
Bay/Hudson River stock, and female SSB and Focean (but not FChesapeake Bay) for the 
Chesapeake Bay stock surpassed the biological threshold level (ASMFC 2018). Hence, it 
is likely that the Delaware Bay/Hudson River and Chesapeake Bay stock are currently 
overfished, the Chesapeake Bay stock is experiencing overfishing in the ocean but not in 
the Chesapeake Bay, and the Delaware Bay/Hudson River stock is experiencing 
 
3 Relevant Biological Literature 
Given the current status of the Atlantic striped bass fishery and prevailing 
management objectives, it is pertinent to explore the short-run impacts to angler welfare, 
total fishing mortality, and mature female fishing mortality of alternative legal harvest 
size restrictions. In the Atlantic striped bass and other recreational fisheries, minimum 
length only, harvest slots, and other types of harvest size restrictions are to employed to 
prevent recruitment overfishing, a condition in which the spawning stock is depleted to a 
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level at which future recruitment declines strongly (Allen et al. 2013). Of course, the 
appropriate specification of the legal harvest size restrictions depends on biological 
characteristics, current stock conditions, and management objectives of the fishery in 
question. Yet increasing attention has been paid to the biological and fishing-quality 
ramifications of minimum length only (ML) and harvest slot (HS) policies in recreational 
fisheries management. 
Compared to ML policies, HSs have been shown to maintain more natural age 
structures, more positively affect spawning and recruitment potential, produce higher 
harvest numbers and trophy catch, lead to lower discard mortality, and distribute sex-
biased fishing exploitation more evenly across both sexes for a variety of recreational 
species (Arlinghaus et al. 2010; Pierce 2010; Wilde 1997; Koehn and Todd 2012; Morson 
et al. 2017). Gwinn et al. (2015) evaluate the differential effect of ML versus HS policies 
on fishery outcomes for a range of representative fisheries. They simulate an age- and 
size-structured fish population model under multiple exploitation level and life-history 
parameterizations. For each exploitation level (low and high) they define three 
management objectives (harvest-oriented, trophy-catch oriented, and a compromise 
between the two former objectives), choose the objective-meeting ML and HS policy, and 
calculate fishery and conservation metrics at that regulation. Most relevant to the current 
study are Gwinn et al. (2015)’s simulation results pertaining to the life-history 
parametrization of “large-bodied fish with slow growth, late maturation, and high levels 
of density-dependent recruitment compensation (e.g. striped bass Morone saxatilis, 
Moronidae)”. Across the three management objectives, each evaluated under two 
exploitation levels, they find that compared to ML policies, HSs lead to more desirable 
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outcomes in terms of recreational harvest levels, trophy catch, spawning potential ratio, 
and the proportion of fecundity produced by the older population, but less desirable 
outcomes in terms of biomass yields. Despite the latter finding and taken together with 
results of other life-history parameterizations, the authors posit that for range of 
management objectives, HS policies can produce more favorable compromises between 
fishing-quality and conservation outcomes than ML policies. 
Naturally arising from these studies is a question that has yet to be addressed 
thoroughly in the current body of literature. That is, to what extent does the aggregate 
economic value of recreational fishing vary with the imposition of minimum length only 
versus harvest slot policies? We address this question in the context of the recreational 
Atlantic striped bass fishery by quantifying both economic and biological returns to a 
variety of minimum length only and harvest slot policies and by doing so, compliment 
the stream of recent biological literature on the topic.  
 
4 Relevant Economic Literature 
Many of the economic studies concerned with assessing the potential economic 
effect of recreational fishing regulations estimate angler preferences or willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) values for marginal changes in fishing trip characteristics. As fishery managers 
are often concerned with the potential effect of new policies, many economists have 
employed stated preference (SP) methods for nonmarket valuation (Hicks 2002; Aas et al. 
2000; Cha and Melstrom 2018; Knoche and Lupi 2016; Lew and Larson 2014, 2012, 
2015; Lew and Seung 2010; Duffield et al. 2012; Goldsmith et al. 2018). SP methods 
allows researchers to evaluate angler preferences for and behavioral responses to virtually 
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any hypothetical policy scenario because, in contrast to revealed preference methods that 
require data on observed behavior, they rely on data obtained from individual responses 
to survey questions, carefully designed to compensate for missing or inadequate 
observational data.  
While estimating angler WTP values is a viable way to understand the value an 
average angler places on catching, harvesting, or releasing fish, or on alternative sets of 
regulations, these values poorly describe broad economic effects of policy-induced 
changes in fishing trip quality. Some studies infer these effects by inserting into the utility 
function and incrementally changing average historical values of the explanatory 
variables (Goldsmith et al. 2018; Gautum and Steinback 1998). Because discrete choice 
models are nonlinear in explanatory variables, however, inserting average historical 
values of these variables can lead to biased estimates of the average response (Train 
2003).  
Additionally, adequately evaluating the broad economic effects of regulatory 
change requires considering the randomness in catch and hence the number of fishing 
trips that may be affected by such changes, as in a few studies on the topic. McConnell et 
al. (1995) estimate angler WTP values for catching additional fish using results from 
travel cost model and, separately, model catch at a particular fishing site as a function of 
the historical catch rate, time spent fishing, and experience. The effect of a bag limit is 
introduced by allowing it to truncate the distribution of fish kept which, under the 
assumption that anglers receive utility from keeping their catch, shifts the expected mean 
catch rate. To calculate the resultant welfare impacts while accounting for randomness in 
catch, McConnell et al. (1995) evaluate the behavioral model at different distributions of 
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catch, but the model operates under the implicit assumption that the recreational value to 
anglers of releasing fish is zero. More recently, Anderson et al. (2013) integrate marginal 
values of keeping and releasing fish, estimated using DCE data, and historical catch data 
into a simulation model to evaluate angler WTP to avoid fishery closures for rockfish and 
other species in the Puget Sound of Washington. Using the same data and a similar 
methodology, Anderson and Lee (2013) evaluate angler WTP for increases in salmon bag 
limits and test for differences in harvest values between wild and hatchery-reared salmon.  
Some economists have sought to understand how regulations affect anglers as 
well as fish stocks (Homans and Ruliffson 1999; Anderson 1993). Woodward and Griffin 
(2003) develop a theoretical model of angling behavior with which they derive the short- 
and long-term implications of recreational bag and size limits on future stock levels. 
Their theoretical results suggest that bag limits are always as effective as size limits at 
reducing fishing mortality, but for both types of policies, the actual stock implications 
depend partly on whether fishing quality and angler effort are substitutes or compliments. 
Woodward and Griffin (2003) then apply their theoretical model to an empirical context 
by estimating a bioeconomic model of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery. Modelling 
fishing demand as a function of travel costs, household income, expected catch rates, 
anglers’ fishing experience, and boat ownership, they find that the effects of regulations 
on future stock levels and angler welfare is highly dependent on the discard mortality 
rate; when discard mortality rates are high, size limits policies can lead to outcomes that 
fall below the efficient frontier of welfare and spawning stock levels. Like McConnell et 
al. (1995), however, and due a lack of available data, their model implicitly assumes that 
the marginal value to anglers of releasing their catch is zero.  
 61 
 
A few recent studies consider both randomness in catch and the recreational value 
of releasing fish when evaluating the aggregate effects of changes in regulations. 
Providing the framework for the current research, these studies simulate fishery outcomes 
under alternative regulatory conditions by parameterizing an aggregate demand model 
with the results of a choice experiment analysis. Holzer and McConnell (2017) examine 
how alternative assumptions about summer flounder anglers’ risk preferences for harvest 
uncertainty affect welfare and participation predictions. The authors explicitly introduce 
summer flounder catch uncertainty by defining its levels in the DCE with ranges of 
possible outcomes, as opposed to with discrete values. Estimates from utility models 
specified under the assumption of risk aversion indicate that their sample is, on average, 
risk averse to random variation in summer flounder harvest. To introduce the effect of 
policy changes in the northeast U.S. recreational summer flounder fishery as shifting the 
entire catch distribution, which consequently affects both the mean of and dispersion in 
expected harvest, their simulation model specifies anglers’ expected level of harvest and 
release as averages over multiple draws of the choice occasion. After repeating the 
simulation procedure under alternative risk preference parameterizations, they find that 
failing to account for angler risk aversion for uncertainty in harvest, when such 
preferences hold, can lead to misestimated predictions of welfare changes in response to 
changes in regulations.  
 Lee et al. (2017)’s bioeconomic model of recreational cod and haddock fishing in 
the northeast is currently used to determine fishing regulations for these species (83 
Federal Register 18972). In this illustration of the model, they evaluate the efficacy of 
actual and alternative 2014 policies at reaching allowable catch limits (ACL) for both 
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species. They find that while both the actual and proposed 2014 policies had similarly 
minimal effects on stock levels three years in the future, only the actual 2014 policy met 
target ACLs for both species. Underlying this result, however, was an assumed 0% 
haddock discard mortality rate that was subsequently revised by managers to 50%. 
Simulation results based on the revised estimate reveal that neither the actual nor 
proposed 2014 policies would have successfully met the recreational haddock ACL, a 
finding that exemplifies how management success can depend on the time lag in 
obtaining new scientific information.  
The structure of our aggregate demand model is similar to that employed by 
Holzer and McConnell (2017) and Lee et al. (2017) in that angler welfare and behavior 
responds to policy-induced shifts in the rate at which legal-sized fish are encountered. Yet 
we build on the framework established in these studies by incorporating keep and release 
parameters for small, medium, and trophy-sized fish such that angler behavior is also 
influenced by policy-induced changes in the proportion of small, medium-sized, and 
trophy-sized striped bass that constitute the harvestable population. This modification is 
essential given the findings in Section 6 that suggest the recreational value of keeping and 
releasing striped bass increases exponentially with the size of fish caught. 
 
5 Angler Behavioral Model 
We model of angler behavior using the choice experiment data and random utility 
maximum (RUM) framework described in Chapter 1. Fishing trip utility is specified as a 
function of the number of the number of small, medium, and trophy striped bass kept and 
released (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, 
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𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, and 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, respectively), the number of other legal-sized fish 
caught (𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ), the trip cost (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡), and the opt-out alternative (𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡). We 
also include two indicators variables, 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 and 𝑀𝑖𝑛30, which measure the differential 
impact to fishing trip utility from a 28” and 30” minimum size limit relative to the impact 
of 20” minimum size limit, respectively. The utility that angler 𝑛 receives from 
alternative 𝑗, in choice scenario 𝑡, is: 
       𝑈௡௝௧ = 𝑉௡௝௧  + 𝜀௡௝௧                                                            
 𝑈௡௝௧ = 𝛽ଵ𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝௡௝௧  
               + 𝛽ସ𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௡௝௧ + 𝛽ହ𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௡௝௧ + 𝛽଺𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௡௝௧ 
               + 𝛽଻𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ௡௝௧ + 𝛽଼𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଽ𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡௡௝௧  
               + 𝛽ଵ଴𝑀𝑖𝑛28௡௝௧ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝑀𝑖𝑛30௡௝௧ + 𝜀௡௝௧. (1) 
   
where the indirect utility function, 𝑉௡௝௧ = 𝛽ᇱ𝑥௡௝௧, relates observed attributes to utility, 𝛽ᇱ 
measures the relative importance to anglers of the attributes 𝑥௡௝௧ that describe alternative 
𝑗, and 𝜀 captures the utility derived from all other unobservable factors.  
Equation (1) is estimated using a random parameters logit (RPL) specification, 
which allows some or all parameters to be randomly distributed across the population of 
sampled anglers. We specify the striped bass catch parameters to be normally distributed, 
which captures the most important sources of heterogeneity in the context of this study, 
and treat the other parameters as fixed.11 Because respondents selected both a first- and 
second-most preferred alternative in each of up to four DCE questions, we treat the data 
as a panel and specify the response variable to be a full ranking of alternatives, as 
                                                 
11 Alternative models in which all non-cost parameters are specified to be normally distributed 
yielded qualitatively similar results but at the expense less precisely estimated coefficients. 
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opposed to as a single choice. Compared to those that use unranked data, choice models 
estimated using ranked data have been shown to improve the precision, and thus reduce 
sampling variance of estimated utility parameters (Chapman and Staelin 1982).  
Table 14 displays estimation results of Equation (1). The mean parameters on the 
non-striped bass attributes behave as expected. Catching other species of fish while 
fishing for striped bass is a boon to angler utility, as indicated by the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ. The trip cost parameter, which 
represents the marginal utility of price, is negative and statistically significant. We infer 
from the negative and significant parameter on 𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡 that striped bass anglers prefer 
fishing for striped bass when such an opportunity is available. The coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 
is negative but statistically insignificant, which suggests that if at least one medium 
striped bass can be kept, the average angler is indifferent to regulations that permit 
harvest of small striped bass. One potential explanation for this result is that most 
recreational striped bass anglers in our sample and across the population are accustomed 
to fishing in the absence of small-fish harvest slot regulations. In contrast to that 
on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28, the estimated parameter on 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 is negative, significant, and relatively large 
in magnitude, indicating that anglers are highly averse to prohibitions on the harvest of 
any striped bass shorter than 30”. This result may be driven by angler sensitivity to 
changes in the status-quo, 28” recreational minimum size restriction adopted by most 
states in recent years (ASMFC 2017, 2016, 2015). Nonetheless, this finding is consistent 
with other studies that model angler utility as a function of both catch and catch-and-
release regulations (Cha and Melstrom 2018; Knoche and Lupi 2016).  
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Table 14. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model. 
 
All estimated keep and release parameters in Table 14 are positive, indicating that 
the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery is executed both for sport and for personal 
consumption. A closer look at the magnitudes of these estimates reveals that angler utility 
increases almost exponentially with the size of fish kept or released. Additionally, the 
estimates intuitively suggest that for each size-class, anglers prefer keeping and releasing 
Table 14. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model.  
Variable Mean Parameters Standard Deviations 
    Small keep   0.242*** 0.967*** 
 (0.060) (0.067) 
    Medium keep   0.348*** 1.156*** 
 (0.061) (0.063) 
    Trophy keep   0.653*** 1.247*** 
 (0.080) (0.093) 
    Small release   0.088*** 0.407*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
    Medium release   0.129** 0.512*** 
 (0.058) (0.059) 
    Trophy release   0.242*** 0.678*** 
 (0.034) (0.042) 
    Other catch 0.151***  
 (0.016)  
    Cost -0.018***  
 (0.002)  
    Opt-out -3.170***  
 (0.130)  
    Min. 28” -0.109  
 (0.088)  
    Min. 30” -0.644***  
 (0.106)  
Num. Observations               1,747  
Num. individuals               469  
Log likelihood  -2003.305  
McFadden Pseudo R2               0.360  
AIC 4040.600  
Notes: 500 Halton draws used to maximize the simulated log-likelihood. 
*,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. 
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larger striped bass to smaller ones. Table 14 also reveals the relatively high returns to 
angler utility from catching-and-releasing trophy striped bass. For example, the marginal 
utility of releasing a trophy-sized striped bass is virtually identical to that of keeping a 
small striped bass. Finally, the statistically significant standard deviation coefficients on 
each of the striped bass catch variables indicate considerable unobserved preference 
heterogeneity across the population of sampled anglers  
 
7 Simulation Procedure 
7.1 Overview and Study Area 
To evaluate potential impacts of alternative 2015 striped bass regulations on 
angler welfare and participation, total recreational removals, and mature female 
recreational removals, we integrate the estimates in Table 14 and historical catch and 
effort data into an aggregate demand model. The model simulates the striped bass fishery 
at the trip-level under actual 2015 policy conditions and compute baseline metrics of 
interest. It then imposes alternative 2015 policies that affect expected angler participation 
and recreational fishing mortality by altering the number and size of striped bass kept and 
released, relative to these outcomes under the actual 2015 policy. By summing and 
computing differences in expected levels of angler participation, angler welfare, and 
recreational harvest and release across trips across actual and alternative policies, we 
reveal the external, short-term economic and biological costs of recreational Atlantic 
striped bass fishing policy.  
We simulate the 2015 recreational striped bass fishery in Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, and Connecticut, which together accounted for about 32% of the estimated 
 67 
 
20,282,426 recreational striped bass fishing trips taken during 2015 in the ten coastal 
states from Maine through Virginia.12 We focus on these three states because, unlike those 
further north or further south, each implemented the same set of striped bass regulations 
in 2014 and 2015. This makes the simulation procedure more tractable than it would be 
otherwise and allows for a straightforward test of the accuracy of its predictions, which 
we employ in Section 7.3. 
 
7.2 Data and Procedure  
Simulated fishing trips are first assigned a level of striped bass catch that is 
randomly drawn from probability distributions created using publicly-available, 2015 
Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP) data. We exclude from these data trips 
that record catching more than 15 striped bass, which account for 1.6% of the total 
number of directed striped bass trips taken in 2015 across the study region. Given 
observed differences in catch-per-trip levels, we generate separate catch distributions for 
boat- and shore-based fishing trips.13 Dividing the 𝑛 trips that caught 𝑐 striped bass from 
fishing mode 𝑚 by the total number of directed trips taken from mode 𝑚 gives a 
probability mass function, 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ]௠ =
𝑛௖௠
∑ 𝑛௖௠஼௖ୀ଴
. 
(2) 
 
These distributions are smoothed using a LOWESS (Cleveland 1979) and shown in the 
top panel of Figure 3. 
                                                 
12 We use the Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP) data to estimate recreational effort, 
defined as fishing trips on which striped bass was caught or was the primary target.  
13 We aggregate private, charter, and head boat trips when generating the boat-based catch-per-trip 
distribution. 
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After catch levels are assigned, fish sizes are randomly drawn from a catch-at-
length distribution created using MRIP and state-level volunteer angler logbook (VAL) 
data. Because MRIP data contain few recorded lengths of released striped bass, we first 
Figure 3. 2015 striped bass catch-per-trip (top) and catch-at-length (bottom) distributions. 
Figure 3. 2015 striped bass catch-per-trip (top) and catch-at-length (bottom) 
distributions. 
 69 
 
combine and calculate harvest and release proportions-at-length using 2015 VAL data 
collected by the Connecticut Volunteer Angler Survey Program and the Massachusetts 
Sportfish Data Collection Team (SADC) Program. Raw VAL data is displayed in Figure 
A2 in the Appendix. We then multiply these proportions by MRIP-based estimates of 
total 2015 harvest and releases across the study region. The total number of length-𝑙 fish 
caught (𝐶௟) in the study region during 2015 is 
  
𝐶௟ = ቈቆ
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௟௏஺௅
∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௟௏஺௅௅௟ୀ௜
ቇ ∗ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒ெோூ௉቉  
 
       + ቈቆ
ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡௟௏஺௅
∑ ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡௟௏஺௅௅௟ୀ௜
ቇ ∗ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡ெோூ௉቉. (3) 
   
Calculating Equation (3) for shore and boat modes separately resulted in 
qualitatively similar catch-at-length distributions. We therefore aggregate MRIP and VAL 
data across fishing modes. The probability of an angler catching a length-𝑙 striped bass, 
LOWESS-smoothed and shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3, is 
  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ = 𝑙] =
𝐶௟
∑ 𝐶௟௅௟ୀ௜
. (4) 
   
We impose actual and counterfactual regulations that, along with catch, determine 
the realized number and size of striped bass kept and released on each simulated trip. 
Striped bass catch is then allocated into one of three size bins—small (≤ 25”), medium 
(26”-34”), and trophy (≥ 35”)—that correspond to definitions of the striped bass catch 
attributes used in the choice experiment, but we retain catch lengths to calculate the age, 
sex, and maturity distribution of total recreational removals.  
Simulated anglers harvest legal-sized striped bass as they are encountered until 
the bag limit is reached and discard subsequent catch. They do not selectively harvest or 
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high-grade.14 Based on anecdotal and empirical evidence, however, we do incorporate 
volunteer release behavior, the practice of releasing legal-sized fish despite not reaching 
the bag limit. We randomly select choice occasions having positive legal catch level and 
reclassify harvested fish as released fish until a pre-specified rate of voluntary release is 
reached. Although this reclassification affects predicted levels of recreational fishing 
mortality, it does not affect participation or welfare estimates because we assume that the 
value anglers place on a voluntarily-released striped bass is at least that of keeping that 
same fish.15 We specify the rate of voluntary release to be 0.25 based on calculations 
from Connecticut Volunteer Angler Survey Program data that span the period 2013-
2016.16 Finally, simulated trips are assigned a representative, mode-specific trip cost 
derived from the most recent angler expenditure survey in which this information is 
available (Lovell et al. 2013).17 
After deriving the striped bass catch and other variables corresponding to those 
used in the behavioral model, we compute the expected utility of each choice occasion, 
given by Equation (5). Following Train (2003), the probability of observing the trip, 
                                                 
14 Selective harvesting is when anglers discard legal-sized fish to retain the ability to harvest fish of a more 
preferred size; high-grading is when anglers retain but then discard legal-sized fish to harvest fish of a more 
preferred size. 
15 It is reasonable to assume that rational anglers would not voluntarily release a legal-sized striped bass if 
they receive more utility from harvesting that same fish. 
16 Using this data, we calculated the rate of voluntary release across the four years by examining trip logs 
that recording catching the exact number or fewer legal-sized striped bass permitted under the bag limit. In 
2013 and 2014, the daily possession limit in Connecticut was two fish equal to or longer than 28”; in 2015 
and 2016, the daily possession limit in Connecticut was one fish equal to or longer than 28”. After 
aggregating numbers of legal-sized fish kept and released on these trips across the four years, we calculated 
the overall portion of voluntary released striped bass to be 48%. It is likely, however, that anglers who 
participate in the Connecticut Volunteer Angler Survey Program are more avid than the population of 
anglers at large, and therefore may be more inclined to catch-and-release legally harvestable fish. Thus, we 
use a more conservative estimate of voluntary release in the simulation model. 
17 Specifically, costs are a weighted average of each state’s average trip cost (minus lodging expenses and 
tournament fees) with weights proportional to the number of trips taken in each state. We generate a 
separate cost for shore and boat modes, the latter which reflects a weighted average across private, charter, 
and head boat trips. 
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conditional on the number and size of striped bass kept and released and the trip cost, is 
 
 𝑝௧ =
exp (𝑉௡௝௧)
1 + exp (𝑉௡௝௧)
. (5) 
   
The expected number of length-𝑙 striped bass harvested (released) on each choice 
occasion is the probability-weighted number of length-𝑙 fish retained (discarded). 
Summing these values across choice occasions gives the total number of length-𝑙 striped 
bass harvested and released under a given policy scenario: 
  
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡௟ = ෍(𝑝௧ × ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡௟௧)
்
௧ୀଵ
, (6) 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௟ = ෍(𝑝௧ × 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௟௧)
்
௧ୀଵ
. (7) 
   
We apply the 0.09 discard mortality rate used in the striped bass stock assessment 
to 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௟ to determine dead releases-at-length. Adding dead releases-at-length to 
harvest-at-length and summing these values across length-classes gives total recreational 
removals, defined below.  
 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 = ෍ൣ𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡௟ + (𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒௟ × 0.09)൧
௅
௟ୀ௜
 (8) 
   
To calculate mature female recreational removals, we convert removals-at-length 
to removals-at-age using an age-length key created by combining data from three 
separate 2015 striped bass age-length keys provided each by the Massachusetts’ Division 
of Marine Fisheries, New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation Division of 
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Marine Resources, and Rhode Island’s Division of Fish and Wildlife.18 We then multiply 
removals-at-age by the female sex proportions-at-age (𝑠௔) and proportions mature-at-age 
for females (𝑚௔) indices provided in striped bass stock assessments and sum these values 
across age-classes, as in Equation (9) below. We express total and mature female 
recreational removals in terms of biomass weight by translating numbers-at-age to 
weights-at-age using stock assessment conversion indices. 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 = ෍[(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠)௔ × 𝑠௔ × 𝑚௔]
஺
௔ୀଵ
. (9) 
  
A principal goal of this paper is to understand the impact of recreational striped 
bass regulations on angler welfare. Thus, for each simulated trip we compute 
compensating variation (CV), which in our case indicates the level of compensation 
required to hold anglers’ expected utility constant after a policy-induced change in fishing 
trip quality. Following Haab and McConnell (2002), CV for choice occasion 𝑖 is 
 
 𝐶𝑉௜ =
1
𝛽௖௢௦௧
 ቎ln ቌ෍ exp(𝑉௜௝ଵ)
௃
௝ୀଵ
ቍ − ln ቌ෍ exp(𝑉௜௝଴)
௃
௝ୀଵ
ቍ቏, (10) 
   
where 𝑗 indexes alternatives and 𝑉௜௝଴ and 𝑉௜௝ଵ is anglers’ expected utility under 
current and changed regulatory conditions, respectively. 𝐶𝑉௜ is summed across all choice 
occasions to infer the aggregate effect of regulatory adjustment on angler welfare.  
 
7.3 Model Calibration 
We calibrate the model by randomly selecting a subset of choice occasions such 
                                                 
18 Figure A2 in the Appendix displays length-age conversions based on the combined age-length data. 
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that ∑ 𝑝௧்௧  approximates the actual number of fishing trips taken in the study region 
during 2015. This process is employed using samples of shore- and boat-based choice 
occasion separately given differences in costs and catch-per-trip between the two fishing 
modes. The calibrated model predicts the occurrence of 4,045,220 shore- and 2,427,158 
boat-based choice occasions, which closely matches the 4,045,181 and 2,427,178 
respective trips taken from each mode across the study region during 2015.  
Simulation model calibration diagnostics are shown in Table 15. The model 
overestimates the total number of striped bass caught by about 7%, which results in 
overestimates of total harvest, mature female harvest, release, and total removal numbers 
by 21%, 16%, 5%, and 13% relative to actual 2015 levels, respectively. Despite these 
overestimates, however, the model underestimates recreational release weight by 20%. 
The calibration diagnostics for mature female recreational releases provides some insight 
into the possible source of this discrepancy. That is, the model underestimates total 
numbers and weight of mature female striped bass released by 33% and 51% compared to 
2015 levels, respectively, which suggests that the likelihood of voluntarily releasing 
striped bass may increase with the size of fish caught, a behavior that is unaccounted for 
in the model. This potential source of error, however, is compensated by overestimates of 
total catch, hence predicted levels of mature female removal numbers and weight align 
closely with actual 2015 levels.  
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Table 15. Simulation model calibration diagnostics. 
Table 15. Simulation model calibration diagnostics.   
 Model 2015 Actual Error (%) 
Total catch (numbers) 9,151,419 8,578,012 -6.7 
Total catch (pounds) 54,306,593 63,780,363 14.9 
Harvest (numbers) 837,951 693,135 -20.9 
Harvest (pounds) 10,460,637 8,980,707 -16.5 
Mature female harvest (numbers) 500,906 432,359 -15.9 
Mature female harvest (pounds) 7,644,967 6,799,069 -12.4 
Releases (numbers) 8,313,468 7,884,877 -5.4 
Releases (pounds) 43,845,956 54,799,656 20.0 
Mature female releases (numbers) 1,355,476 2,021,500 33.0 
Mature female releases (pounds) 13,925,708 28,236,467 50.7 
Total removals (numbers) 1,586,163 1,402,774 -13.1 
Total removals (pounds) 14,406,773 13,912,676 -3.6 
Mature female removals (numbers) 622,899 614,294 -1.4 
Mature female removals (pounds) 8,898,281 9,340,351 4.7 
Notes: Statistic calculated using MRIP data and information contained in the 2016 stock 
assessment update (ASMFC 2016) and the 2018 preliminary stock assessment (ASMFC 
2018). More information about these data and the derivation of Table 15 statistics is 
given in Table A2 in the Appendix.     
 
As another way to gauge the accuracy of our model at predicting changes in 
fishery outcomes, we compare actual and predicted changes in fishery outcomes that 
occurred between 2014 and 2015 when recreational striped bass fishery managers in 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut decreased the daily bag limit from two to 
one fish, 28” or longer in total length. We run the simulation procedure using a catch-per-
trip distribution generated using 2014 MRIP data and the 2015 catch-at-length 
distribution described in Section 7.2. The model is calibrated to the number of shore- and 
boat-based fishing trips taken across the study region in 2014.  
Table 16 shows actual and predicted changes in fishery outcomes that occurred in 
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the study region between 2014 and 2015. Predicted changes in fishing trips, harvest 
weight, release numbers, and mature female removal weight approximate the actual 
changes that occurred between the two years. However, the model overestimates the 
observed decrease in recreational harvest numbers, total removals numbers and weight, 
and mature female removals numbers and it underestimates the observed increase in 
recreational releases numbers and weight. These discrepancies may be an artifact of 
assuming a constant, a 0.25 rate of voluntary release across simulated policies, whereas 
the actual rate may be higher when anglers can keep two rather than one striped bass per 
day. This hypothesis is somewhat validated by responses to a non-DCE question included 
in the angler survey that asked respondents to indicate the number of small (20” to 26”), 
medium- (27” to 36”), and trophy-sized (37” and 43”) striped bass they would actually 
keep if they caught and could legally harvest two of each size-class; on average, 
respondents indicated that they would keep 0.96, 1.21, and 1.00 out of two harvestable 
small, medium, and trophy-sized striped bass caught on a trip, respectively, which 
suggest the rate of voluntary release may be closer to 0.5 when the bag limit is two. Were 
we to incorporate this behavior into the simulation, predicated changes in recreational 
harvest numbers, total removals numbers and weight, mature female removals numbers, 
and recreational releases numbers and weight would more closely align with actual 
changes between the two years. Nonetheless, similarity between actual and predicted 
changes in the two metrics of interest, total removal numbers and mature female removal 
weight, bolsters confidence in the model’s ability to illuminate tradeoffs between angler 
welfare and recreational fishing mortality created by different types of recreational 
Atlantic striped bass fishing policy. 
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Table 16. Actual and predicted changes in fishery outcomes between 2014 and 2015. 
Table 16. Actual and predicted changes in fishery outcomes between 2014 and 2015.   
 % ∆ between 2014 and 2015 
 Model Actual 
Number of trips -0.68 -3.04 
Harvest (numbers) -30.95 -16.22 
Harvest (pounds) -30.72 -28.84 
Releases (numbers) 0.43 3.71 
Releases (pounds) 5.88 54.79 
Total removals (numbers) -19.71 -7.20 
Total removals (pounds) -24.07 -11.98 
Mature female removals (numbers) -25.67 -13.49 
Mature female removals (pounds) -26.60 -20.91 
 
8 Policy Simulation 
We simulate the effect of twenty-nine alternative recreational striped bass fishing 
policies on angler welfare, total recreational fishing removals, and female SSB 
recreational removal volume. Each policy analyzed specifies a one- or two-fish daily 
possession limit and a 20”, 24”, or 28” minimum size limit. We examine impacts to 
fishery outcomes from full or partial harvest restrictions on larger striped bass by 
specifying across the policies analyzed several types of maximum harvest size 
restrictions. In addition to minimum length only policies that exclude such a restriction, 
some policies specify a maximum size limit that is eight or sixteen inches longer than the 
minimum size limit; we refer to these policies as narrow and wide harvest slots, 
respectively. We also examine the effect of more complex, partial harvest restrictions on 
larger striped bass by simulating two-fish policies defined by two separate, adjacent 
narrow harvest slots for each fish in the bag limit, as well as policies defined by a narrow 
slot limit for the first fish in the bag limit only. The last type of size restriction analyzed 
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also partially restricts harvest of larger striped bass; these slot-option policies allow 
anglers to harvest either two smaller, or one smaller and one larger striped bass. Table A3 
in the Appendix displays raw outcomes for each the 29 policies analyzed.  
To easily assess the relative economic efficiency of changes in biological 
outcomes under the various policies analyzed, we plot simulated outcomes in Figures 4, 
5, and 6. Figure 4 display each policy’s short-term production plan in terms of welfare 
and recreational removal numbers, while Figure 6 displays production plans in terms of 
welfare and female SSB recreational removal weight. Figure 5 plots outcomes of the two-
fish bag limit policies only, allowing us to decipher trends in the effect of different types 
of size restrictions on welfare and recreational fishing mortality while holding bag limits 
constant. Relative changes in total and mature female fishing mortality are expressed in 
terms of fish numbers and fish weights, respectively, as these metrics correspond to those 
used in the striped bass stock assessment for estimating the rate of fishing mortality and 
the level of female spawning stock biomass. We interpret these indices as inputs to the 
production of welfare such that in each figure, the outermost policies plotted shape the 
efficient frontier. 
 
8.1 Simulation Results 
Tradeoffs between angler welfare and total recreational removals created by the 
twenty-six policies analyzed are displayed in Figure 4. Overall, the figure implies a 
positive and linear relationship between the aggregate economic value of the fishery and 
recreational removals, with the least- and most-restrictive policies analyzed, A2 (2 fish ≥ 
20”) and E1 (1 fish 28-36”), predicted to yield the highest and lowest relative increase in 
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both outcomes, respectively.  
 
The simulated outcomes of policies H1 (1 fish 28-44”) and E1 (1 fish 28-36”) 
provide some insight into the primary research objective of evaluating the short-run 
: 20” minimum size : 24” minimum size : 28” minimum size 
A1: 1 fish ≥ 20” B1: 1 fish ≥ 24”  
C1: 1 fish 20-28” F1: 1 fish 24-32” E1: 1 fish 28-36” 
D1: 1 fish 20-36” G1: 1 fish 24-40” H1: 1 fish 28-44” 
A2: 2 fish ≥ 20” H2: 2 fish ≥ 24” O2: 2 fish ≥ 28” 
B2: 2 fish 20-28” I2: 2 fish 24-32” P2: 2 fish 28-36” 
C2: 2 fish 20-36” J2: 2 fish 24-40” Q2: 2 fish 28-44” 
D2: 1 fish 20-28” & 
       1 fish > 28” 
K2: 1 fish 24-32” &  
       1 fish > 32” 
R2: 1 fish 28-36” &  
       1 fish > 36” 
E2: 1 fish 20-28” &  
       1 fish > 28 to 36” 
L2: 1 fish 24-32” &  
       1 fish > 32 to 40” 
S2: 1 fish, 28-36” &  
       1 fish > 36 to 44” 
F2: 2 fish 20-28”; only  
      1 fish > 28” 
M2: 2 fish 24-32”; only  
        1 fish > 32” 
T2: 2 fish 28-36”; only 
       1 fish > 36” 
G2: 2 fish 20-28”; only  
       1 fish > 28 to 36” 
N2: 2 fish 24-32”; only  
       1 fish > 32 to 40” 
U2: 2 fish 28-36”; only  
       1 fish > 36 to 44” 
 
Figure 4. Predicted changes in welfare and recreational removals under alternative 
2015 policies in MA, CT, and RI. Actual 2015 policy of one-fish, 28” or longer 
used as baseline policy.  
 
Figure 4. Predicted change  in welfare and recreational removals under alternative 2015 policies in MA, CT, and RI. 
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economic and biological returns to minimum length only versus harvest slot policies in 
the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery. Policies H1 and E1 are the sole policies 
analyzed predicted to achieve a reduction in recreational fishing mortality relative to 
expected levels under the actual 2015 minimum-length-only policy. Furthermore, despite 
slight to moderate relative reductions in angler welfare that are predicted to occur under 
both policies, each policy lies along the efficient frontier. If accurate, this suggests that by 
implementing these policies, managers could consciously reduce the social value of the 
fishery in exchange for an efficient reduction in recreational fishing mortality.  
Figure 4 reveals the sensitivity of angler welfare and recreational removals to 
changes in the minimum size limit. Across policy types, recreational fishing mortality 
increases incrementally from 2015 levels with each incremental four-inch decreases in 
the minimum size limit from 28”. These changes are due to concurrent, disproportionate 
increases in the rate at which anglers encounter legally harvestable, yet smaller striped 
bass that reflect the shape of the 2015 striped bass catch-at-length probability distribution 
(Figure 3). Along with this effect and despite the lower nonmarket value of smaller 
striped bass compared to larger ones, decreasing the minimum size limit also leads to 
aggregate angler welfare gains because the nonmarket value of harvesting a striped bass 
is nearly thrice that of releasing the same fish across each of the three size-classes 
analyzed. Simulated outcomes of policies A1 (1 fish ≥ 20”) and D1 (1 fish 20-36”) also 
exemplify the responsiveness of angler welfare to decreases in the baseline, 28” 
minimum size limit. These policies constrain the bag limit to one, yet both are predicted 
to produce higher returns to angler welfare than all two-fish, 28” minimum size limit 
policies analyzed. Taken together, these results imply that, rather than the relative 
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difference in nonmarket value between small, medium, and trophy-sized fish, the effect 
of policy action on angler welfare is driven largely by how these actions affect the rate at 
which anglers encounter legally harvestable fish. 
However, the relative economic efficiency of policy-induced changes in 
recreational fishing mortality also depends on rate at which anglers encounter legally 
harvestable striped bass. This can be seen in Panels A, B and C of Figure 5, where we 
plot the outcomes of policies defined by 20”, 24”, and 28” minimum size limit, 
separately. For example, by specifying a wide range of legal harvest sizes and not 
constraining the number of small or medium-sized striped bass that may be kept under 
the bag limit, minimum length only (A2, H2, and O2), slot-option (F2, M2, T2, G2, N2, 
and U2), and wide harvest slot policies (C2, J2, Q2) induce larger relative increases in 
recreational removals compared to other types of size restrictions in each of panels A, B, 
and C. Hence, for reasons discussed above, these policies also induce relatively large, 
positive changes in angler welfare. Conversely, policies defined by differentiated size 
restrictions for each striped bass in the bag limit (D2, E2, K2, L2, R2, and S2), while 
more expensive in terms of angler welfare compared to minimum length only, slot-
option, and wide harvest slot policies, are among the most effective at mitigating 
recreational fishing mortality. This finding is intuitive because such policies constrain the 
number of frequently-encountered, small and medium-sized striped bass that may be 
harvested under the bag limit to one. Policies that fully direct harvest toward smaller fish, 
however, are excessively costly to both anglers and fish stocks, as all three narrow slot 
limit policies, policies B2 (2 fish 20-28”), I2 (2 fish 24-32”), and P2 (2 fish 28-36”), are 
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predicted to inefficiently generate angler welfare from recreational removals.  
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Figure 5. Predicted changes in welfare and recreational removals (Panels A, B, and C) 
and welfare and female SSB recreational removal weight (Panels D, E, and F ) under 
alternative 2015 two-fish bag limit policies in MA, CT, and RI. Actual 2015 policy of 
one-fish, 28” or longer used as baseline policy. 
Figure 5. Predicted changes in welfare and recreational removals (Panels A, B, and C) and welfare and female SSB 
recreational removal weight (Panels D, E, and F ) under alternative 2015 two-fish bag limit policies in MA, CT, and 
RI. 
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Thus, directing effort toward or away from certain striped bass size-classes via 
specification of the size limit has important implications for angler welfare and 
recreational fishing mortality. When accompanying a one-fish increase in the current 
daily bag limit, size limits that allow but do not require both striped bass under the bag 
limit to be small or medium-sized will likely induce considerable net gains in angler 
welfare that come at the expense of high levels of recreational fishing mortality. Although 
the magnitude of change in both outcomes diminishes under size limits that allow anglers 
to harvest one small and medium-sized, or one medium- and one trophy-sized striped 
bass only, these changes remain efficient relative to expected outcomes of the other types 
of size limits analyzed. However, size limits requiring both fish in the bag limit to be 
small or medium-sized may lead to an inefficient utilization of the stock.  
While Figures 4 and 5 show that several sets of efficient recreational striped bass 
fishing regulations are available when proposed policy action intends to influence total 
recreational fishing mortality, there exist many fewer efficient policy options when these 
actions seek to protect the fecund striped bass population. Figure 6 displays impacts of 
the simulated policies on angler welfare and female SSB removals. The number of 
policies forming the efficient frontier is reduced dramatically compared to that in Figure 
4 and only six policies, each defined by a baseline minimum size limits of 20”, are 
predicted to achieve efficient changes in female SSB removal volume relative to the 
actual 2015 policy. Across policy types, relative changes in female SSB removals volume 
increase in magnitude with each incremental, four-inch increase in the baseline minimum 
size limit because such policy adjustments direct harvest toward the mature female 
striped bass population. Due to the relatively low rate at which anglers encounter this 
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population of striped bass, however, we see no clear relationship between female SSB 
removal volume and angler welfare.  
 
 
Figure 6. Predicted changes in welfare and female SSB recreational removal weight 
under alternative 2015 policies in MA, CT, and RI. Actual 2015 policy of one-fish, 
28” or longer used as baseline policy. 
 
: 20” minimum size : 24” minimum size : 28” minimum size 
A1: 1 fish ≥ 20” B1: 1 fish ≥ 24”  
C1: 1 fish 20-28” F1: 1 fish 24-32” E1: 1 fish 28-36” 
D1: 1 fish 20-36” G1: 1 fish 24-40” H1: 1 fish 28-44” 
A2: 2 fish ≥ 20” H2: 2 fish ≥ 24” O2: 2 fish ≥ 28” 
B2: 2 fish 20-28” I2: 2 fish 24-32” P2: 2 fish 28-36” 
C2: 2 fish 20-36” J2: 2 fish 24-40” Q2: 2 fish 28-44” 
D2: 1 fish 20-28” & 
       1 fish > 28” 
K2: 1 fish 24-32” &  
       1 fish > 32” 
R2: 1 fish 28-36” &  
       1 fish > 36” 
E2: 1 fish 20-28” &  
       1 fish > 28 to 36” 
L2: 1 fish 24-32” &  
       1 fish > 32 to 40” 
S2: 1 fish, 28-36” &  
       1 fish > 36 to 44” 
F2: 2 fish 20-28”; only  
      1 fish > 28” 
M2: 2 fish 24-32”; only  
        1 fish > 32” 
T2: 2 fish 28-36”; only 
       1 fish > 36” 
G2: 2 fish 20-28”; only  
       1 fish > 28 to 36” 
N2: 2 fish 24-32”; only  
       1 fish > 32 to 40” 
U2: 2 fish 28-36”; only  
       1 fish > 36 to 44” 
 
Figure 6. Predicted changes in welfare and female SSB recreational removal weight under alternative 2015 policies 
in MA, CT, and RI. 
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Assessing the incentives faced by anglers can uncover the important tradeoffs 
between welfare and conservation created by minimum length only and harvest slot 
restrictions, as exemplified by the outcomes of policies G1 (1 fish 24-40”) and O2 (2 fish 
≥ 28”). The model predicts the two policies yielding roughly the same relative impact to 
angler welfare and total recreational removals, as shown in Figure 4. Yet Figure 6 shows 
a marked divergence in each policy’s relative effect on female SSB removal volume. 
While policy O2 is predicted to induce a 38% increase, policy G1 is predicted to achieve 
a 30% decrease in female SSB recreational removal volume relative to the simulated 
outcome of the actual 2015 policy. These differential impacts reflect the interface 
between regulations and the biological characteristics that govern the natural growth and 
reproductive processes of Atlantic striped bass, thus highlighting the importance of 
accounting for such characteristics when proposed policy action intends to protect the 
fecund population. 
As before, we plot the impacts to angler welfare and female SSB removals across 
each set of two-fish bag limit policies separately in panel D, E and F of Figure 5. These 
panels reveal the important influence of minimum and maximum size limits on female 
SSB removal volume. Policy O2 (2 fish ≥ 28”), for example, is predicted to yield a 40% 
increase in female SSB removal volume relative to the simulated outcome of the actual 
2015 policy. But the magnitude of this relative change dampens with each incremental, 
four-inch decrease in the minimum size limit, as policies H2 (2 fish ≥ 24”) and A2 (2 fish 
≥ 20”) are predicted to achieve a 22% and 2% relative increase female SSB removal 
volume, respectively. We find even larger differential impacts to female SSB removals 
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when comparing changes that occur under policy O2, H2, and A2 with each policy’s 
narrow harvest slot analogue: policy P2 (2 fish 28-36”), I2 (2 fish 24-32”), and B2 (2 fish 
20-28”), are predicted to achieve a -14%, -42%, and -59% relative change in female SSB 
removal volume, respectively. Thus, whereas panels A, B, and C reveal narrow harvest 
slot policies leading to inefficient outcomes in terms of welfare and total recreational 
removals, here we find that, compared to others in panels D, E, and F, these policies are 
both efficient and among the most effective at protecting fecund striped bass. Finally, in 
each of panels D and E, policies D2 (1 fish 20-28” & 1 fish > 28”) and E2 (1 fish 20-28” 
& 1 fish > 28-36”), and policies K2 (1 fish 24-32” & 1 fish > 32”) and L2 (1 fish 24-32” 
& 1 fish > 32-40”) are shown to inefficiently generate welfare from female SSB removal 
volume. By requiring one fish in the two-fish bag limit to be medium- or trophy-sized, 
these policies direct effort toward the fecund population. Given the relatively low 
frequency at which angler encounter this population, these policies provide little returns 
to angler welfare.  
Figures 4, 5, and 6 illuminate the important, short-run biological ramifications of 
decreasing the current 28” minimum size limit or implementing harvest restrictions on 
medium- and trophy-sized striped bass. These policy adjustments effectively protect 
fecund striped bass and are likely to improve the population’s spawning potential, at least 
in the short-run. But such adjustments are conducive to high rates of recreational fishing 
mortality for small- to medium-sized striped bass. This may yield adverse impacts to the 
stock structure in the medium- to long-run. While outside the scope of this study, 
integrating a biological growth model into the simulation would allow us to evaluate the 
medium- and long-run stock implications of recreational Atlantic striped bass fishing 
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policy. 
 
9 Conclusion 
In this study, we evaluated the short-run economic and biological impact of 
different types of recreational Atlantic striped bass fishing policy. We parameterized an 
aggregate demand model with the results of 2016 choice experiment survey to assess the 
relative impact of alternative 2015 policies to angler welfare, angler participation, and 
total and mature female recreational fishing mortality in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island. We selected as alternatives to the actual 2015 policy of one fish, 28” or 
longer, several one- and two-fish bag limit policies that varied in specification of the 
minimum and maximum size limit. We modelled trip-level angler behavior as a function 
of trip cost and the number of small, medium-sized, and trophy-sized striped bass kept 
and released. Met through incorporating these size-specific harvest and release preference 
parameters into the aggregate demand model, one research objective was to examine the 
economic and biological impact of full and partial harvest restrictions on trophy-sized 
striped bass that to-date have not been considered jointly in the policymaking process.  
Angler welfare was found to be highly responsive to changes in the minimum size 
limit. Our model predicts that incremental, four-inch decreases in the minimum size limit 
from 28” induce considerable gains to angler welfare levels. These gains stem primarily 
from anglers encountering and harvesting legal-sized striped bass more frequently, hence 
such policy actions also generate high levels of recreational removals. Implementing size 
limits that fully or partially restrict harvest of medium- or trophy-sized striped bass were 
found to be effective at protecting the fecund population of striped bass. While one might 
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expect such harvest restrictions inducing considerable adverse impacts to angler welfare, 
we find some instances in which these costs are low relative to the short-run stock 
benefits they may provide.  
We found that a wide range of efficient policies are available when the primary 
purpose of proposed policy action across the studied region is to control total recreational 
fishing mortality. When proposed management action is intended to curtail mature female 
recreational fishing mortality, however, proposed policy action that does not account for 
potential economic consequences can lead to inefficient outcomes, as exemplified by 
several of the policies analyzed lying inside the efficient frontier of welfare and female 
SSB recreational removals volume. This finding illuminates the practicality of assessing 
angler responses to regulatory stimuli to select efficient and effective policies, 
particularly when fisheries managers seeks to balance socioeconomic goals with multiple 
conservation objectives.  
We assessed the potential economic and biological tradeoffs that are created by 
recreational striped bass fishing regulations such that they can be considered during the 
policymaking process. Yet anglers’ decision-making processes is complex, and thus it 
was necessary to make several assumptions that potentially introduce bias in our results. 
First, we assumed that striped bass anglers harvest the first legal-size fish encountered up 
to the bag limit, but it is likely that some selectively harvest fish. Anglers might exhibit 
such behavior in response to encountering a school or “blitz” of striped bass while 
fishing, while others may simply prefer certain size-classes of striped bass to others. 
Second, we assumed a constant, 0.25 rate of voluntary release, but the actual rate may 
vary with the bag limit or the size of catch . Additionally, we specify a linear-in-catch 
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utility function based on the attributes and levels selected for the experimental design. 
However, diminishing marginal utility of harvesting and release striped bass is perhaps a 
more accurate depiction of returns to angler utility. In the future, we hope to reassess the 
validity of these assumptions and update our analysis appropriately.  
Our study is also limited by its relatively narrow geographical and temporal 
scope. We focus on one sub-region of the fishery but expanding our analysis to the coast 
wide fishery is the natural next step in this line of research. Additionally, while we 
evaluate the short-run effects of regulations on total and female SSB removals, these 
outcomes may differ in the medium- and long-run; changes in total recreational removals, 
for example, may be endogenous to changes in female SSB. By integrating a biological 
growth model into the simulation procedure, we could consider these dynamics and 
assess the future stock impacts of recreational striped bass fishing regulations.  
 
 89 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
SUSTAINABILITY AND TOURISM: THE EFFECT OF THE UNITED STATES’ 
FIRST OFFSHORE WIND FARM ON THE VACATION RENTAL MARKET 
by 
Andrew Carr-Harris and Corey Lang 
 
is submitted to Resource and Energy Economics 
 
1 Introduction 
Although U.S. offshore wind currently accounts for only 0.03% of the 96.5 
gigawatts of installed wind capacity in the country (American Wind Energy Association 
2018), future growth in wind generation will likely be more concentrated offshore. The 
political climate is evolving with federal policies that encourage wind power 
development and with aggressive, state-level renewable energy objectives to source wind 
power offshore.19 The industry itself reached an important milestone on December 12, 
2016 when America’s first and to date only offshore wind farm (OSWF), the five turbine, 
30 megawatt (MW) Block Island Wind Farm (BIWF), began generating electricity. 
Partially due to the success of BIWF, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut 
recently awarded contracts for 800, 400, and 200 MW OSWFs that are expected to be 
                                                 
19 Massachusetts requires state electricity providers to procure 1,600 MW of offshore wind capacity by 
2027 (Massachusetts 2016); New York has committed to develop up to 2,400 MW of offshore wind power 
by 2030 (NYSERDA 2016); Maryland recently awarded two offshore wind projects the right to receive 
Offshore Wind Renewable Energy Credits as part of the state’s Offshore Wind Energy Act of 2013 
(Maryland 2013); New Jersey’s governor signed an Executive Order on January 31, 2018 to promote the 
development of 3,500 MWs of offshore wind energy generation by 2030 (P. D. Murphy 2018). 
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operational by 2021, 2023, and 2023, respectively, assuming permits are granted. Other 
OSWF projects along the U.S. east coast are also forthcoming, including New York’s 
recently approved 90-MW South Fork Wind Farm that could be operational in 2022 and 
Maryland’s 120-MW OSWF project, Skipjack Wind, whose offshore construction will 
likely begin in 2021 with generation set for 2022.  
Despite the progress, there are several impediments to widespread growth of U.S. 
offshore wind energy. The high levelized cost of producing offshore wind energy makes 
it difficult to compete with other energy sources without subsidies.20 At the federal level, 
the absence of federally mandated offshore wind energy goals, the short-term and 
inconsistent nature of production tax credits, and the imposition of lease and royalty fee 
payments can discourage development (Portman et al. 2009). At the local level, 
community members and other stakeholder groups have fervently opposed proposed 
offshore wind energy facilities, as exemplified by failed development plans of Cape Wind 
off the coast of Massachusetts. OSWFs have been opposed for several reasons, ranging 
from the impacts to marine fauna, the loss of recreational and commercial fishing 
grounds, the environmental and human safety risks of ship-turbine collisions, and the 
effects on nearby property values.21 Snyder and Kaiser (2009) discuss several of the 
ecological and socioeconomic arguments used in favor of and against offshore wind 
power.  
                                                 
20 Estimates suggest that the levelized cost of offshore wind is among the highest of all sources of energy 
production (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2018a). 
21 The extent to which these claims materialize depend on site-specific factors, hence growing with the 
industry is a body of case studies investigating the ecological (Bergström et al. 2014; Lindeboom et al. 
2011) and socioeconomic (Jensen et al. 2018) impacts of OSWF installations. In some sense, however, 
whether there is basis in the academic literature for these claims is irrelevant; valid or not, these claims can 
impede OSWF development.     
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In coastal communities, one of the most commonly voiced concerns is that OSWF 
development will deter tourists. Rudolph (2014) examines how stakeholders rationalized 
this apprehension during the planning phase of two OSWFs in Germany and Scotland. 
Opponents invoked several lines of reasoning for why the two OSWFs might detract for 
the area’s desirability and therefore hurt the tourism industry, including that the wind 
farms would visually disturb the seascape, erode the area’s cultural character and identity, 
or interfere with recreational activities like boating and fishing. Except for the latter, 
these concerns seem valid in the context of American OSWF development based on 
suggestive findings from a few recent studies (Parsons and Firestone 2018; Firestone et 
al. 2018; ten Brink and Dalton 2018). However, there exists no empirical evidence to 
substantiate the overall claim that OSWFs negatively affect tourism. Filling this research 
gap is critical because local conflicts about the impact of OSWFs on tourism can have 
important implications for where, and how far offshore, proposed offshore wind power 
facilities are located.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of offshore wind development on 
tourism by examining the effect of the BIWF on the vacation rental market. The BIWF 
stands within Rhode Island state waters, approximately three miles off the coast of Block 
Island, and is visible from any location on Block Island that has a direct view, as well as 
from ferry rides to and from the mainland. We use data from AirBnb over the period 
October 2014 to December 2017, which spans before and after construction of the BIWF. 
Our method is rooted in a hedonic valuation framework, and we estimate a difference-in-
differences (DD) model using three nearby tourist destinations as controls. Our 
specification includes property fixed effects to mitigate omitted variable bias, as well as 
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temporal variables that control for seasonality and trends in the vacation rental market. 
Using this modelling approach, we focus purely on understanding visitor preferences for 
the BIWF and leave evaluating impacts to permanent residents for future work. 
The model yields an island-wide treatment effect, which is most relevant for 
assessing tourism impacts in this context for two reasons. First, there are several impacts 
of the BIWF’s presence, like the creation of new recreational fishing opportunities or the 
symbolization of progress toward clean energy, that are unrelated to visibility but might 
nonetheless stimulate overnight visits to the island. Second, the small geographical size 
of Block Island—about 10 square miles—allows for easy access to the best views of the 
turbines from any location on the island; hence, overnight visitors need not rent 
properties that are in direct viewshed to experience the wind farm.22 Moreover, it is likely 
that few Block Island AirBnb properties in our sample are in direct viewshed of the wind 
farm.  
Block Island offers an excellent setting for examining visitor preferences for the 
BIWF because the tourism industry is the backbone of the local economy. While home to 
about 1,000 permanent residents, Block Island can host up to 20,000 visitors per day 
during peak summer season (New Shoreham Planning Board 2016). Thus, by 
establishing a baseline and examining post-construction movements in the vacation rental 
market relative to other tourist destinations, we infer how tourists, in aggregate, respond 
                                                 
22 To put this in perspective, visitors can traverse almost the entire island on a 16-mile bike loop that stops 
at the BIWF and all 12 of its other major sites. 
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to the wind farm.23 If the overall tourist experience changes because of the BIWF, then 
the vacation rental market will change accordingly.  
There are two noteworthy features of this analysis. First, our study evaluates 
multiple margins of adjustment, which contrasts with many previous hedonic studies 
applied to the vacation rental market that evaluate only price adjustments.24 We estimate 
our model using five different dependent variables: booked price, number of nights 
available, number of nights reserved, occupancy rate, and revenue. Because the speed at 
which vacation rental prices respond to environmental shocks is unknown,25 it is 
important to evaluate other margins of adjustment that may be more elastic. Furthermore, 
rental market adjustments may differ in the short-run (1 year) and the long-run (3-5 
years). The price and availability of a rental property should be codetermined in the long-
run. In the short-run, however, there may be a divergence in the various rental market 
metrics because landlords do not immediately respond to environmental shocks, but 
renters do. If this were the case, we would expect to see changes in the number of booked 
nights, occupancy rates, and revenues, but not in prices nor availability. 
Second, our study is the first to empirically test the effect of offshore wind farms 
on tourism within a revealed preference framework. Other studies, reviewed in Section 2, 
have evaluated preferences for OSWFs using stated preference approaches, but these data 
                                                 
23 Almost certainly, there are tourists that are attracted by and repulsed by the BIWF and everywhere in 
between. Our measures are aggregate, and we cannot distinguish preferences of individuals or even the 
proportion of tourists falling into different categories.  
24 Applications include hedonic pricing of: tourist activity and online reputation (Perles Ribes et al. 2018), 
rural recreation amenities (Nelson 2010), seascape amenities (J. M. Hamilton 2007), smoking prohibitions 
(Benjamin et al. 2001), access to coastal beaches (Taylor and Smith 2000), and land-uses in Spain (Bilbao-
Terol et al. 2017), Belgium (Vanslembrouck et al. 2005) and France (LeGoffe 2000) 
25 To the best of our knowledge, no study has explored the dynamics of vacation rental property price 
responsiveness. While intuition may suggest that more transactions would lead to faster price changes, 
(Lang 2015) finds that amenity changes are capitalized more quickly for owner occupied housing than 
rental housing.  
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can be biased for many reasons, including recall error, motivated reasoning, or just 
outright lying. Especially in the case of renewable energy development, support for 
which can be tied to a person’s political ideology (Kennedy 2017), results may be biased 
as respondents seek to influence outcomes. Biases in this manner have been documented 
with stated preference measures in similarly politically contentious issues of gun control 
and climate change (Kahan et al. 2017; Goebbert et al. 2012; Howe and Leiserowitz 
2013; Lang 2014). 
Our results suggest that construction of the BIWF led to significant increase in 
nightly reservations, occupancy rates, and monthly revenues for properties in Block 
Island during the peak-tourism months of July and August. Specifically, we estimate that, 
during each peak-tourism month of July and August following construction, the BIWF 
caused a seven-night increase in reservations, a nineteen percentage point increase in 
occupancy rates, and a $3,490 increase in revenue for AirBnb properties in Block Island 
relative to AirBnb properties in control cities. In other months, treatments effects are 
statistically insignificant, though results are often consistent with positive effects. We find 
no significant movements in nightly price, despite this being likely the easiest margin of 
adjustment. Overall, there is little within-property, temporal variation in prices, 
suggesting prices are “sticky”, and that landlords are experiencing changes to other 
margins of the vacation rental market. While specific to this context, these findings 
mitigate concerns about negative effects of OSFWs on local tourism.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review relevant literature. 
Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. We provide results in Section 4 and we 
conclude in Section 5.  
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2 Literature review 
 Our research is grounded in hedonic price theory, which postulates that the overall 
price of a good is determined by the part-worth contribution from each observable 
attribute (Rosen 1974). Hedonic analysis is among the most popular revealed preference 
approaches for evaluating preferences for non-market goods and environmental 
amenities. Applied to a context of residential housing prices, the hedonic pricing method 
(HPM) relates sale prices of housing transactions to a vector of property attributes that 
typically include intrinsic, locational, and environmental characteristics. Intrinsic 
characteristics are factors such as the size of the house, the size of the lot, the number of 
bathrooms, and the number of bedrooms. Locational characteristics can include the 
condition of nearby homes, the crime rate, and quality of schools. In the field of 
environmental economics, regressors of interest are one or more environmental 
characteristic that describes a non-market amenity, such as air quality, adjacent open 
space, and ocean views.  
HPM has been applied to estimate the implicit value of a wide range of amenities 
and disamenities related to energy extraction and production: power plants (Davis 2011), 
fracking (Muehlenbachs et al. 2015; Boslett et al. 2016), air quality (Chay and 
Greenstone 2005; Bento et al. 2015); and transmission lines (Hamilton and Schwann 
1995). Several studies use hedonic methods to infer the external cost of onshore wind 
turbine facilities. Those that employ a quasi-experimental identification strategy 
generally find insignificant or slightly negative property value impacts from turbine 
proximity (Dröes and Koster 2016; Hoen and Atkinson-Palombo 2017; Hoen 2014) or 
turbine view (Gibbons 2015; Lang et al. 2014). However, two recent papers suggest 
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larger housing price devaluations. Sunak and Madlener (2016) estimate a 9-14% decrease 
in values for properties “extremely” to “moderately” visually disturbed by wind turbines. 
Heintzelman et al. (2017) analyze upstate New York properties and find that the value of 
homes with a full or partial view of a turbine were reduced by about 17% following 
turbine construction. Jensen et al. (2018) is the only study to date that estimates property 
value impacts from offshore wind energy facilities within a hedonic valuation framework. 
Their results indicate that neither of two Danish OSWFs under study had any significant 
effect on the prices of primary or secondary homes.26 While the bulk of HPM onshore 
wind studies indicate zero to negative price effect, this may not carry over to the vacation 
rental market because valuation may be a function of the time horizon spent around the 
turbines.27 For example, utility gains from seeing the turbines for the first time or over the 
course of a couple of days of vacation may outweigh the loss of unfettered ocean views, 
but for a permanent resident, 10 years of lost views may outweigh everything else and 
lead to net utility losses.  
Although HPM applications to offshore wind are limited, there is a substantial 
body of economic literature examining preferences for and tourism impacts of OSWFs. 
Most of these studies employ stated preference approaches, which use questionnaire 
responses to infer preferences and values. These approaches are appealing in the context 
of offshore wind development because observational data is limited or, as it was in the 
U.S. prior to the BIWF, non-existent. Yet the novelty of offshore wind development also 
raises concerns about the validity of evaluating its external cost using stated preference 
                                                 
26 The two offshore wind farms under study in Jensen et al. (2018) consist of 72 and 90 turbines and are 
located approximately six and two miles offshore, respectively. 
27 More broadly, some amenities (e.g., local school quality) are expected to be reflected in the price of 
nearby housing but not in the price of nearby vacation rentals, and vice versa.  
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data. These data may be affected by the degree of respondent familiarity and experience 
with the good or amenity in question (Boyle et al. 1993; Cameron and Englin 1997), 
which is limited when it comes to OSWFs; nearly all the existing nonmarket valuation 
studies of OSWFs analyze stated preference data generated by individuals who lack any 
experience with this type of environmental amenity. Observational data, if representative 
of the population of interest, is not subject to this potential source of bias nor others, like 
sample selection bias, protest and strategic response bias, and hypothetical bias that may 
threaten valid inference. Moreover, it is generally argued that individuals’ behavior in the 
market can convey information about their core preferences for nonmarket goods and 
amenities. We therefore believe our revealed preference approach to illumining the 
socioeconomic impacts of OSWFs is a critical departure from the current body of 
literature. Nonetheless, it is important to review the existing economic literature that uses 
stated preference methods to infer such impacts. This stream of literature can be 
classified into two groups: the first estimates the implicit cost of visual disturbances from 
OSWFs and the second estimates the impact of these facilities on aggregate recreational 
visitation and beach use.  
With the exception of a few studies that find mixed preferences for OSWFs 
(Fooks et al. 2017a; Westerberg et al. 2013), the first group of stated preference studies 
generally reveal OSWFs to be an environmental disamenity. These studies find that the 
visual disturbance from an OSWF located near the shore can generate considerable 
welfare losses for individuals, but these losses diminish as the distance of the OSWF 
from shore increases (Ladenburg and Dubgaard 2009, 2007; Krueger et al. 2011; Landry 
et al. 2012). Among this group, our study is perhaps most closely related to the work of 
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Lutzeyer et al. (2018), who evaluate potential responses of the vacation rentals market to 
OSWF development. They survey recent renters of oceanfront and ocean-view vacation 
properties in North Carolina and assess their preferences for future rentals with different 
utility-scale wind farm configurations using a choice experiment.28 For all visible turbine 
configurations, utility parameter estimates are negative and significant, which suggests 
that this population of renters, on average, strongly prefers unobstructed views of 
seascape. This result is broadly consistent with Fooks et al. (2017b), who, using an 
incentive compatible elicitation mechanism, find that tourists prefer hotel rooms without 
a view of an onshore wind turbine to those with a view of a turbine. Lutzeyer et al. (2018) 
also estimate utility parameters using a latent class model. These results reveal substantial 
heterogeneity in preferences across respondent groups, ranging from repulsion for all 
visible turbine configurations to indifference and even attraction to certain visible 
configurations, relative to the status-quo of no visible turbines. However, positive utility 
estimates from this model never translate to statistically significant willingness-to-pay 
values for moving OSWF turbines closer to shore.  
The second group of stated preference studies are less conclusive about the impact 
of OSWFs. Landry et al. (2012) estimate an aggregate demand model to assess the 
behavioral response of North Carolina residents to a widespread offshore wind energy 
development scenario: 100-turbine OSWFs located one mile off the coast of all major 
beach destinations in North Carolina. They find indistinguishable differences in the 
expected number of annual beach trips between the hypothetical windfarm scenario and 
the current, no-windfarm scenario. Most recently, Parsons and Firestone (2018) employ a 
                                                 
28 The most intrusive visible OSWF configuration has 144 turbines and is located five miles offshore; the 
least intrusive visible OSWF configuration has 64 turbines and is located 18 miles offshore.  
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contingent behavior web survey to evaluate beachgoer perceptions about offshore wind 
development and behavioral responses to OSWFs at beaches along the U.S. east coast. 
Consistent with the findings from other studies, theirs suggest that wind farms located 
close to the shore, within about 13 miles, will lead to reductions in beach trips and 
economic losses in form of foregone beachgoer welfare.  
One complication with accurately predicting the net impact of OSWFs on coastal 
recreational is the population of recreators may change. Parsons and Firestone (2018) 
estimate that, for an average beach, the first OSWF could generate nearly 13 million 
additional “curiosity trips” over the course of five to ten years from people who would 
not otherwise visit that beach. These estimates are not included in their main results, but 
the authors note that, if realized, an influx of curiosity trips of this magnitude would 
likely lead to net positive effects for many beaches. Other studies have also evidenced the 
potential for new OSWFs to attract tourists. In Lilley et al. (2010)’s intercept survey of 
Delaware beachgoers, 66% of out-of-state residents indicated being somewhat or very 
likely to visit a new or different beach at least once to see a 200-turbine OSWF located 
approximately six miles from the beach. In Firestone et al. (2009)’s mail survey, 84% of 
Delaware residents expressed being somewhat or very likely to visit a new or different 
beach at least once to see a 500-turbine OSWF located six miles from the beach. 
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the projected impact of OSWFs on coastal 
recreation given the findings uncovered across the relevant stated preference literature. 
People prefer seascape horizons that are uncontaminated by wind turbines, but it remains 
unclear if and to what extent their behavior will change in response to OSWFs, as well as 
how many will be attracted to new OSWFs. Furthermore, many of the studies mentioned 
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above capture preferences prior to OSWF installation, and preferences and support may 
change once OSWFs are installed. For example, Firestone et al. (2018) survey residents 
of Block Island, near-coastal Rhode Island, and coastal Rhode Island both before and 
after operation of the BIWF to understand changes in and determinants of support for the 
BIWF. Compared to those in the pre-installation period, levels of support in the post-
operation period increased across all three strata, yet only among the coastal Rhode 
Island stratum were these changes in opinion found to be statistically significant. The 
authors also find that a respective 83% and 78% of Block Island and non-Block Island 
residents who saw the BIWF “[liked] the way the turbines looked”, and this factor most 
strongly determined current support for the BIWF. In sum, the impacts of OSWFs on 
coastal recreation and tourism remains ambiguous. A concrete understanding of these 
impacts is vital for managers and developers of U.S. offshore wind resources to 
accurately assess externalities of OSWF development. 
 
3 Data and Methods 
 In this section, we discuss the study context and data in relation to the 
econometric modelling strategy, sample construction, and identifying assumptions. 
Section 3.1 provides a timeline of events that guides our definition of the treatment 
period. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the data. We specify the econometric models in 
Section 3.3. Construction of the sample is outlined in Section 3.4 and sample 
characteristics are described in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 discusses the assumptions 
behind the DD estimator and potential threats to identification.  
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3.1 Timeline of Events 
  First established in 2004, Rhode Island’s Renewable Energy Standard (RES) 
requires that 38.5% of the state’s electricity come from renewable resources by the end of 
2035. RES targets began in 2007, requiring electricity providers to source 3% of their 
retail sales from renewable resources, with incremental increases in target levels each 
year. To help meet the goals of the RES, in 2008 Rhode Island selected Deepwater Wind 
as the state’s preferred offshore wind developer and initiated the Ocean Spatial Area 
Management Plan (Ocean SAMP), a marine zoning plan that provides management 
recommendations for developing and protecting Rhode Island’s marine resources 
(Smythe and McCann 2018). Approved in 2011, the Ocean SAMP identified the waters 
off the southern coast of Block Island as having the highest wind speeds and lowest 
relative costs of development within RI state waters, and thus deemed this area viable for 
offshore renewable energy development. The Ocean SAMP designated this 13 square-
mile area, which extends east to southwest of Block Island, a Renewable Energy Zone 
(REZ) (Coastal Resources Managment Council 2010).  
 Following approval of the Ocean SAMP, Deepwater Wind surveyed the sea floor 
within the REZ to determine potential locations for the turbine foundations and the two 
underwater cables, one connecting Block Island to the BIWF and one connecting Block 
Island to mainland Rhode Island.29 Deepwater Wind opted to locate the turbine array 
within southeast portion of the REZ to minimize environmental impacts and costs 
                                                 
29 A fiber optic cable for high speed-internet access was included in the undersea cable connecting Block 
Island to mainland Rhode Island. Block Island renters having better internet connection due to the 
construction of the BIWF may lead to identification problems. However, our data cover the period when 
the necessary on-island infrastructure was not yet built, hence renters experienced no change in internet 
service quality due to the BIWF over the course of the study period. 
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(Deepwater Wind 2012). They submitted state and federal permit applications for the 
wind farm in 2012 and received the final permit needed to advance the project in 
September 2014. In March 2015, Deepwater Wind fully financed the BIWF project by 
securing more than $290 million in loans.  
Offshore construction of the BIWF project commenced in the summer of 2015. 
By the end of the 2015 offshore construction season, in early December, turbine 
foundations that protrude slightly from the water had been set in place. At this point, 
scheduled strategically to avoid overlap with the tourist season, onshore construction 
activities began and lasted through spring of 2016. The 2016 offshore construction season 
started in early August and ended soon after, on August 18, 2016, when Deepwater Wind 
installed the fifth and final 600-foot-tall, 6 MW wind turbine. On December 12, 2016, 
after several weeks of testing, the BIWF began providing wind-generated electricity to 
mainland Rhode Island. Block Island was connected to the BIWF’s electrical grid in May 
of 2017, prior to which four diesel generators sourced the island’s electricity needs. Now, 
because Block Island relies primarily on the electricity generated from the BIWF, these 
diesel generators operate only occasionally, which reduces air and noise pollution on one 
part of the island. 
 Our identification strategy involves comparing pre- and post-treatment rental 
activities, thus it is necessary to define when the treatment period begins, which is a bit 
ambiguous. In our case, the most important determinant of treatment-induced rental 
market adjustments is public awareness of the BIWF, so that tourists can take the 
information into account when deciding where to visit. The natural candidates are the 
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dates of completed construction and grid connection.30 We choose to define treatment as 
completed construction because that is when the turbines are visible, but the Appendix 
discusses results from models that use an alternative treatment date defined by grid 
connection. 
An additional event, unrelated to BIWF, is necessary to discuss. In March 2017, 
corporate representatives from AirBnb visited Block Island and Nantucket Island to 
increase the number of AirBnb listings in those locations. They were particularly focused 
on encouraging owners of existing boutique hotel and bed-and-breakfast properties to use 
the AirBnb platform. Their visit to Block Island seems to have had the intended effect 
because beginning in March 2017, the data reveal an influx of new Block Island AirBnb 
properties,31 most of which are boutique hotels or bed-and-breakfasts. This event 
motivates some key modelling decisions, and we discuss its relevance in more detail in 
Section 3.4. 
 
3.2 Data 
AirBnb is an online hospitality service that provides people with short-term 
lodging options from hosts seeking to rent out their rooms or properties. We obtained 
AirBnb rental data from AirDNA, a company that collects publicly available information 
about individual properties from the AirBnb website. AirDNA currently tracks the 
performance of roughly four million AirBnb listings worldwide through an automated 
scraping procedure that occurs every three days. The data cover a 39-month period 
                                                 
30 A simple Google Trends query for “Block Island Wind Farm” confirms these milestones as important, as 
the weeks including August 18, 2016 and December 12, 2016 are the two highest points of search interest. 
31 Figure A4 in the Appendix displays this graphically. 
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starting in October 2014, when AirDNA began collecting this information, to December 
2017. Both daily and monthly data is provided, but we estimate our model using the 
monthly-aggregated data to ease interpretation of results.32 
The dataset contains two important types of information on each property: rental 
activities and property characteristics. Rental activities include nightly rates, monthly 
revenues, and whether nights are reserved, available but not reserved, or blocked by the 
host and thus unavailable for reservation. We use this information to generate our 
dependent variables. Property characteristics include city, number of bedrooms, number 
of bathrooms, minimum length of stay, maximum number of guests allowed, cleaning 
fee, extra people fee, security deposit, listing type (private room, entire place, etc.), and 
property type. There are a variety of property types included in the data and we aggregate 
them into four categories: bed-and-breakfasts, apartments, guest suites, and houses. 
Approximate latitude and longitude coordinates are also included, and we use these 
variables to calculate Euclidean distance to the coast. In Figure A5 in the Appendix, we 
plot these approximate locations to ascertain the visibility of the BIWF from our sample 
of AirBnb properties. Also included in Figure A5 is a visibility map of the area 
surrounding Block Island, adapted from Griffin et al. (2015). The figure suggests that few 
Block Island properties are in direct viewshed of the wind farm.  
We estimate econometric models using five different dependent variables. These 
variables are measured at the monthly level and are defined as follows: (1) Available 
nights, which equals the sum of reserved and available nights, (2) Reservation nights, 
which equals the number of nights a property was booked, (3) Occupancy rate, which is 
                                                 
32 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we estimate our model using the daily data. 
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equal to Reservation nights divided by Available nights, (4) Average booked rate, which 
equals the average price of booked nights, and (5) Revenue, which is equal to total 
monthly AirBnb revenue.33 Because owners determine directly the number of nights their 
property is available and its price, short-run changes in Available nights and Average 
booked rate might capture supply-side responses. Conversely, short-run changes in 
Reservation nights, Revenue, and Occupancy rate may be more representative of 
consumer demand. While these variables are of course related and determined by many 
of the same forces, our goal is to understand different margins of adjustment and get a 
broad picture of the whole story of how the vacation rental market responds to an 
environmental shock.  
Our method is rooted in hedonic valuation; however, our data are not the standard 
property sales typically used with this method. As a first step to build confidence in our 
data and as exploration of implicit prices in the vacation rental market, we estimate a 
basic, cross-sectional hedonic regression with log(Average booked rate) on the left-hand 
side and property characteristics on the right-hand side. We use all observations occurring 
before construction of the BIWF.  
The estimated coefficients in Table 17 generally follow the direction of a priori 
expectations, and thus bolster our confidence that valuable signals can be recovered from 
the data. Properties with greater numbers of bedrooms or bathrooms command higher 
rental rates. Those within 0.1 miles of the coast come with a substantial, roughly 30% 
rental premium. A one-person increase in the maximum number of guests allowed to stay 
                                                 
33 Average booked rate and Revenue also include a per-visit cleaning fee, but additional fees charged for 
extra people are not visible on the AirBnb website and are therefore not included in the calculation of these 
variables. 
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at a property increases average booked rates by about 5%. After controlling for other 
rental rate determinants, rental rates for houses and bed-and-breakfasts are not 
statistically different than rental rates for apartments; guest suites, however, are booked at 
13% lower average price than apartments. Compared to Block Island properties, rental 
rates are more than 40% lower in Narragansett, RI and Westerly, RI, and about 19% 
higher in Nantucket, MA. Average booked rates are highest relative to January in July, 
August, and September.   
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Table 17. Determinants of nightly booked rates: OLS estimation results. 
Table 17. Determinants of nightly booked rates: OLS estimation results. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
log(Average booked rate) 
Variable Coefficient  Standard 
error Bedrooms 0.101***  (0.039) 
Bathrooms 0.126***  (0.035) 
Within 0.1 miles of coast (1=yes) 0.274***  (0.059) 
Minimum stay 0.007  (0.006) 
Maximum number of guests allowed 0.049***  (0.017) 
Security deposit ($100’s) 0.024***  (0.007) 
Extra people fee ($100’s) 0.040  (0.041) 
House 0.018  (0.059) 
Bed and breakfast 0.057  (0.072) 
Guest suite -0.131*  (0.075) 
Nantucket 0.188**  (0.091) 
Narragansett -0.436***  (0.084) 
Westerly -0.480***  (0.106) 
February -0.017  (0.094) 
March -0.134  (0.089) 
April 0.131  (0.081) 
May 0.309***  (0.081) 
June  0.287***  (0.082) 
July 0.408***  (0.082) 
August 0.406***  (0.082) 
September 0.444***  (0.090) 
October 0.300***  (0.094) 
November 0.256**  (0.101) 
December 0.312***  (0.082) 
2015 0.108  (0.070) 
2016 0.254***  (0.084) 
Observations         2,188   
R-squared 0.701   
Notes: Sample contains property-months with at least one reservation night and 
is restricted to observations occurring prior to September 2016. Standard errors 
are clustered at the property level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
3.3 Econometric Models 
We use a DD modeling strategy to examine the effect of the BIWF on the 
vacation rental market. We compare rental transactions in Block Island, the treated group, 
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to other tourist destinations, the control group, before and after construction of the wind 
farm. Control locations are Narragansett, RI, Westerly, RI, and Nantucket, MA. These 
cities are comparable to Block Island in that they are highly desirable summer vacation 
and tourist destinations in Southern New England. Figure 7 shows a map of all four cities 
and the approximate location of the BIWF. Narragansett and Westerly are located on the 
southern coast of mainland Rhode Island, approximately 10 miles from Block Island.34 
Nantucket is located approximately 20 miles off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts 
and, like Block Island, offers a unique island experience to visitors. A standard DD 
equation applied to this context can be written as: 
 
𝑦௜௖௧ = 𝛽ଵ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧)  
                                            + 𝛽ଶ𝐵𝐼௜௖ + 𝛽ଷ𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧ + 𝑋′௜௖௧𝜃 + 𝜀௜௖௧ , (1) 
   
where 𝑦௜௖௧ is the outcome variable for property 𝑖 in city 𝑐 during year-month 𝑡, 𝐵𝐼௜௖ is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a property is in Block Island, and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧  
is a dummy variable that equals one if an observation occurred during the post-
construction period. Although construction of the BIWF was completed on August 18, 
2016, we specify the post-construction period to begin on September 2016 because our 
data are aggregated to the monthly level.35 Property characteristics are contained in 𝑋௜௖௧. 
Finally, 𝜀௜௖௧  is the error term. We cluster errors at the property level to allow correlation 
across time within individual properties. The difference in rental market outcomes 
between Block Island and control groups cities, and between the pre- and post-treatment 
                                                 
34 The BIWF can be seen from a few locations on the southern portion of Narragansett. From these 
locations, however, the turbines appear as an extremely small cluster on the horizon and can be perceived 
only under certain weather and sky conditions.   
35 In the Appendix, we provide results from models that exclude August 2016 from the sample given this 
treatment status uncertainty. These results are very similar to our main results. 
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period, are measured by 𝛽ଶ and 𝛽ଷ, respectively. 𝛽ଵ is the coefficient of interest, and it 
measures the differential change in rental market outcomes from the pre-treatment period 
for Block Island properties relative to changes in rental market outcomes for properties in 
Narragansett, Westerly, and Nantucket. 
 
Equation (1) is a standard DD model, but we chose to strengthen it with several 
sets of fixed-effects and other control variables. First, we include property fixed effects 
that purge from the error term any unobservable time-invariant factors, such as nearby 
amenities and online appeal, that both affect rental market outcomes and differ across 
individual properties. Second, we include year-month fixed effects that capture region-
wide temporal variation in rental activity. Such variation is particularly large in this 
Figure 7. Geographic location of treated and control locations and the BIWF turbines. 
Figure 7. Geographic location of treated and control locations and the BIWF turbines. 
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context because of the highly seasonal nature of the vacation rentals market. Third, we 
include city-specific time trends to control for rental market trends at the city level. These 
variables are critical for disentangling impacts of the BIWF from other potential location-
specific growth trends. After including these variables, our new specification is 
  𝑦௜௖௧ = 𝛽ଵ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧) + 𝑋′௜௖௧𝜃 +  𝛾௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝛿௖𝑡 + 𝜀௜௖௧, (2) 
   
where terms are as described previously with the addition of 𝛼௜, the property fixed-
effects, 𝛾௧, the year-month fixed effects, and 𝛿௖, which estimate the city-specific time 
trends. We find that models which include year-month fixed effects and city-specific time 
trends are, across the five dependent variables, broadly superior in terms model fit and 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) than those that omit one or both of sets of controls; 
Table A4 of the Appendix discusses the results of models that add these control variables 
sequentially.  
All time-invariant property characteristics, including property location, distance to 
the coast, and property type are excluded from estimation due to the inclusion of property 
fixed-effects. Yet for a small portion of properties, listed amenities such as minimum 
length of stay, maximum number of guests, security deposit, cleaning fees, and fees for 
extra people do change over time, and hence we include them in 𝑋௜௖௧.36 If these time-
varying property amenities are endogenous to treatment, however, their inclusion in 
model would violate the basic identification condition 𝐸[𝑋𝜀] = 0 and render OLS 
estimates inconsistent. This is a plausible source of endogeneity for our study, 
considering that landlords in Block Island or elsewhere may have, in response to the 
                                                 
36 Models for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees from the vector of time-varying 
property amenities because these fees are incorporated in the dependent variable.  
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BIWF, sought out additional means to make their properties more attractive—by 
decreasing the minimum length of stay or extra-people fee, for example. To address this 
concern, we first examined properties in the main estimation sample (Table 18) and found 
that only a few properties in Nantucket or Narraganset—no Block Island properties—
varied their amenities over time (Appendix Table A6). Next, we estimated DD models 
like those defined by Equations (3) and (4) below but specified the time-varying property 
amenities as the dependent variable (Appendix Table A7). Although these models reveal 
negative and significant treatment effects for one of the five property amenity variables, 
these effects are driven by a few properties in Nantucket and the coefficient estimates are 
negligible in magnitude. Based on these findings, we take all time-varying property 
characteristic as exogenous to treatment.  
 The treatment effect in Equations (1) and (2) is an average across all months of 
the year. Because most rental market activity occurs during the tourist season,37 we 
hypothesize that treatment effects may be different during this period compared to other 
times of the year. Hence, we specify two models that differentiate treatment effects by 
time of year. In the first, we interact the treatment effect term 𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
with indicator variables for summer and off-summer, where summer is defined as the 
months of June, July, August, and September. The second model is similar, but further 
differentiates peak (July and August) and off-peak (June and September) summer. We 
choose to specify these models such that the full effect of treatment in each season is 
represented by a single coefficient on a triple interaction term. These two models are 
defined below. 
                                                 
37 To see this, Table A5 in the Appendix displays each month’s contribution to the total sample revenue and 
reservation nights that accrued over 2015, 2016, and 2017.  
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   𝑦௜௖௧ = 𝛽ଵ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧ × 𝑂𝑓𝑓_𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟௧) 
         + 𝛽ଶ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧ × 𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟௧) 
         +𝛽ଷ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝑂𝑓𝑓_𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟௧) +  𝛽ସ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟௧)     
         + 𝑋′௜௖௧𝜃 + 𝛾௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝛿௖𝑡 + 𝜀௜௖௧ (3) 
   
 𝑦௜௖௧ = 𝛽ଵ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝑂𝑓𝑓_ 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟௧ × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧)  
         + 𝛽ଶ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔௧ × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧)  
         + 𝛽ଷ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑆𝑒𝑝௧ × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧)  
         +𝛽ସ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝑂𝑓𝑓_ 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟௧) + 𝛽ହ(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔௧)   
         + 𝛽଺(𝐵𝐼௜௖ × 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑆𝑒𝑝௧)+ 𝑋′௜௖௧𝜃 + 𝛾௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝛿௖𝑡 + 𝜀௜௖௧ (4) 
 
3.4 Sample Construction 
The full dataset comprises 1,368 AirBnb rental properties and $39.5 million in 
rental transaction revenue. Omitted from Equations (2), (3), and (4), however, are 630 
properties that are active only during the post-treatment period and 120 properties that are 
active only during the pre-treatment period because for these properties, the within-
property variation in pre- and post-treatment rental market outcomes necessary to identify 
a treatment effect does not exist. We refrain from estimating Equations (2), (3), and (4) 
without property fixed-effects, which would retain these properties in the sample, 
because, as discussed in Section 3.1, corporate representatives from AirBnb seem to have 
successfully persuaded many existing Block Island bed-and-breakfast properties to begin 
using the Airbnb platform during the post-treatment period, and thus we are missing 
important pre-treatment information for these properties. We also examined the 630 
properties active only during the post-treatment period and found significant differences 
in means between treatment groups for almost all housing characteristic variables, 
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including a 45% higher proportion of bed-and-breakfast properties in Block Island. We 
would have additionally liked to examine the extensive margin by looking at new 
entrants into the market. However, given the coincidence of AirBnb’s corporate visit to 
the island, we cannot separate the impact of that event from new entrants due to the wind 
farm. Thus, we focus only on the intensive margin, and leave the extensive for future 
research in a different setting.  
We subsequently remove all bed-and-breakfasts from our sample because the 
outcome variables for these properties may be measured with error. We find an 
abundance of “blocked” property-nights, during both summer and off-summer months, in 
the rental histories of these properties. With near certainty, these properties can be rented 
year-round, so it is likely that some “blocked” nights indicate reservations arranged 
outside of the AirBnb platform.38 If this type of measurement error is correlated with any 
of the independent variables, OLS estimates will biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge 
2013).39 After removing bed-and-breakfasts, we have 590 properties in our sample.  
To improve comparability between treated and control group properties, we 
remove control group properties whose number of bathrooms, number of bedrooms, or 
minimum length of stay are outside the range of values observed for treated group 
properties. These excluded properties have more than six bedrooms, more than five 
bathrooms, or require a minimum stay of more than seven nights. Our final sample 
consists of 558 AirBnb rental properties.  
                                                 
38 Some of these properties in Block Island do use alternative rental platforms as confirmed by members of 
the Block Island Chamber of Commerce who have relationships with these property owners. 
39 The independent variable most likely to be correlated with the measurement error is the treatment group 
indicator, because these types of properties account for a substantially higher proportion of the remaining 
sample properties in Block Island (30%) than in other cities (6%). 
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3.5 Sample Characteristics 
Table 18 assesses the degree of similarity between properties in the treatment and 
control group by displaying pre-treatment means and differences in means between 
groups. Variables are taken as averages across all pre-treatment months in which a 
property had at least one available night or reservation night. Block Island properties 
have fewer available and reservation nights by about 2.5 nights per month than control 
properties. Pre-treatment period monthly revenue is also lower in Block Island by about 
$1,000 per month, which is intuitive given the differences in monthly reservation nights 
and the mean of average booked rates for Block Island properties ($559). Pre-treatment 
occupancy rates and average booked rates are not statistically different between treated 
and control groups.  
The housing characteristic control variables are well-balanced between groups. 
The average Block Island property has three bedrooms and two bathrooms, and requires a 
minimum stay of 3.6 nights, a roughly $500 security deposit, and $15 for each person 
above the maximum number of guests allowed. Twenty percent of properties in each 
treatment group are located within 0.1 miles of the coast. Each treatment group contains 
mostly houses, but apartments constitute a higher, though statistically insignificant, 
proportion of the sample in Block Island than in Narragansett, Westerly, and Nantucket.  
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Table 18. Summary statistics of property characteristics. 
Table 18. Summary statistics of property characteristics. 
 Pre-treatment means (standard deviations)  
Difference 
in means 
Variable Block Island  
Control 
cities   
Available nights 21.19  23.72  -2.53** 
 (7.61)  (6.18)  (1.18) 
Reservation nights 2.85  5.40  -2.55*** 
 (2.54)  (5.22)  (0.96) 
Occupancy rate 0.18  0.23  -0.05 
 (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.04) 
Revenue ($) 1495.83  2506.39  -1010.56* 
 (1452.91)  (3198.00)  (587.68) 
Average booked rate ($) 559.18  554.97  4.20 
 (304.65)  (469.85)  (97.04) 
Bedrooms 2.93  2.85  0.08 
 (1.28)  (1.47)  (0.27) 
Bathrooms 1.95  2.03  -0.08 
 (1.06)  (1.09)  (0.20) 
Within 0.1 miles of coast (1=yes) 0.20  0.20  -0.00 
 (0.41)  (0.40)  (0.08) 
Minimum stay (number of nights) 3.63  3.63  0.00 
 (2.06)  (2.11)  (0.40) 
Maximum number of guests allowed 6.63  6.20  0.44 
 (2.24)  (3.11)  (0.58) 
Security deposit ($) 493.33  422.04  71.29 
 (365.24)  (521.72)  (96.61) 
Extra people fee ($) 13.67  12.79  0.87 
 (31.43)  (34.96)  (6.53) 
House (1=yes) 0.80  0.87  -0.07 
 (0.41)  (0.33)  (0.06) 
Apartment (1=yes) 0.20  0.11  0.09 
 (0.41)  (0.32)  (0.06) 
Observations 30  528  558 
Notes: Property characteristic variables are taken as average values across all pre-treatment 
months in which a property had one or more available or reservation night. For the variable 
Average booked rate, the number of observations across columns is 24, 447, and 471 due to 
some properties having zero rental transactions during the pre-treatment period. Standard 
errors below in parenthesis in the difference in means column. *,**, and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
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3.6 Assumptions 
While the results in Table 18 suggest that treated properties have common support 
along the spectrum of control group properties, the DD estimator relies on two untestable, 
identifying assumptions. First, we must assume that in the absence of treatment, 
differences in outcomes between treatment groups would remain constant over time. 
Support for this “common trends” assumption can be found by visually inspecting 
outcome trends during the pre-treatment period. Because the properties included in the 
sample change over time, instead of graphing raw outcome means, we estimate a version 
of Equation (2) that excludes the interaction term 𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, recover the 
residuals, and calculate differences in residuals between treatment and control.40 Figure 8 
plots these estimated differences with 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 For completeness, Figure A6 in the Appendix displays graphs of raw outcome means between treated 
and control groups.  
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Figure 8 reveals that treated and control groups have similar trends in Reservation 
nights, Occupancy rate, Average booked rate, and Revenue during the pre-treatment 
period.41 For these outcome variables, we find relatively large but statistically 
insignificant differences in some pre-treatment period months, but these differences likely 
reflect the small sample size of the treated group. Figure 8 also shows that differences in 
residuals for Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, Average booked, and Revenue are 
                                                 
41 For the Average booked rate plot, missing values of differences in residuals reflect months in which no 
Block Island properties transacted; missing confidence intervals reflect months in which only one Block 
Island property transacted.    
Figure 8. Pre-treatment trends in dependent variables. Notes: A version of Equation (2) 
that excludes the interaction term 𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is estimated for each 
dependent variable and residuals are calculated. Figures plot differences in residuals 
between treatment and control by month. 95% confidence intervals plotted in gray. 
Vertical red lines indicate the onset of the treatment period. 
Figure 8. Pre-treatment trends in dependent variables. 
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largest—and statistically significant for all but the latter outcome—during the post-
treatment period, which is unobserved in these models. Our DD model specification 
serves to identify the portion of this unobserved variation attributable to the BIWF. The 
one concerning result in Figure 8 is the large and statistically significant deviation in 
Available nights residuals that immediately precedes treatment. One possible explanation 
is that the construction phase of the BIWF rendered Block Island a less attractive tourist 
destination, prompting landlords in Block Island to reduce monthly availability. However, 
this seems unlikely because we see reductions in Available nights during the summer of 
2015, when offshore construction began, for both groups (Appendix Figure A6). 
Alternatively, Block Island landlords may use other rental platforms as their primary 
means of renting out rooms during the summer, resulting in a fewer number of available 
nights during the summer than at other times of the year. This explanation is equally 
questionable because we observe Block Island-specific reductions in available nights 
during the summers of 2015 and 2016, but not in the summer of 2017 (Appendix Figure 
A6). Nonetheless, the treated group’s decrease in monthly availability during the months 
preceding treatment will result in DD estimators that overstate the effect of the BIWF on 
Available nights. 
The second major assumption necessary for casual inference in DD models is the 
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which requires that treatment does not 
affect the outcome of the control group (Rubin 1980). In the context of our study, this 
means we assume that the BIWF had no impact on rental activities in Nantucket, 
Narragansett, or Westerly. However, there are two plausible scenarios that would lead to a 
SUTVA violation. First, tourists may view the control locations as substitutes for Block 
 119 
 
Island. If they are attracted to the BIWF, then they may vacation on Block Island instead 
of their normal destination of Nantucket. Or, if they are repulsed by the BIWF, they may 
do the opposite. This substitution behavior would lead to exaggerated treatment effect 
estimates. A second possibility is that the BIWF is an attractive force even in control 
group cities. This is a concern particularly for Narragansett, as this is one of the main 
ports for ferries to Block Island. Tourists may be more likely to visit Narragansett 
knowing they can take a day-trip to Block Island to see the turbines. This SUTVA 
violation would lead to an underestimate of positive treatment effects. Given that we 
estimate positive treatment effects, the possible SUTVA violations have opposing effects, 
which renders any resulting bias ambiguous. While we cannot verify the SUTVA 
assumption holds, when we estimate models that omit Nantucket or Narragansett, the 
estimates change in the opposite way as would be expected if the hypothesized SUTVA 
violations were true. Thus, we proceed cautiously that the SUTVA holds. 
 
4  Results 
Table 19 presents our main results. Panel A reports estimates from Equation (3), 
and Panel B and Panel C come from Equation (4). All models include property fixed 
effects, property amenity variables that change over time, year-month fixed effects, and 
city-specific time trends.42  
We first discuss the results in Panel A. We find positive and significant summer 
and off-summer treatment effects on Available nights, and the range of point estimates 
imply an increase of between 2.7 and 6 available nights per month for Block Island 
                                                 
42 Results from estimating Equation 2 are displayed in Table A4 in the Online Appendix.   
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properties in response to the BIWF. However, these results are likely overestimates of the 
true effect of treatment on Available nights given the pre-treatment parallel trend issues 
discussed in Section 3.6. The summer treatment effect on Reservation nights is positive 
and statistically significant, and its coefficient indicates a 4.3-night increase in the 
number of reservations for the average Block Island property in each month from June 
through September. The coefficient representing the off-summer treatment effect on 
Occupancy rate is significant at the 10% level of confidence, indicating a seven 
percentage point decrease in occupancy rates for treated properties during off-summer 
months. In contrast, the summer treatment effect on Occupancy rate is positive but 
statistically insignificant. Estimated summer and off-summer treatment effects on 
Average booked rate are positive but insignificant, each with large standards errors.43 
Finally, Panel A shows a significant summer treatment effect on Revenue. The magnitude 
of this coefficient implies that construction of the BIWF induced monthly revenue gains 
of $1,721 for Block Island properties relative to control group properties during the 
following summer months of June, July, August, and September.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 The large standard errors likely reflect the smaller sample size used in these models - we exclude 
property-month observations with zero rental transactions. Further, there is limited residual variation in 
prices remaining after controlling for property-specific factors, as shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
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Table 19. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market. 
Table 19. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market. 
Panel A: Summer and off-summer treatment effects 
 
Available 
nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
   
BI×Post_construction×Off_summer 2.675* -0.164 -0.069* 47.960 -55.881 
 (1.494) (0.809) (0.039) (34.959) (436.147) 
BI×Post_contsruction×Summer 6.010*** 4.312*** 0.083 7.787 1721.120** 
 (1.621) (1.264) (0.052) (47.337) (869.615) 
Observations 10,019 10,019 10,019 4,385 10,019 
R-squared 0.254 0.481 0.512 0.930 0.412 
      
Panel B: Off-summer, peak-summer, and off-peak summer treatment effects 
 
Available 
nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
   
BI×Post_construction×Off_summer 2.065 -0.266 -0.055 32.351 
-32.868 
 (1.582) (0.791) (0.037) (30.877) (378.234) 
BI×Post_construction×July_Aug 7.416*** 7.081*** 0.188*** -18.750 3489.919** 
 (2.280) (1.837) (0.071) (55.573) (1451.393) 
BI×Post_construction×June_Sep 2.519 1.248 0.028 -5.771 75.870 
 (1.766) (1.263) (0.052) (36.469) (798.076) 
Observations 10,019 10,019 10,019 4,385 10,019 
R-squared 0.255 0.482 0.512 0.930 0.413 
      
Panel C: Restricted sample, June through September 
 
Available 
nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
BI×Post_construction×July_Aug 8.935*** 6.010*** 0.131 -10.265 3398.752** 
 (3.001) (2.119) (0.085) (70.513) (1687.622) 
BI×Post_construction×June_Sep 4.339* -0.556 -0.068 -13.724 -550.277 
 (2.262) (1.763) (0.075) (36.679) (989.486) 
Observations 3,923 3,923 3,923 2,649 3,923 
R-squared 0.358 0.505 0.542 0.946 0.490 
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable for the post-construction 
(treatment) period, ‘Summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of June, July, August, and 
September, ‘Off_summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of October through May, ‘July_Aug’ is 
an indicator variable for the months of July and August, and ‘June_Sep’ is an indicator variable for the 
months of June and September. Included in all regressions as controls are minimum stay (number of 
nights), maximum number of guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and cleaning fee ($); 
however, regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as these fees are 
incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects, year-month fixed 
effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and 
clustered at the property level.  *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. 
 
Panel B of Table 19 presents a similar story, but indicates that all treatment effects 
are occurring in the peak tourism months of July and August. For Available nights, the 
treatment effect is 7.416 for July and August, but just 2.519 for June and September. In 
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the Reservation nights and Revenue models, we observe a similar pattern, but the 
treatment effects grow substantially in magnitude for July and August relative to Panel A. 
The magnitude of these coefficients implies that construction of the BIWF caused a 
seven-night increase in the number of nights booked and a $3,490 increase in AirBnb 
revenue in each of July and August for Block Island properties relative to control group 
properties. These effects are considerable, as the seven-night treatment effect on 
Reservation nights represents a roughly 125% increase relative to the average number of 
Reservation nights among Block Island properties during pre-treatment months of July 
and August. This result is somewhat comparable to Parsons and Firestone (2018)’s 
findings that curiosity trips to a first OSWF project at larger beaches (five million visitors 
per year) along the U.S. east coast could lead to a 40% annual increase in beach trips, and 
that at smaller beaches (half a million visitors per year), the potential market for curiosity 
trips could lead to a 400% increases in annual beach trips.  
Panel B also lends evidence to support demand increasing rather than supply-side 
adjustments. By disentangling the effect of treatment during the peak-tourism months of 
July and August from its average effect across all four summer months, the differential 
increase in Available nights over Reservation nights becomes smaller. As a result, and in 
contrast to Panel A, the coefficient representing the treatment effect on Occupancy rate 
during July and August in Panel B is positive and highly significant, indicating a 19 
percentage point increase in occupancy rates during these months for Block Island 
properties, relative to the control group properties. In other months of the year, the effect 
of treatment on Occupancy rate is statistically insignificant. This finding implies that, 
during the peak-tourism months of July and August following construction, the BIWF 
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yielded a disproportionately higher effect on Reservation nights than on Available nights, 
which suggests that treatment-induced changes in Reservation nights are not driven 
purely by treatment-induced changes in Available nights. In other words, this finding is 
evidence that our results are driven by changes in consumer demand, as measured by 
changes in Reservation nights, as opposed to supply-side responses that are reflected by 
changes in Available nights.  
 Because the data generating process may differ between summer and off-summer 
months, the models in Panel C use a sample that is restricted to observations occurring 
from June through September. This sample captures almost 75% of sample Revenue and 
Reservation nights in Panel B. Except for those pertaining to Available nights, estimated 
peak-summer treatment effects in Panel C are attenuated compared to those Panel B, but 
results are broadly consistent between the two panels. Panel C reveals lower but 
comparable peak-summer treatment effects on Reservation nights and Revenue, which is 
further evidence that the effect of treatment is largely confined to the peak summer 
months of July and August. Like in Panels A and B, we see estimate no significant change 
in prices, which bolsters the idea that landlords set prices and stick to them while 
experiencing changes to other margins of the vacation rental market.  
In sum, we broadly see increases in rental activity during July and August and no 
change in other months. This could indicate that rental activity in the months of 
September through June is unresponsive to the BIWF; however, it is more likely a 
byproduct of the sparsity of rental activity during these months relative to July and 
August. Each panel of Table 19 yields similar results, yet treatment effects on 
Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, and Revenue, are most precisely estimated when 
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differentiated between peak-summer (July and August), off-peak summer (June and 
September), and off-summer (October through May) months. Our preferred set of results 
are therefore those in Panel B. 
As stated before, the focus of this paper is tourism and not impacts to permanent 
residents, and one reason for this is the ambiguity of our results applied to permanent 
residents. The positive treatment effects on Revenue could imply welfare gains. However, 
landlords may view the BIWF as a disamenity and decide to stay in their property less 
often and increase its availability on the rental market. If this leads to welfare losses that 
outweigh concurrent AirBnb revenue gains, the net effect on landowners would be 
negative. While this behavior is plausible, results in Figure 8 lend credence to the idea 
that construction of the BIWF had little effect on rental market participation. The figure 
shows that only in the model for Available nights do differences in residuals between 
treated and control group cities remain relatively constant during the post-construction 
period. We view this as additional evidence that our results driven primarily by changes 
in consumer demand. 
 
4.1 Heterogeneity of impacts by property characteristics 
If rental sorting behavior occurs across different segments of the population, there 
may be heterogeneity in the effect of the BIWF that depends on property characteristics. 
In Table 20, we investigate heterogeneity in the effect of treatment across two property 
characteristics: 𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑠, which is the mean-centered number of bedrooms, and 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡, 
which is a dummy variable that equals one if a property is within 0.1 miles of the coast. 
Note that we examine heterogeneity with respect to 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡 not to illuminate the 
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differential effects of treatment with respect to turbine visibility, as we cannot ascertain 
this factor from the data, but rather to discern whether different segments of the vacation 
rental market are more strongly affected by treatment than others. Specifically, properties 
located within 0.1 miles of the coast are, on average across all four cities, 27% more 
expensive than properties located further inland (Table 17), hence these properties are 
likely to accommodate a different segment of the renter population.  
Each column of Table 20 shows results from two models. The models are 
specified by Equation (4), but they also include all two- and three-way interactions 
between the property amenity variable of interest, 𝐵𝐼, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, and the 
seasonal indicator variables that are necessary to identify differential effects of treatment 
by season and property characteristic. These differential effects are measured by 
coefficients on the four-way interactions terms displayed in the table. Because estimated 
𝑂𝑓𝑓_𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 and 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑆𝑒𝑝 treatment effects have been largely insignificant, Table 20 
displays the estimated coefficient on the main and interacted 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔 treatment effect 
only. Other variables are not displayed in Table 20 for ease of exposition. We also report 
under each set of estimates the linear combination of the two coefficients displayed. 
These estimates indicate the effect of treatment for properties with one bedroom above 
the mean or properties on the coast.  
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Table 20. Heterogeneity of BIWF treatment effects by property characteristic. 
 
 Overall, we see little evidence of heterogeneity across property characteristics, but 
with a couple suggestive findings. Differential treatment effects on Available nights, 
Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, and Average booked rate are statistically 
insignificant for each property amenity variable. However, models that disentangle 
treatment effects on Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, and Revenue between properties 
with and above the sample average number of bedrooms yield an interesting result: for 
each outcome variable, the coefficients on (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔 ×
𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑠) is positive and the total effect of treatment on properties having one more 
Table 20. Heterogeneity of BIWF treatment effects by property characteristic.  
Variable Available nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
β1(BI×Post_construction×July_Aug) 5.025** 6.943*** 0.213*** -64.411 2600.966**
 (2.094) (2.130) (0.076) (45.133) (1191.415) 
β2(BI×Post_construction 0.950 0.666 0.057 39.547 1397.293 
        ×July_Aug×Bedrooms) (1.606) (1.331) (0.052) (55.504) (1407.110) 
β1 + β2 5.975*** 7.609*** 0.270*** -24.863 3998.258**
 (2.273) (1.863) (0.069) (81.244) (1869.507) 
β1(BI×Post_construction×July_Aug) 5.959*** 6.898*** 0.199*** -44.627 3102.638* 
 (2.172) (2.126) (0.076) (56.675) (1640.852) 
β2(BI×Post_construction 
         
-3.290 4.213 0.382 -7.015 6381.021**
        ×July_Aug×Coast) (4.371) (4.785) (0.301) (86.818) (2736.047) 
   β1 + β2 2.668 11.110*** 0.581** -51.642 9483.660***
 (3.795) (4.327) (0.292) (69.043) (2200.988) 
Notes: Estimated interaction coefficients from two separate regressions, delineated by horizontal lines, 
are shown in each column. Estimated coefficients on other variables are not displayed, but a full table of 
results is available upon request. ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable 
for the post-construction (treatment) period, ‘July_Aug’ is an indicator variable for the months of July 
and August, ‘Bedrooms’ is the mean-centered number of bedrooms, and ‘Coast’ is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a property is within 0.1 miles of the coast and zero otherwise. Numbers of observations 
across columns are listed in Panel B of Table 4. Included in all regressions as controls are minimum stay 
(number of nights), maximum number of guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and cleaning 
fee ($); however, regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as these fees 
are incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects, year-month 
fixed effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and 
clustered at the property level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. 
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bedroom than the sample average is significant at the 5% level or higher. These results 
imply that properties able to accommodate larger parties are more strongly affected by 
treatment than those able to accommodate smaller parties. They may also be an indication 
that treatment-induced changes in rental market outcomes are not driven purely by 
“curiosity trips” to the wind farm, which we would expect to be composed of smaller 
parties. 
 The coefficient on (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔 × 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡) in the model 
for Revenue implies a significant, $6,381 difference in the effect of treatment between 
properties located within and those located further than 0.1 miles from the coast. 
Additionally, the effect of treatment on Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, and Revenue 
for properties located within 0.1 miles from the coast properties is significant and 
considerably larger in magnitude than its effect on properties located further inland. 
Given these findings and that coastal proximity comes with a substantial rental premium, 
it is possible that the positive treatment impacts estimated by our preferred specification 
are driven largely by behavioral changes occurring among the high-income segment of 
the vacation renter population.  
 
5  Conclusion 
In this study we evaluate the impact of the BIWF on tourism as measured by 
changes in local AirBnb rental market activity. Within a hedonic valuation framework, we 
estimate a series of DD models using scraped AirBnb data. To uncover the full story of 
how the BIWF impacted the local rental market, we estimate each model using multiple 
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dependent variables, each of which derives from a confluence of supply- and demand-
side adjustments.  
We find that the installation of the BIWF acted not as a tourist deterrent, but as 
tourist attractant. Results from our preferred specifications indicate that during each peak-
tourism month of July and August following its construction, the BIWF caused a seven-
night increase in the number of nights reserved, a nineteen percentage point increase in 
occupancy rates, and a $3,490 increase in revenue for AirBnb properties in Block Island 
relative to properties in control group cities.  
While there are no other similar studies with which we can compare results, our 
findings align with several indications of public interest in the BIWF that are outside of 
the vacation rental market. The Block Island Ferry, local for-hire fishing boats, and 
helicopter charters have all capitalized on the BIWF by adding new tours around the wind 
farm. Because its underwater structures act as fish aggregators, the BIWF has created 
new fishing opportunities (ten Brink and Dalton 2018) and thus drawn praise from the 
recreational fishing community (Monti 2018, 2017). One for-hire fishing boat owner was 
pleasantly surprised about the impacts of the BIWF, saying that “the business level 
picked up more than [expected]” and that it “continues to grow” (Maritime Executive 
2018). Representatives from other sectors of the tourism industry in Block Island 
expressed similar sentiments about the BIWF during recent focus group interviews 
(Smith et al. 2018). Another potential indicator of public interest is that information about 
the BIWF is emphasized on the Block Island Times website. Thus, taken within the 
broader context, our results are plausible reflections of wider interest in and economic 
gains from the BIWF.  
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Another factor that may be driving our results is the “warm glow” effect of 
OSWF development. Evidenced in a few recent studies, this effect is unrelated to the 
visibility or ecological impacts of OSWFs; rather, it derives from the positive feelings 
some may experience when supporting a renewable energy source. Parsons and Firestone 
(2018) find that the rationale behind 52% of respondents who indicated that a wind farm 
would improve their beach experience was knowing something good was being done for 
the environment; only 11% of these respondents cited as their rationale the aesthetic 
appeal of the turbines in the horizon. Additionally, the authors find little variation in the 
percentage of respondents who would switch from their current beach to an alternative 
one with an OSWF with respect to the distance of the OSFW from the beach, which is 
also consistent with the “warm glow” effect. Firestone et al. (2018) provide additional 
evidence of the “warm glow” effect after studying determinants of support for the BIWF, 
noting that “the description of the [Block Island] wind turbines that resonated most 
universally among both Block Island and coastal Rhode Island supporters [who had seen 
the turbines] was ‘symbolic of progress towards clean energy’”. Hence, it could be that 
our results are driven partly by increased visitation from individuals who like the feeling 
of supporting a clean energy source, but might not necessarily care about seeing the 
BIWF. 
 Our study is novel and a strong application of revealed preference data, however 
several limitations exist. Because the AirBnb rental property data used to proxy for 
tourism represents one segment of the tourist population, we are unable to capture 
behavioral responses from other important segments, like single-day visitors and those 
who book short-term lodging accommodations through other rental platforms. Research 
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using more comprehensive data is needed to explore whether preferences for the BIWF 
revealed in this study are representative of the tourist population at large. The data is also 
confined to a relatively short, roughly one-year post-construction time horizon. Updating 
our analysis using additional years of data would allow us to ascertain whether BIWF-
related tourism impacts are transient or persistent.  
The overarching objective of this research is to understand the effects of offshore 
wind energy development on tourism. However, because we focus on the BIWF, there are 
several factors that limit the external validity of our results, in the sense that our estimates 
may not apply to future OSWFs. First, our estimates come from the United States’ very 
first OSWF, which may elicit more excitement or interest than subsequent developments. 
Second, future OSWFs in the U.S. will differ from the BIWF in terms of the number of 
turbines, installed capacity, proximity to and visibility from the shoreline and beach, and 
the physical and socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding community. Thus, we 
urge caution when trying to generalize our results to future OSWFs. However, our results 
provide an important data point to the ongoing debate surrounding tourism impacts of 
OSWFs and provide a baseline for future work.  
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APPENDICES 
 
The appendix for this dissertation provides supplemental figures, statistics, and 
results to the main text. 
 
Appendix for Chapter 1 
Table A1 shows estimation results from a panel rank-ordered mixed logit model in 
which observations are weighted by the inverse of predicted response propensity. 
Estimated utility parameters from this model are consistent with those estimated by our 
preferred specification.  
Figure A1 displays an example of the 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail 
survey.  
 
Appendix for Chapter 2 
 Table A2 shows data and their sources used to calculate actual fishery outcomes 
displayed in Table 15.  
 Figure A2 displays raw 2015 VAL data collected by the Connecticut Volunteer 
Angler Survey Program and the Massachusetts Sportfish Data Collection Team (SADC) 
Program. 
 Figure A3 displays length-age conversions based combined data from three 
separate 2015 striped bass age-length keys provided each by the Massachusetts’ Division 
of Marine Fisheries, New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation Division of 
Marine Resources, and Rhode Island’s Division of Fish and Wildlife.  
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Appendix for Chapter 3 
Figure A4 plot the number of new rental market properties in each month as a 
proportion of the number of properties that existed in October 2014 and includes all 
properties in the raw dataset. For reference, 7, 54, 21, and 7 AirBnb properties operated in 
Block Island, Nantucket, Narragansett, and Westerly during October 2014, respectively. 
The figure shows that rental market entrance is generally highest during the summer 
months. Trends are similar across cities until March 2017, when an influx of new AirBnb 
properties enter the Block Island market.  
Figure A5 includes a map depicting the approximate location of sample AirBnb 
properties in Block Island (left) and a visibility map of the waters surrounding Block 
Island, adapted from Griffin et al. (2015) (right). Many sample properties are clustered 
around the main town and beach area on the eastern side of the island, from which the 
BIWF is not visible. The BIWF could be visible from a few, but likely no more six, 
properties located on the southern part of the island.   
Figure A6 shows raw outcome means between treated and control groups using 
the sample of properties included in Table 18 in the main paper. The vertical red line 
marks the treatment date, September 2016.  
Table A4 presents results from estimating Equation (2). The table has three 
columns, which each add covariates to the model. The first column includes property 
fixed effects and property variables that change over time, Column (2) adds year-month 
fixed effects, and Column (3) adds city-specific time trends. The table also has five 
panels, one for each of our dependent variables.  
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The results in Panel A of Table A4 imply that the BIWF lead to a statistically 
significant increase in Available nights for Block Island properties relative to control 
group properties. Estimates of this increase range from about two nights per month in 
Columns (1) and (2), to about five nights per month in Column (3). Within R-squared 
increases only slightly moving from Column (1) to Columns (2) and (3), which suggests 
that there is little within variation in Available nights over time once property fixed 
effects are included in the model. Columns (1) and (3) of Panel B show a significant 
treatment effect on Reservation nights. These coefficients indicate a treatment-induced 
monthly increase of 1.6 booked nights for the average Block Island property compared to 
the average control group property. Panel C indicates small and statistically insignificant 
effects of treatment on Occupancy rate. Panel E shows a positive effect of treatment on 
Revenue, though only statistically significant in the first column. Overall, these results 
suggest a weak increase in tourism due to BIWF.  
Panel D of Table A4 presents results from models with Average booked rate as the 
dependent variable. The estimated coefficients are positive, but imprecisely estimated. 
This is consistent with the overall story of these results indicating a weak increase in 
tourism activity. However, there is another pattern worth discussing. Like the results for 
Available nights but unlike those for the other dependent variables, within R-squared 
increases only slightly with the inclusion of year-month fixed effects, which implies that 
prices do not change much over time, but reservations, occupancy rates, and revenues do. 
This indicates that property fixed effects explain a huge amount of variation in prices and 
there is little within variation remaining. These findings strongly support our use of 
multiple dependent variables to evaluate the effect of the BIWF on the vacation rental 
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market.  
Results in Panels A, B, C, and E Table A4 inform our selection of control 
variables used in the specifications presented in the main paper. In these panels, the 
Column (3) specification is preferred because it yields the highest within R-squared and 
lowest AIC among the three specifications. We therefore include year-month fixed effects 
and city-specific time trends in model specifications presented in the main paper.  
Table A5 shows each month’s contribution to total 2015, 2016, and 2017 Revenue 
and Reservation using the sample of properties from Table 2 in the main paper. This table 
reveals rental market activity to be highly concentrated in the summer months of June, 
July, August, and September; within these months, rental market activity is highest during 
July and August. Findings in this table motivate our exploration of seasonal heterogeneity 
in the effect of treatment.  
Table A6 shows the percent of sample properties in each city whose amenities 
changed over time. The table reveals that a very small proportion of properties in 
Nantucket and Narragansett varied these amenities over the course of the study period. 
No properties in Block Island varied these amenities over the course of the study period.  
Table A7 shows estimation results from DD models akin to Equations (3) and (4) 
in the main paper but that use the time-varying property amenity variables as dependent 
variables. Construction of the BIWF significantly affected one of the five property 
amenity variables, minimum stay, but the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is very 
small. Additionally, there is such little variation in these amenities over the study period 
to be explained by the model that these relationships seem no more than spurious 
correlations. Thus, we take all five property amenities as exogenous to treatment.  
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Table A8 serves as a robustness check to Table 19 in the main paper by specifying 
an alternative treatment date, December 2016, that corresponds to when the BIWF was 
connected to the electrical grid. The results in Table A8 are broadly consistent with Table 
19 results. In Panel A, estimates of the summer and off-summer treatment effect on 
Occupancy rate are statistically significant, unlike in Table 19 where only the latter effect 
is significant. The estimated summer treatment effect on Revenue in Panel A of Table A8 
is smaller compared to Table 19.  
In Panel B of Table A8, treatment effects during July and Augusts on Reservation 
nights and Revenue are attenuated compared to Table 19 estimates. Although the off-
summer treatment effect on Occupancy rate is statistically significant, unlike in Panel B 
of Table 19, the effect does not translate to significant decreases in revenue, as implied by 
estimated coefficient in the Revenue model. Finally, Panel C of Table A8 shows 
exaggerated treatment effect during July and August on Reservation nights, Occupancy 
rate, and Revenue compared to the estimates in Panel C of Table 19. Ultimately, the 
findings in Table A8 support our primary set of results in the main paper. They confirm 
that the BIWF lead to significant increases in reservation nights, occupancy rates, and 
monthly revenue during the peak-tourism months on July and August for Block Island 
properties compared to control group properties.  
Table A9 displays results from DD models that exclude August 2016 observations 
from the sample. These specifications are a robustness check on our main results given 
uncertainty about whether August 2016 is a treated or untreated month. We define the 
treatment period to begin when construction of the BIWF was complete, which occurred 
on August 18, 2016; in the main paper, however, we specify the first treated month as 
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September 2016 because our analysis uses monthly data. Overall, the results in Table A9 
are consistent with those displayed in Table 19. When significant, estimates representing 
the effect of treatment during the peak-tourism months of July and August in Panel B and 
C are approximate in magnitude to those presented in the main paper.  
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Figure A1. 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. 
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. 
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. 
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. 
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. 
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. 
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. 
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. i r   ( ti ).  r r ti l stri  ss l r il s r . 
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. 
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey. 
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Figure A2. Raw VAL data used to generate 2015 striped bass catch-at-length 
distribution. 
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Figure A3. Striped bass length-age conversions based on combined 2015 age-
length keys from NY, MA, and RI by length. 
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Figure A4. New properties in proportion to the number of properties in October 2014. 
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Figure A5. Left: Approximate location of Block Island AirBnb properties, 
plotted in red, included in main estimation sample and the BIWF turbines, 
plotted in white. Right: favorable visibility areas over the 20-year lifetime 
of the BIWF, adapted from Griffin et al. (2015). For all map locations 
(cells), viewer days reflects the sum across all viewers of the number of 
days that each viewer, resident or visitor, can see a turbine at that location. 
Viewing is weighed more heavily for residents than for visitors. 
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Figure A6. Mean outcome trends by treatment group. 
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Table A1. Utility parameter estimates from weighted panel rank-ordered mixed 
logit model.  
Variable Mean Parameters Standard Deviations 
    Small keep   0.233*** 0.966*** 
 0.056 0.061 
    Medium keep   0.278*** 1.168*** 
 0.055 0.058 
    Trophy keep   0.656*** 1.369*** 
 0.075 0.091 
    Small release   0.084***       0.417*** 
 0.021 0.022 
    Medium release   0.127** 0.496*** 
 0.054 0.052 
    Trophy release   0.244*** 0.710*** 
 0.031 0.039 
    Other catch 0.157***  
 0.015  
    Cost -0.017***  
 0.002  
    Opt-out -3.086***  
 0.115  
    Min. 28” -0.121  
 0.081  
    Min. 30” -0.672***  
 0.101  
Num. Observations               1,684  
Num. individuals               447  
Log likelihood              -2475  
McFadden Pseudo R2               0.180  
AIC               4983  
Notes: Observations from each individual are weighted by the inverse of their 
predicted response propensity. 500 Halton draws used to maximize the simulated 
log-likelihood.*,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
of significance, respectively. 
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Table A2. Data and derivation of removals-at-age and mature female removals-at-age numbers and weights.  
 2015 proportions-at-age    2015 removals-at-age 
2015 mature female 
removals-at-age 
Age Harvest1 Releases1 
Weights
-at-age 
(lbs.)1 
Female sex 
proportions-
at-age1 
Proportions 
mature-at-
age for 
females2 
Numbers Pounds Numbers Pounds 
1 0.000 0.000 0.33 0.53 0 54 18 0 0 
2 0.001 0.013 0.64 0.56 0 9,931 6,350 0 0 
3 0.004 0.086 2.03 0.56 0 63,747 129,295 0 0 
4 0.027 0.393 3.51 0.52 0.09 297,105 1,041,458 13,905 48,740 
5 0.136 0.223 5.51 0.57 0.32 253,131 1,395,145 46,171 254,474 
6 0.164 0.078 8.27 0.65 0.45 169,145 1,398,380 49,475 409,026 
7 0.133 0.039 10.05 0.73 0.84 119,766 1,204,018 73,441 738,304 
8 0.135 0.029 12.54 0.81 0.89 114,056 1,430,747 82,223 1,031,425 
9 0.130 0.035 15.37 0.88 1 114,873 1,765,168 101,088 1,553,347 
10 0.110 0.035 16.95 0.92 1 101,555 1,721,718 93,431 1,583,981 
11 0.079 0.030 19.73 0.95 1 76,126 1,502,063 72,319 1,426,960 
12 0.029 0.021 23.24 0.97 1 34,750 807,487 33,708 783,262 
13+ 0.052 0.017 31.13 1 1 48,534 1,510,831 48,534 1,510,831 
Total   1,402,774 13,912,676 614,294 9,340,351 
Notes: 2015 total striped bass recreational harvest and release numbers in MA, RI, and CT was 693,135 and 7,884,877, 
respectively. Removals-at-age numbers calculated as: (total harvest numbers × harvest proportions-at-age) + (total release 
numbers × release proportions-at-age × 0.09). Removals-at-age weight calculated as: removals-at-age numbers × weights-
at-age. Mature female removals-at-age numbers calculated as: removals-at-age numbers × female sex proportions-at-age × 
proportions mature-at-age for females. Mature female removals-at-age weight calculated as: mature female removals-at-
age numbers × weights-at-age.  
1 Sourced from 2016 striped bass stock assessment update.  
2 Sourced from preliminary 2018 stock assessment.  
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Table A3. Simulated fishery outcomes under alternative 2015 policies. 
   ∆ Num. of 
Expected 
Trips (%) 
∆ Total Removals (%) ∆ Female SSB Removals (%) 
Policy        Regulation CV ($M) Num. fish Weight Num. fish Weight 
A1 1 fish ≥ 20” 16.74 1.02 37.62 -4.50 -21.95 -35.59 
B1 1 fish ≥ 24” 11.94 0.75 24.30 0.67 -9.28 -20.49 
C1 1 fish 20-28” 6.49 0.36 29.95 -26.5 -49.53 -68.61 
D1 1 fish 20-36” 12.89 0.77 35.44 -14.04 -32.20 -51.99 
E1 1 fish 28-36” -8.84 -0.58 -7.97 -21.06 -21.15 -34.01 
F1 1 fish 24-32” 12.89 0.77 35.44 -14.04 -32.20 -51.99 
G1 1 fish 24-40” 10.30 0.64 23.27 -4.61 -13.79 -29.74 
H1 1 fish 28-44” -0.76 -0.05 -0.67 -2.82 -1.95 -4.74 
A2 2 fish ≥ 20” 51.16 3.29 114.06 50.03 23.24 1.83 
B2 2 fish 20-28” 32.27 2.06 94.12 6.91 -28.92 -59.09 
C2 2 fish 20-36” 44.31 2.84 108.35 31.66 3.82 -28.44 
D2 1 fish 20-28” & 1 fish > 28” 40.15 2.55 84.05 45.97 29.83 17.82 
E2 1 fish 20-28” & 1 fish > 28-36” 30.41 1.91 72.94 21.12 5.22 -20.70 
F2 2 fish 20-28”; only 1 > 28” 49.89 3.21 112.74 46.32 18.64 -3.70 
G2 2 fish 20-28”; only 1 > 28-36” 43.69 2.80 107.67 30.10 1.66 -30.51 
H2 2 fish ≥ 24” 37.48 2.42 79.87 50.82 38.34 22.09 
I2 2 fish 24-32” 20.40 1.30 62.21 9.30 -9.88 -42.09 
J2 2 fish 24-40” 34.70 2.24 77.33 41.35 30.30 6.23 
K2 1 fish 24-32” & 1 fish > 32” 27.03 1.70 52.76 38.98 31.49 26.37 
L2 1 fish 24-32” & 1 fish > 32-40” 23.44 1.47 48.31 27.05 21.69 7.64 
M2 2 fish 24-32”; only 1 > 32” 36.57 2.36 78.91 47.94 34.91 17.38 
N2 2 fish 24-32”; only 1 > 32-40” 34.03 2.20 76.56 39.30 27.67 2.97 
O2 2 fish ≥ 28” 12.67 0.79 26.14 34.27 37.60 39.61 
P2 2 fish 28-36” -0.40 -0.05 11.21 -0.28 2.43 -13.96 
Q2 2 fish 28-44” 11.46 0.71 24.72 29.59 34.15 32.06 
R2 1 fish 28-36” &  1 fish > 36” 6.08 0.36 11.30 18.78 19.87 25.32 
S2 1 fish, 28-36” &  1 fish > 36-44” 4.84 0.28 9.75 13.98 16.33 17.69 
T2 2 fish 28-36”; only 1 > 36” 12.04 0.75 25.22 32.11 35.40 36.24 
U2 2 fish 28-36”; only 1 > 36-44 10.97 0.68 24.05 27.95 32.41 29.44 
Notes: Actual 2015 policy was one fish ≥ 28” and is used as the baseline policy.     
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Table A4. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market. 
Panel A: Dependent variable is Available nights 
 (1) (2) (3) 
BI×Post_construction 1.866** 2.157*** 5.273*** 
 (0.898) (0.831) (1.436) 
Within R2 0.012 0.073 0.075 
AIC         68,179         67,607         67,598 
Panel B: Dependent variable is Reservation nights 
 (1) (2) (3) 
BI×Post_construction 1.601** 0.896 1.552* 
 (0.649) (0.689) (0.916) 
Within R2 0.006 0.297 0.298 
AIC         67,545          64,140         64,131 
Panel C: Dependent variable is Occupancy rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
BI×Post_construction 0.020 -0.010 -0.023 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.042) 
Within R2 0.005 0.311 0.312 
AIC          2,785          -822          -825 
Panel D: Dependent variable is Average booked rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
BI×Post_construction 49.731 47.639 14.327 
 (49.718) (50.354) (39.455) 
Within R2 0.003 0.070 0.070 
AIC         54,482         54,253          54,255 
Panel E: Dependent variable is Revenue  
 (1) (2) (3) 
BI×Post_construction 745.815** 439.569 388.066 
 (318.160) (330.980) (578.829) 
Within R2 0.002 0.205 0.209 
AIC         199,304         197,105         197,060 
Year-month fixed-effects N Y Y 
City time trends N N Y 
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable for the 
post-construction (treatment) period. In panels A, B, C, and E, the number of 
observations is 10,019. In panel D, the number of observations is 4,385. Included in all 
regressions as controls are minimum stay (number of nights), maximum number of 
guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and cleaning fee ($); however, 
regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as these fees 
are incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects 
and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and clustered at 
the property level.  *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
of significance, respectively. 
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Table A5. Proportion of total 2015, 2016, and 2017 revenue and 
reservation nights, by month. 
Month Revenue (%) Reservation nights (%) 
January 0.4 0.8 
February 0.4 0.8 
March 1.0 1.2 
April 3.2 3.2 
May 7.4 7.6 
June  11.5 12.3 
July 23.6 22.2 
August 25.1 23.8 
September 15.4 14.6 
October 5.5 6.6 
November 2.9 3.1 
December 3.6 3.9 
Notes: Statistics reflect the sample of properties in Table 18 of the 
main paper.  
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Table A6. Percent of properties in estimation sample with changing property amenities, by city.   
Property Amenity Block Island Nantucket Narragansett Westerly 
Maximum number of 
guests 0 0 0.7% 0 
Cleaning fee 0 1.8% 0 0 
Minimum stay 0 4.5% 0 0 
Security deposit 0 1.8% 0 0 
Extra people fee 0 0.3% 0.7% 0 
Notes: Statistics reflect the sample of properties in Table 18 of the main paper. 
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Table A7. The effect of BIWF on rental property amenities.  
Panel A: Summer and off-summer treatment effects 
 
Max. Guests Security Deposit 
Extra 
People Fee 
Minimum 
Stay 
Cleaning 
Fee 
BI×Post_construction 0.002 0.489 0.010 -0.014* -0.005 
    ×Off_summer (0.002) (0.468) (0.034) (0.007) (0.299) 
BI×Post_construction 0.005 0.666 0.071 -0.007 0.233 
    ×Summer (0.005) (0.604) (0.072) (0.005) (0.202) 
   Observations     10,019     10,019     10,019     10,019     10,019 
   R-squared 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.996 0.995 
      
Panel B: Off-summer, peak-summer, and off-peak summer treatment effects 
 
Max. Guests Security Deposit 
Extra 
People Fee 
Minimum 
Stay 
Cleaning 
Fee 
BI×Post_construction 0.002 0.630 0.013 -0.016** -0.008 
    ×Off_summer (0.002) (0.486) (0.036) (0.007) (0.239) 
BI×Post_construction 0.005 1.216 0.040 -0.019** 0.011 
    ×July_Aug (0.006) (1.461) (0.093) (0.009) (0.255) 
BI×Post_construction 0.005 0.615 0.113 -0.003 0.364 
    ×June_Sep (0.005) (0.430) (0.085) (0.005) (0.284) 
Observations     10,019     10,019     10,019     10,019     10,019 
R-squared 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.996 0.995 
      
Panel C: Restricted sample, June through September 
 Max. Guests 
Security 
Deposit 
Extra 
People Fee 
Minimum 
Stay 
Cleaning 
Fee 
BI×Post_construction 0.000 0.701 0.035 -0.012 0.403 
    ×July_Aug   (.) (1.146) (0.038) (0.011) (0.535) 
BI×Post_construction 0.000 0.105 0.032 0.003 0.766 
    ×June_Sep (.) (0.325) (0.035) (0.005) (0.776) 
Observations       3,923       3,923       3,923       3,923       3,923 
R-squared 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.996 
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable for the post-construction 
(treatment) period, ‘Summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of June, July, August, and 
September, ‘Off_summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of October through May, ‘July_Aug’ 
is an indicator variable for the months of July and August, and ‘June_Sep’ is an indicator variable for 
the months of June and September. All regressions include property fixed-effects, year-month fixed 
effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and 
clustered at the property level.  *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. 
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Table A8. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market, treatment date defined by grid connection 
(December 2016).  
Panel A: Summer and off-summer treatment effects 
 
Available 
nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
BI×Post_connection 1.823 -0.924 -0.064** 76.715 -505.499 
    ×Off_summer (1.198) (0.855) (0.032) (70.753) (368.677) 
BI×Post_connection 5.370*** 3.781** 0.101* 37.371 1597.148 
    ×Summer (1.490) (1.548) (0.061) (68.482) (1098.376) 
   Observations      10,516      10,516      10,516      4,579     10,516 
   R-squared 0.251 0.482 0.512 0.932 0.411 
      
Panel B: Off-summer, peak-summer, and off-peak summer treatment effects 
 
Available 
nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
BI×Post_connection 1.858 -0.899 -0.064** 74.875 -492.025 
    ×Off_summer (1.188) (0.871) (0.032) (67.658) (374.737) 
BI×Post_connection 8.926*** 6.362*** 0.150* 25.262 2963.787* 
    ×July_Aug (1.927) (2.000) (0.079) (87.378) (1531.455) 
BI×Post_connection 2.669 1.650 0.054 49.689 428.814 
    ×June_Sep (1.706) (1.470) (0.058) (53.072) (910.412) 
Observations      10,516      10,516      10,516       4,579      10,516 
R-squared 0.254 0.483 0.512 0.933 0.412 
      
Panel C: Restricted sample, June through September 
 
Available 
nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
BI×Post_connection 10.057*** 8.423*** 0.200* 65.910 4733.241** 
    ×July_Aug (3.334) (2.865) (0.115) (115.804) (1972.163) 
BI×Post_connection 4.638 2.819 0.052 82.776 1342.639 
    ×June_Sep (3.240) (2.589) (0.099) (77.701) (1477.465) 
Observations      3,643      3,643      3,643      3,643      3,643 
R-squared 0.338 0.495 0.526 0.944 0.488 
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_connection’ is an indictor variable for the post-electrical grid 
connection (treatment) period, ‘Summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of June, July, August, 
and September, ‘Off_summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of October through May, 
‘July_Aug’ is an indicator variable for the months of July and August, and ‘June_Sep’ is an indicator 
variable for the months of June and September. Included in all regressions as controls are minimum 
stay (number of nights), maximum number of guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and 
cleaning fee ($); however, regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as 
these fees are incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects, year-
month fixed effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in 
parenthesis and clustered at the property level.  *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
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Table A9. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market; sample excludes August 2016 
observations. 
Panel A: Summer and off-summer treatment effects 
 
Available 
nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
BI×Post_construction 1.877 -0.304 -0.061 32.170 -170.384 
    ×Off_summer (1.556) (0.793) (0.038) (34.983) (413.404) 
BI×Post_construction 4.187** 3.328*** 0.071 -19.643 1262.520 
    ×Summer (1.679) (1.235) (0.049) (40.703) (863.465) 
   Observations      9,185      9,185      9,185      3,891      9,185 
   R-squared 0.256 0.490 0.515 0.931 0.432 
      
Panel B: Off-summer, peak-summer, and off-peak summer treatment effects 
 
Available 
nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
BI×Post_construction 1.643 -0.153 -0.045 19.788 -7.080 
    ×Off_summer (1.597) (0.788) (0.037) (32.190) (366.229) 
BI×Post_construction 5.956** 6.514*** 0.186** -47.543 3295.099** 
    ×July_Aug (2.368) (1.926) (0.078) (54.532) (1550.609) 
BI×Post_construction 2.195 1.160 0.021 -21.651 45.473 
    ×June_Sep (1.736) (1.275) (0.052) (38.939) (805.603) 
Observations      9,185      9,185      9,185      3,891      9,185 
R-squared 0.257 0.491 0.516 0.931 0.432 
      
Panel C: Restricted sample, June through September 
 
Available 
nights 
Reservation 
nights 
Occupancy 
rate 
Average 
booked rate Revenue 
BI×Post_construction 8.265** 5.066** 0.099 -37.135 3145.601* 
    ×July_Aug (3.554) (2.328) (0.102) (71.467) (1833.962) 
BI×Post_construction 4.557* -0.750 -0.085 -31.861 -635.360 
    ×June_Sep (2.419) (1.798) (0.078) (40.280) (984.784) 
Observations      3,891      3,891      3,891        2,224      3,891 
R-squared 0.368 0.527 0.561 0.947 0.528 
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable for the post-construction 
(treatment) period, ‘Summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of June, July, August, and 
September, ‘Off_summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of October through May, ‘July_Aug’ 
is an indicator variable for the months of July and August, and ‘June_Sep’ is an indicator variable for 
the months of June and September. Included in all regressions as controls are minimum stay (number of 
nights), maximum number of guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and cleaning fee ($); 
however, regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as these fees are 
incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects, year-month fixed 
effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and 
clustered at the property level.  *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. 
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